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The Long-term Residents Directive (LTR Directive) concerning the status of third-country 
nationals (TCNs) who are long-term residents (LTRs) in the European Union was adopted by 
the Council of the Union in 2003. Given that the Directive was promulgated, inter alia, in order 
to implement the objectives of the Tampere Programme, the Directive’s provisions would be 
expected to be in line with the Programme’s objectives. This thesis is concerned with the 
question of whether the LTR Directive is capable of achieving the objectives set for the Union 
in the Tampere Programme. This thesis is also a plea for the approximation of the rights and 
status of LTRs and EU citizens, as recommended by the Tampere Programme. Although such 
an approximation has been explored in a number of studies, the literature has paid little 
attention to what benefits this might have for the Union. This thesis, therefore, seeks to do this 
by analysing the benefits of the approximation of the rights and status of LTRs to EU citizens 
extension of rights and status of LTRs to EU citizens from the point of view of the Union. 
Analysing the Tampere Programme shows that the Programme intended to enhance the 
integration of LTRs into the EU’s society by giving LTRs rights and obligations comparable 
to the rights and obligations of EU citizens. Nevertheless, the analysis in this thesis 
demonstrates that i) the approach of the LTR Directive to the integration of LTRs into the EU’s 
society is different from what the Tampere Programme recommended; ii) the Directive fails to 
give LTRs rights and obligations comparable to the rights enjoyed by EU citizens, and the 
obligations imposed on them; iii) the status of long-term residence granted to LTRs by the 
Directive is far from EU citizenship. Thus, the LTR Directive is not capable of achieving the 
main objectives of the Tampere Programme with regards to LTRs. In this thesis, it will also be 
illustrated that approximating the rights and status of LTRs to EU citizens will i) enhance the 
integration of LTRs into the EU’s society; ii) contribute to the effective attainment of the EU’s 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Directive 2003/109/EC (LTR Directive) concerning the status of third-country nationals 
(TCNs) who are long-term residents (LTRs) in the European Union (EU) was adopted by the 
Council of the EU (the Council) on 25 November 2003.1 The LTR Directive grants certain 
rights to those TCNs who have resided in a Member State for a period of, at least, five years.2 
The LTR Directive was adopted based, inter alia, on the objectives set by the Member States 
for the Union in the Tampere summit, namely to i) grant TCN residents the rights which are 
comparable to those enjoyed by EU citizens; ii) facilitate the integration of TCN residents 
into the receiving society; iii) approximate the status of TCN residents in the Union to the 
status of citizens of the Union.3 The principle underpinning the LTR Directive is that for the 
first time, domicile generates entitlements to security of residence in the host State, the right 
to equal treatment with nationals of the host State, and the rights to move and reside in a 
second Member State.4 
This thesis is concerned with the capability of the LTR Directive to achieve the above 
objectives set for the Union in the field of EU migration policy in the Tampere summit The 
ultimate aim of this thesis is to examine the capability of the LTR Directive to facilitate the 
integration of LTR into the EU society. Various definitions have been provided for the term 
‘integration’ of migrants into the host society, and different models of integration have been 
recommended. The term will be defined in detail in chapter 2, nevertheless, it is worth it to 
clarify here at the beginning of the thesis what this term means and which method of 
integration I advocate. 
 
1 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. The Directive entered into force on the day of its publication 
in the Official Journal of the European Union.  
2 The scope of the LTR Directive is geographically limited. It does not apply to the UK, Ireland, and Denmark.  
3 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, Brussels. 
4 T Kostakopoulou, ‘Long-Term Resident Third Country Nationals in the European Union: Institutional 
Legacies and Evolving Norms’ in R Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union Law (2004) 318. Host 
State here refers to the Member State which grants the status of long-term residence for the first time to a TCN. 
Second Member State refers to the State to which an LTR moves, after acquiring the status in another Member 
State. 
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The integration of migrants, or ‘the integration of immigrants into the institutional and social 
fabric of receiving societies’,5 does not have a single, clear and comprehensive definition. 
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the integration of migrants in the receiving society is 
the process of facilitating the inclusion of newcomers in the native society, so they can get 
together as the members of the same society.6 This process is a two-way process, with the 
migrants being on the one side, and citizens, residents and the government of the receiving 
society on the other side.  
In this thesis, two methods of integration will be presented, namely, the civic integration 
method, and the inclusion of migrants in the receiving society. The former method utilises 
tests and courses which have their aim to educate the migrants on the history and language of 
the host state. The latter relies on providing a welcoming environment for migrants and 
ensuring that migrants are treated equally with other members of the receiving society. In this 
thesis, it will be demonstrated that it is neither necessary nor justified to adopt the civic 
integration method for TCNs who apply for the status of long-term resident.7 Their 
integration will, rather, be enhanced by adopting the inclusion method of integration. This 
will be discussed further in sections 4, 5, and 6 of chapter 2. 
It should also be pointed out here that the term ‘integration’ in this thesis refers to the 
inclusion of LTRs in the European society, and not just their inclusion in the host Member 
State. 
2. EU and immigration  
It is a generally accepted rule of international law that each state can decide who enters its 
territory, for how long, and under what conditions and limitations.8 Accordingly, each state in 
the world has the exclusive competence to control migration of foreigners (non-nationals) to 
its territory. Anyone who does not hold the nationality of a state may not enter into and reside 
 
5 C Murphy, ‘Immigration, Integartiona and Citizenship in European Union: The Position of Third Country 
Nationals’ 8 Hibernian Law Journal 155, 155. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Immigration, Integration and Employment (Brussels, 
COM (2003) 336) 17; M Jesse, The Civic Citizens of Europe : The Legal Potential for Immigrant Integration in 
the EU, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Brill 2017) 24. 
7 Other categories of migrants are out of the scope of this thesis, thus, it will not be discussed which method of 
integration is more suitable for those migrants.  
8 C Dauvergne, ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ (2004) 67 The Modern Law 
Review 588, 595–6. 
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in that country, unless (s)he holds a right of abode or has been granted a permission to do so 
in a form of visa or a permission to enter at the border.9  
Nevertheless, in respect of EU Member States, this general rule does not apply, at least to 
some extent. Control over the conditions of entry and residence of non-nationals to an EU 
Member State has been significantly overtaken by EU law, in situations involving a Member 
State national. Moreover, even when the migrant is not a Member State national (i.e. (s)he is 
a TCN), the host Member State only has the full power to act and apply its national 
immigration law if there is no EU legislation regulating the conditions of entry and residence 
of the TCN.  
2.1. Control over entry and residence of nationals of other Member States 
The power of EU Member States to control ‘migration’10 of EU nationals to their territories 
has been limited step by step since the creation of the EU.11 Initially, their power to control 
the movement of economically active actors was limited, as this category of Member State 
nationals could freely move between the Member States.12 Then in the early 1990s, all 
nationals of the Member States became exempt from immigration control as a result of the so 
called ‘Residence Directives’13 and the introduction of EU citizenship and its affiliated rights 
for all Member States’ nationals by the Treaty of Maastricht. ‘Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’.14  
EU citizens enjoy, inter alia, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States.15 Border controls between EU Member States have also been abolished,16 
 
9 In addition to the regular forms of entry permission, a person may enter into the territory of a country of which 
(s)he is not a national, in order to seek asylum: The 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 31.  
10 Today, movement of EU citizens is not governed by EU immigration policy, therefore, it may not be referred 
to as migration. 
11 Formerly, the European Communities. In this thesis, the term ‘EU’ will also be used instead of European 
Communities or ‘EC’. 
12 TEEC [1957], Article 39 (ex 48). Initially, since the Communities had a mainly economic aim, only 
economically active Member State nationals enjoyed free movement rights 
13 Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence [1990] OJ L180/26, Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of 
residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ 
L180/28, Directive 93/96/EC on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59. 
14 TFEU, Article 20.  
15 TFEU, Article 21.  
16 As a result of the implementation of the Schengen Acquis into EU law: Council Decision 1999/435/EC, 
[1999] OJL176/1. A minimum level of control still exists in a few Member State which either have opted-out of 
the Schengen acquis or have not yet implemented it, but still this control is limited to requiring EU citizens to 
produce a passport or ID card at the entry border. The movement of EU citizens to another Member States may 
not be limited; EU Member States may restrict the entry of an EU citizen to their territory only in very limited, 
circumstances on the grounds of public health, public security and public policy. This will be discussed further 
in chapter 3.   
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and any EU citizen may freely move within the territory of the Union without being subject 
to immigration control.  
Additionally to the right to move and reside in other Member states, EU citizens enjoy a 
general protection in the host State against discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 
within the scope of application of the Treaties.17 This protection against discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality gives the mobile EU citizen an equal opportunity with the host State’s 
nationals in any aspect of life, particularly in access to the labour market.  
In addition to the above primary rights which EU citizens derive from the Treaty, family 
members of an EU citizen who exercises their free movement rights can derive – through the 
EU citizen – the right to join the EU citizen in the host State.18 The right of family members 
to accompany or join their EU citizen family member is laid down in the Treaties, 
nevertheless, EU secondary legislation covers all family members who fall within the 
definition of family members,19 regardless of their nationality. In other words, those, 
including TCNs, who are affiliated with an EU citizen, enjoy the right to move and reside in 
the Member State where their EU citizen family member resides.      
2.2. Control over the migration of TCNs and conditions of their residence 
As we saw, the control of EU Member States on the conditions of entry and residence of EU 
citizens has been gradually, but significantly, curbed by EU law.20 The extent of EU 
competence governing the migration of Member State nationals and TCNs has not developed 
simultaneously. Unlike the domain of movement of Member State nationals in which the EU 
has always had the competence to intervene,21 until recently migration of TCNs had been an 
exclusive Member State competence. Due to this lack of competence, the EU was not 
involved in this field for decades. The involvement of the EU in this field may be divided to 
three main eras: (1) before the Treaty of Maastricht; (2) between the Treaty of Maastricht and 
the Treaty of Amsterdam; (3) after the Treaty of Amsterdam.   
 
17 TFEU, Article 18. 
18 Articles 5, 6, 7, 16 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
19 Directive 2004/38, Article 2(2).  
20 For a more detailed analysis of the impact of EU law on control of Member States on migration of EU citizens 
to their territories, see: A Tryfonidou, ‘The Impact of EU Law on Nationality Laws and Migration Control in the 
EU’s Member States’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 358. 
21 Initially, the competence did not include all Member State nationals, however, the EU’s competence in the 
field of movement of Member State nationals has been gradually expanded. Free movement of persons has 
always been at the core of the European integration project. 
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2.2.1. Before the Treaty of Maastricht, and between Maastricht and 
Amsterdam 
Traditionally, immigration and the treatment of TCNs were considered as sovereignty-
sensitive areas and fell within the exclusive competence of the receiving State. The Member 
States of the Union could enter an agreement with one or more states, either in the Union or 
elsewhere, to collaborate in immigration matters, but this type of collaborations were usually 
ad hoc, informal, and limited. An example for such collaborations is the Schengen 
Convention 1990 (before being implemented into EU law), in which five Contracting States22 
agreed to abolish checks at their common borders, adopt a common visa policy, and set up a 
database to exchange information on the foreigners who may pose a threat to the security of 
the signatory states.23  
The informal intergovernmental cooperation in the field of immigration of TCNs was 
formalised following the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The Treaty of 
Maastricht declared that developing a common policy on the immigration of TCNs, 
particularly the conditions of their entry and residence in the territory of the Member States, 
is of ‘common interest’ to the Union.24 Cooperation in managing migration and adopting 
common immigration policy and visa standards at EU level seemed to be logical and 
inevitable prerequisites for the abolition of internal border controls between the Member 
States, as a TCN once admitted to a Member State could freely move to the others where 
there is no border control between the Member States.25  
The Treaty of Maastricht built the Union on three ‘pillars’ and brought immigration of TCNs 
under Title VI of the ‘third pillar’, namely, Justice and Home Affairs. Actions in matters 
falling within the ‘third pillar’ could take the form of coordination, possibly resulting in 
intergovernmental measures, such as a common position, taking a joint action or adoption of 
a Convention by the Council. Community measures, such as Directives, Decisions or 
Regulations, could also be adopted following a Commission proposal if all the Member 
States unanimously endorsed the proposal. The European Parliament (EP) would only be 
consulted on adopting the intergovernmental measures,26 and the European Court of Justice 
 
22 Belgium, West Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
23 The Schengen Acquis, OJL 239, 22/09/2000 p 0013. 
24 Treaty of Maastricht, Article K1. 
25 As a result of the implementation of the Schengen Acquis to EU law, with the exception of the UK and 
Ireland.  
26 Treaty of Maastricht, Article G. 
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(ECJ) would only have powers as regards Conventions and any Community measures 
adopted in the area of Justice and Home Affairs.27    
After the Treaty of Maastricht, the cooperation between the Member States on the migration 
of TCNs into the EU was strengthened compared to the pre-Maastricht era, however, the 
cooperation under Title VI TEU was still at the ‘intergovernmental’ level rather than the 
‘supranational’ level.28 In other words, the locus of the competence in the policy area was 
still with the Member States and not the EU. The adopted Conventions and Decisions were 
merely instruments of international law and, thus, while they were binding under 
international law, they did not have direct effect and, thus, could not be relied on before 
national courts.29   
The results of the intergovernmental cooperation under the Maastricht regime were rather 
poor, particularly due to the structural deficit of third pillar decision-making.30 The absence 
of the EP in the decision-making process, the lack of clearly defined aims, and the absence of 
judicial supervision resulted in the cooperation which was formed following the Treaty of 
Maastricht becoming ineffective, undemocratic, and inconsistent.31 Instead of developing a 
principled, coherent and integrated policy for controlling migration in line with the Union’s 
interests, this cooperation focused on restricting migration from outside the Union.32 The 
essential parts of a comprehensive common immigration policy - who can enter from outside 
the EU, reside in the Member States and what rights they have under EU law – were missing 
from EU immigration policy.  
 
27 For a more detailed analysis of the function of the ‘third pillar’ see: S Peers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law 
(S Peers and N Rogers eds, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006).  
28 The border between these two levels of institutional cooperation is not clear. Whether cooperation in a policy 
area is intergovernmental or supranational depends on a number of factors. For instance, the right of initiative 
(Member State or Commission); decision-making procedure (unanimous agreement of all Member States or 
their consensus); locus of the competence in the policy area (exclusive to the Member States, shared between 
the EU and Member States, or exclusive to the EU); the nature of the laws adopted in the policy area (soft law or 
hard law); monitoring level by the European Court of Justice (ECJ); the extent to which the European 
Parliament can influence a legislation in the policy area. See Neil Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice (Oxford University Press 2004) 16. 
29 On the concept of direct effect see: P Craig and G de Burca, EU LAw: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2015) 185. 
30 See Report of Justice and Home Affairs Council to the European Council of 11/12 December 1993, 10655/93 
JAI 11; the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 23 February 
1994, COM (94) 23 final.  
31 J Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union. The Development of the Third Pillar (Peter Lang 
1995); D O’Keeffe, ‘The Emergence of a European Immigration Policy’ (1995) 20 ELR 20. 
32 The Dublin Convention 1990 which regulates the asylum claims made to EU Member States is an example.   
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2.2.2. The Treaty of Amsterdam – a new era 
The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in May 1999, was a turning point in the EU’s 
competence on migration of TCNs and its relevant issues. It brought this area of EU law 
within the shared competence of the EU and the Member States, by moving it from the Third 
Pillar to the First Pillar of the EU.33 Unlike the Third Pillar, within which cooperation 
between the Member States was intergovernmental, in the sphere of the First Pillar, the EU 
could promulgate supranational legislation in the field of migration of TCNs.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam set a five-year deadline for the EU to adopt a common policy on 
the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs in the Member States.34 Consequently, the 
status of having a common policy on immigration was changed from a common interest – as 
declared by the Treaty of Maastricht – to a mandate for the EU. 
In addition to requiring the Council to adopt measures defining the conditions of entry and 
residence of TCNs in a Member State, the Amsterdam Treaty required the Council to 
establish an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) in the EU, where TCNs could freely 
move between Member States. Article 73J of the Amsterdam Treaty obliged the EU to 
abolish the internal border controls for TCNs. This, as mentioned before, was inevitable once 
border controls for EU citizens were abolished as one could not distinguish TCNs from EU 
citizens and enforce the controls on TCNs only. Paragraph 4 of Article 73K of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam also required the EU to adopt measures defining the conditions under which 
TCNs who were legally resident in a Member State, might reside and possibly settle in other 
Member States. Setting such an objective for the EU signalled a change in the EU’s attitude 
that the freedom of movement for persons is limited to EU citizens and those TCNs who are 
somehow affiliated to an EU citizen. This could lead to the creation of a new privileged 
group of TCNs under EU law, based on the person’s residence. TCNs would be able to 
directly derive free movement rights from EU law; they would not be required any more to be 
either a family member of an EU citizen, or employee of an EU company or a national of a 
country with association agreement with the EU,35 to be able to move and reside freely across 
 
33 Title IV of TEU was transferred to the Title IV TEC (now TFEU), which received the title of ‘Visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons’ 
34 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 73O.   
35 Article 217 TFEU allows the Union to enter an association agreement with a third country. Such agreements 
provide nationals of that state with certain rights under EU law, particularly the rights of residence and equal 
treatment with EU citizens. A famous example of an agreement between the Union and a third country is the 
EU-Turkey Association Agreement: Council Decision of 23 December 1963 on the conclusion of the 
Agreement establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey OJ 1964 
217/3685. 
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the EU. The changes brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam to EU law indeed constituted a 
significant progress towards the extension of the freedom of movement within the EU to 
TCNs.  
The new objectives defined by the Treaty of Amsterdam for the EU were not limited to 
ensuring the free movement of TCNs in the EU, but also included ensuring protection of the 
rights of TCNs in the second Member State. In other words, the EU was required to adopt 
measures for safeguarding the rights of TCNs in the host Member State. This was an entirely 
new mandate for the Union. 
The structural changes brought to EU migration law by the Amsterdam Treaty enabling the 
EU to adopt supranational laws, and the mandate to ensure the free movement of TCNs and 
the protection of their rights in the host State, envisaged the expansion of EU citizenship to 
TCNs, at least to those TCNs who are regular residents in the Member States. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 5.   
3. The Tampere Programme: ambitious but ambiguous  
The changes that the Treaty of Amsterdam brought to EU law, in terms of the legal basis for 
adopting legislation on the conditions of residence and rights of TCNs in the EU, marked a 
significant progress in the legal status of TCNs, especially resident TCNs. Their position may 
be still far from the legal status of EU citizens, but to give a clear understanding of the impact 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the legal status of TCNs, their position in EU law after the 
Amsterdam Treaty must be evaluated against their position in the pre-Amsterdam era, when 
TCNs were generally excluded from the EU framework governing the free movement of 
persons.36  
However, these changes did not include a comprehensive and coherent strategic plan for the 
EU in achieving the objectives that the Treaty set for the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
solely set the objectives, marked the areas that the EU should get involved in, and gave the 
necessary competence to the EU to do so, but left it entirely to the Council to adopt 
‘appropriate’ measures in order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and 
justice in the EU.37 Further, specific actions were necessary by the European Council to direct 
 
36 Unless they were somehow linked to an EU citizen or EU company or a country with a special agreement 
with the EU.  
37 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 73I . 
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the EU institutions in achieving the aim. Therefore, a few months after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into force the European Council held a special meeting in the city of 
Tampere, Finland, and agreed a five- year plan, known as the Tampere Programme or 
Tampere Agenda.38 The Programme was in the form of a policy guidance highlighting the 
priorities that would define the EU’s actions in the field of Justice and Home Affairs between 
1999 and 2004.39  
3.1. The analysis of the objectives of the Tampere Programme  
The meeting was exclusively dedicated to the new mandate which was set for the EU by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam to create an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU; the 
conclusions of the meeting (the Programme’s objectives) were also in line with this mandate. 
The European Council declared the development of the Union ‘as an area of freedom, 
security and justice by making full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’ as an objective at the very top of the political agenda.40 
The European Council in moving towards ‘a Union of freedom, security and justice’ adopted 
milestones under four main titles:41 
1. Pursuing a common EU asylum and immigration policy: ‘the separate but closely related 
issues of asylum and migration call for the development of a common EU policy to 
include the following elements’. 
2. Establishing a genuine European area of justice: the European Council recognised that ‘in 
a genuine European Area of Justice individuals and businesses should not be prevented or 
discouraged from exercising their rights by the incompatibility or complexity of legal and 
administrative systems in the Member States’. 
3. Developing a union-wide fight against crime: The European Council is deeply committed 
to reinforcing the fight against serious organised and transnational crime. The high level 
of safety in the area of freedom, security and justice presupposes an efficient and 
comprehensive approach in the fight against all forms of crime. A balanced development 
 
38  Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, Brussels. 
39 European commission, Justice and Home affairs Fact Sheet - Tampere Kick-start to the EU’s policy for 
justice and home affairs, <http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20040617/tampere_09_2002_en.pdf>, accessed 12 
October 2014.  
40 The Tampere Programme, paras 2-3.  
41 The scope of this research is narrowed to the examination of Directive 2003/109/EC – which regulates the 
status of long-term residents – from the lens of the Tampere Programme. Therefore, the analysis of the Tampere 
Programme in this chapter will be limited to the part of the Programme which deals with the rights of long-term 
residents. 
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of union-wide measures against crime should be achieved while protecting the freedom 
and legal rights of individuals and economic operators. 
4. Taking stronger external actions in Justice and Home Affairs. 
Among the 62 primary objectives for a plan to make the EU an area of freedom, security and 
justice for everyone, three objectives were exclusively related to the status and treatment of 
third country nationals who reside legally in the EU.42 These objectives are objective, 18, 20, 
and 21. In objective 18, the heads of State defined a mandate for the Union to ensure fair 
treatment of TCN residents in the Union: 
European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally 
on the territory of its Member States.  
Moreover, in the same objective, the European Council recommended adoption of an 
integration policy at the Union level which is based on granting rights to facilitate integration 
– different models of integration of migrants will be discussed further in chapter 2: 
A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in 
economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.43 
The European Council also called for a legal status for TCNs after certain period of residence 
in a Member State: 
The legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of Member 
States' nationals. A person, who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of 
time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be granted 
in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. the right to reside, receive education, and work as an 
employee or self-employed person, as well as the principle of non-discrimination vis à 
vis the citizens of the State of residence.44 
In this objective, the European Council made a particular reference to long-term residents and 
suggested that they should enjoy a set of rights similar to what EU citizens enjoy in the host 
 
42 The focus and scope of other milestones was on TCNs who immigrate to the Union from a third country or 
seek asylum in a Member State.  
43 Tampere Programme, objective 18 
44 ibid, objective 21. 
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State, and the legal status of the former should be approximated to that of the latter. The 
European Council also suggested that the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the 
citizens of the State of residence should be extended to LTRs.45 It drew a parallel between the 
rights of LTRs with those of EU citizens’, as the latter enjoy equality of treatment with the 
nationals of the host State. The Tampere Programme signalled a change in the EU’s approach 
to the treatment of EU TCN residents indicating they should not be treated as second-class 
citizens and that they are entitled to equal treatment, secure residence rights, and the option of 
full citizenship.46 
Creating a legal status for TCNs who are regular residents in the Member States and granting 
them rights similar to those that EU citizens enjoy, could mark a significant improvement in 
their rights and encourage them to move and reside in other Member States. Granting long-
term residents such a legal status and encouraging them to move, is not only in the interest of 
long-term residents, but also in the interest of the EU. The movement of long-term residents 
to the host State and their right to take-up employment there can, also, be beneficial from the 
EU’s perspective: it could contribute to the effective attainment of the EU’s internal market 
objectives, by filling the shortages in the labour market of that Member State.   
In addition to the above objectives which were exclusively related to TCN residents, the 
European Council pointed out in the Tampere Programme that ‘the area of freedom, security 
and justice should be based on the principles of transparency and democratic control’ and an 
open dialogue should be developed with civil society on the aims and principles of this area. 
From this statement, it could be understood that a possible feature of the rights that the 
Tampere Programme intended to grant long-term residents would at least include the political 
right that any member of a democratic society would have: the right to vote, if not the right to 
stand in the elections. Creating an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU would not 
be democratic if those who are living in the area on a long-term basis and thus their lives are 
affected by EU law, do not have the right to vote in the European Parliament elections – a 
point to which we will return in chapter 4 of the thesis.   
The European Council in the Tampere Programme emphasised that the EU freedoms given to 
EU citizens to freely move and reside in any Member State, should be extended to TCNs and 
 
45 S Peers, ‘Implementing Equality ? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country Nationals’ [2004] 
European Law Review 1. Page 21.  
46 K Groenendijk, ‘Security of Residence and Access to Free Movement for Settled Third Country Nationals 
under Community Law’ in E Guild and C Harlow (eds), Implementing Amsterdam (Hart Publishing 2001) 226. 
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the EU should become an area of freedom, security and justice for everyone who is legally in 
the territory of the EU.47  Setting such an objective for the EU in the domain of Justice and 
Home Affairs was rather revolutionary. It illustrates a significant alteration in the EU’s 
approach for the rights derived from EU law by TCNs. In particular, the European Council in 
the meeting called for the extension of the freedom of movement of persons to all TCNs who 
are already admitted to an EU Member State. Given that, until then it was only EU citizens, 
TCNs related to EU citizens, and nationals of those countries with special agreements with 
the EU that could enjoy such rights under EU law, the extension of the free movement rights 
to all TCNs in the EU territory seemed to be a necessary element of a genuine area of 
freedom, security and justice for everyone.  
One might say that such extension had already been enacted via the Schengen acquis. Others 
might say that the inclusion of TCNs in the freedom of movement was inevitable; when there 
is no border control between the Member States, it is not practically possible to distinguish 
TCNs from EU citizens and restrict the movement of TCNs only. Once they are in the EU, 
they may move to the other Member States.48 However, controlling TCNs who move to 
another Member State for a short time, for instance when they visit as a tourist, may be 
impractical, but controlling those TCNs who move for the purpose of work, study or simply 
residence, does not seem to be impossible. Without a recognised legal status in the receiving 
Member State, a TCN may not undertake employment or enrol in a course of study. Their 
access to accommodation and basic services may also be limited. Therefore, the possibility to 
move did not seem to be sufficient for TCNs to move and reside for a long time in a Member 
State other the one to which they were already admitted. The movement of TCN residents 
within the Union will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
The European Council in the Tampere Programme reiterated the Amsterdam Treaty aims, 
however, it adopted a more liberal approach. As discussed earlier, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
did not prohibit discrimination against TCNs (including long-term residents) based on their 
nationality, while the Tampere Programme prescribed the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and aimed at making the EU an area of freedom, security and justice 
 
47 Tampere Programme, para 2.  
48 Except those EU Member States which are not participating in the Schengen acquis.  
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for all, whatever is their nationality. The Tampere Programme was premised on the principle 
of equality under EU law regardless of nationality.49  
As Anderson and Apap suggest, ‘good policy-making in Justice and Home Affairs requires 
that decision-makers are given a clear mandate and that those agencies charged with policy 
implementation are well managed’.50 In this regard, the Tampere Programme seemed to meet 
these ‘requirements’. It set a clear mandate for the EU, fixed a clear deadline and listed the 
tasks for the organisations in charge. The Commission was invited to closely cooperate with 
the European Council and the European Parliament in the full and immediate implementation 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, propose measures after considering the possibilities for the 
Treaty’s implementation, and report the progress of the implementation to the European 
Council and the European Parliament. The European Council in the Programme also defined 
obligations for itself: placing and maintaining the establishment of an AFSJ in the EU at the 
very top of the political agenda, considering and adopting the proposed measures by the 
Commission, and keeping the progress made towards the adopted measures for meeting the 
Amsterdam Treaty’s deadlines under constant review. 
However, the terms used in the objectives of the Tampere Programme on the legal status of 
long-term residents were ambiguous. First, the terms ‘comparable’ and ‘as near as possible’ 
were not clear. The Programme did not provide any clarification on the extent to which the 
rights of long-term residents should be approximated to those of EU citizens. As a result, ‘as 
near as possible’ might be interpreted widely. It may be in favour of long-term residents as 
the ambiguity would enable the ECJ and national courts to interpret the provisions in favour 
of long-term residents. On the other hand, the Member States could have different and 
restrictive interpretations of this term. Secondly, no definition for ‘fair treatment’ exists in 
EU law. It might be even fair to treat TCNs completely differently from EU citizens as the 
legal status of the two are different under EU law. It has been established by the ECJ that 
being in a different legal position, could justify different rights and treatments.51 Holding a 
legal status ‘as near as’ the legal status of EU citizens still puts long-term residents in a 
different legal position from the EU citizens and could justify different treatment for these 
two groups under EU law.  
 
49 Peers, ‘Implementing Equality ? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country Nationals’ (n 45). 
50 M Anderson and J Apap, Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice in an Enlarged European 
Union (CEPS 2002). 
51 Case C-148/02 Avello v Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613. 
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It can be argued that policy guidance is expected to give clear directions rather than creating 
new ambiguities.  A policy guidance should set clear steps for the Union and its Member 
States and should not be vague itself. On the other hand, first, the Tampere Programme was a 
political guideline rather than an instrument imposing legal obligations.52 It might be 
unnecessary for a political document to define the legal terms precisely. The Programme was 
expected to just set the direction for the Union and although the terms of the document appear 
to be vague and unclear, the direction set by the Programme was clear, i.e. enhancing the 
integration of TCN residents in the Union by approximating their rights to what Union 
citizens enjoy. Secondly, these ambiguities in the objectives of the Programme could bring 
adequate flexibility to the legal framework the Programme created, which would make it 
more dynamic. 
Another weakness of the Tampere Programme, which was rooted in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, was the geographical limitation of the Programme. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
extended the opt-out Protocol of the UK, Ireland and Denmark from the domain of JHA; 
these countries were not obliged to participate in reaching the Programme’s milestones.53 
This means that these Member States continued to enjoy an a la carte menu of European 
project of JHA,54 which would be a clear obstacle to creating an ‘EU-wide’ immigration 
policy. The impact of these weaknesses will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
4. The existing literature on the LTR Directive  
The LTR Directive has been the subject of a number of studies.55 The scholarly work around 
the Directive has generally emphasised the importance of extending the rights granted to EU 
 
52 Tampere Programme, para 9 
53 TEU, Protocol 19.  
54 For a detailed analysis of opt-outs from the JHA S Peers, ‘In a World of Their Own? Justice and Home 
Affairs Opt-Outs and the Treaty of Lisbon’ 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 383. 
55 Sergio Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? (1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 171–196; Peers, EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (n 27) 615–660; D Acosta, The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary 
Form of EU Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011); L Halleskov, ‘The Long-Term Residents Directive: 
A Fulfilment of the Tampere Objective of Near-Equality?’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law 
181; A Skordas, ‘Immigration and the Market: The Long-Term Residents Directive’ (2006) 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 201; T Kostakopoulou, ‘Long-Term Resident Third Country Nationals in the 
European Union: Institutional Legacies and Evolving Norms’ in R Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European 
Union Law (2004) 318; Peers, ‘Implementing Equality ? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country 
Nationals’ (n 45); K Groenendijk, E Guild and R Barzilay, The Legal Status of Third Country Nationals Who 
Are Long-Term Residents in a Member State of the European Union (University of Nijmegen 2001); D Acosta, 
‘Civic Citizenship Reintroduced? The Long-Term Residence Directive as a Post-National Form of Membership’ 
(2015) 21 European Law Journal 200; MA Becker, ‘Managing Diversity in the European Union: Inclusive 
European Citizenship and Third-Country Nationals’ (2004) 1 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal. 
15 
citizens to all those who are regularly and lawfully residents of the EU.56 Moreover, it has 
been suggested that promoting free movement of LTRs may contribute to the effective 
attainment of the cardinal economic EU objective, that of creating an internal market.57  
There are scholars  who have criticised the Directive for not genuinely granting LTRs the 
rights they should enjoy as regular residents in the EU, such as the right to move freely 
between Member States, or enjoying equal treatment with migrant EU nationals in the host 
State.58 On the other hand, there is a study – by Acosta - suggesting the LTR Directive has 
had a significant impact on the development of the concept of EU civic citizenship.59 The 
author, for instance, argues that the Directive creates a privileged category of TCNs and by 
giving them direct access to rights similar to those attached to EU citizenship, it has 
potentially created a subsidiary form of EU citizenship for TCNs.60 The study also concludes 
that this subsidiary form of EU citizenship has the potential to escape Member States’ direct 
control on access to rights under EU law.61  
Despite the number of books and journal articles on the LTR Directive, which in some cases 
significantly contradict each other, there are some gaps that this thesis intends to fill. The 
existing literature on the LTR Directive has generally considered the Directive from the 
perspective of its beneficiaries (LTRs), and not from the perspective of its creator (the 
Union). This thesis, therefore, mainly focuses on the benefits the extension of rights of EU 
citizens has for the Union. Moreover, it is yet to be investigated to what extent the provisions 
of the LTR Directive are capable of achieving the aims laid down in the Tampere 
Programme. Thus, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
56 For instance: A Wiesbrock, ‘Granting Citizenship-Related Rights to Third-Country Nationals: An Alternative 
to the Full Extension of European Union Citizenship?’ (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 63; 
Becker (n 55); M Bell, ‘Civic Citizenship and Migrant Integration’ (2007) 13 European Public Law 311. 
57 Skordas (n 55); Peers, ‘Implementing Equality ? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country 
Nationals’ (n 45). 
58 See for example: S Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Non-EU Nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the Status 
of Third-Country Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents: Five Paces Forward and Possibly Three’ [2005] 
Common Market Law Review 1011; A Bocker and T Strik, ‘Language and Knowledge Tests for Permanent 
Residence Rights: Help or Hinderance for Integration?’ (2011) 13 European Journal of Migration and Law 157; 
Skordas (n 55). 
59 D Acosta, The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2011). 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid 227. 
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5. Hypothesis, aims, and the questions at stake 
The provisions of the LTR Directive would be expected to be in line with the objectives of 
the Tampere Programme. First, because the Directive was adopted during the time that the 
Programme was in place - 1999 to 2004 - and any action in the project of creating AFSJ in 
the EU was supposed to be in line with the objectives of the Programme as the policy 
guidance for the project. Secondly, according to the preamble to the LTR Directive, one of 
the purposes of the Directive was achieving the objective of the Programme to approximate 
the rights of TCN long-term residents to the rights of EU citizens.62 However, there is 
evidence suggesting that the Directive has failed to fulfil the Programme’s objectives.63 For 
instance, it did not create a genuine legal status for LTRs comparable to the status of EU 
citizens as required by the Programme. The level of this gap between the initial plan (the 
Programme) and the final product (the Directive), and the reason(s) behind this gap, have not 
been explored in detail, and therefore this thesis seeks to do this. 
As observed by Carrera, during negotiations on the text of the LTR Directive, the 
amendments made by the Member States to the proposal, changed the role of integration 
from ‘the premises advocated at Tampere’ toward ‘a more restrictive tone’.64 The inclusive 
rights-based approach to integration in the Tampere Programme,65 was replaced by an 
exclusionary conditions-based approach in the LTR Directive. The Member States managed 
to, first, protect pre-existing norms of national legislation, and secondly, introduce plenty of 
derogations and custom-made exceptions.66 The hypothesis underlying this study is that there 
are fundamental differences between the LTR Directive’s approach to the integration of TCN 
residents and the approach adopted in the Tampere Programme. These differences seem to 
have caused the LTR Directive to become incapable of achieving the Programmes’ 
objectives.   
Two main questions that this this thesis seeks to answer are:  
 
62 Commission proposal for Directive on the status of long-term resident third-country national, COM (2001) 
127, 13 March 2001. 
63 D Kochenov and M van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union : Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights 
of Third-Country Nationals in the EU’, Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff 2015). 
64 Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? (n 55) 6. 
65 S Morano-Foadi and M Malena (eds), Integration for Third-Country Nationals in the European Union (1st 
edn, Edward Elgar 2012) 62. 
66 M Jesse, ‘The Value of “Integration” in European Law-The Implications of the Förster Case on Legal 
Assessment of Integration Conditions for Third-Country Nationals’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 172, 183. 
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1. To what extent are the provisions of the LTR Directive are capable to achieve the 
objectives of the Tampere Programme?  
2. Why is it in the Union’s interest to follow the approach recommended by the Member 
States in the Tampere Programme and enhance the integration of LTRs into the 
receiving society by giving LTRs the rights and obligation of EU citizens? 
A number of sub-questions that should be answered in order to have clearer answers for the 
two above main research questions are as follows: 
1. Is the LTR Directive capable of establishing a common approach by the Member 
States to the integration of TCN residents? 
2. To what extent are the provisions of the LTR Directive capable of giving LTRs rights 
and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens? 
3. Why is it in the Union’s interest to extend the right to vote of EU citizens to LTRs? 
4. To what extent does the LTR Directive approximate the legal status of TCN residents 
to that of EU citizens? And, why is it in the Union’s interest to approximate the status 
of LTRs to the status of EU citizens? 
5. In the light of the Tampere Programme and the mandate of the Amsterdam Treaty to 
make the Union an area of freedom, security and justice for everyone, is it justified or 
necessary to treat those who have the status of EU citizenship and those who do not 
have the status but have the status of EU permanent resident differently? 
The research focuses on those objectives of the Programme which were related to the legal 
status of long-term residence. Moreover, I will not make any comment on the treatment of 
LTRs in matters which are outside the scope of EU law, though that would be desirable, 
however, ‘purely internal matters’ are not the subject of this thesis.  
The originality of this thesis lies in the point of view from which it examines the rights of 
LTRs. It examines LTRs rights from the point of view of the Union, rather than from the 
point of view of LTRs themselves. The other distinctive feature of this thesis is the lens from 
which it examines the status and rights of LTRs. The objectives of the Tampere Programme, 
mainly the enhancement of non-EU citizens’ integration by granting rights and status as near 
as possible to EU citizens are the yardsticks for this examination. The objectives of the 
Programme play the role of initial plan for the Directive. The provisions of the Directive are 
compared with the initial plan, to examine the extent to which the Directive is in line with the 
initial plan and capable to achieve the objectives of the plan. 
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6. Structure, methodology 
This thesis is composed of the following 6 chapters. Chapter 1, which provides a background 
to the thesis and analyses the Tampere Programme’s objectives. It also outlines the research 
questions, key terms and methodology. Chapter 2 will focus on the integration of LTRs into 
the receiving society. Those objectives of the Tampere Programme which are particularly 
relevant to the integration of LTRs into the receiving society (particularly at EU level) will be 
analysed and compared with the provisions of the LTR Directive, in order to answer the 
following questions: i) to what extent are the provisions of the Directive capable to further 
the integration objectives of the Programme (EU’s policy guidance in the area of JHA when 
the Directive was adopted)? 2) does the LTR Directive follows the same approach to 
integration as adopted in the Tampere Programme? 
Chapters 3 and 4 will focus on objectives 18 and 21 of the Tampere Programme, which called 
for granting LTRs rights which are ‘comparable’ and ‘as near as possible’ to what EU 
citizens enjoy. In these chapters, the core rights of EU citizens, and what the LTR Directive 
bestows on LTRs, will be analysed. The first set of core rights of EU citizens (free movement 
within the Union, residence in any Member State, and equal treatment with the host State 
nationals), will be the subject of chapter 3, and the second set of EU citizens’ core rights 
(political rights) will be the subject of chapter 4.67 
Chapter 5 will focus on the Tampere objective to ‘approximate the status of TCN residents to 
EU citizenship’. This chapter will also deal with that part of the literature which consider the 
status of long-term resident as a subsidiary form of EU citizenship. Concluding observations 
are set out in chapter 6. This chapter will provide possible solutions to correct the deviation 
of the LTR from the initial plan set out in the Tampere Programme. 
As regards methodology, this thesis follows an inter-disciplinary approach. It focuses on EU 
law, while using academic sociology sources, particularly on the integration of migrants into 
the receiving society, as well as political documents such as the Tampere Programme.
 
67 The core rights of EU citizens are those listed in the citizenship provisions of the Treaty, in part two, entitled 
Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the Union. 
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Chapter 2 - Directive 2003/109: help or hindrance for LTRs’ integration? 
1. Introduction 
This chapter intends to assess the extent to which the approach to integration adopted in the 
2003 Long-term Residents Directive (LTR Directive),1 first, is in line with the Tampere 
Programme objectives in general,2 and secondly, is capable of achieving the Programme’s 
main objective, namely, facilitating the integration of long-term residents (LTRs). The 
Programme was the EU’s overarching immigration policy at the time the Directive was 
adopted; nevertheless, it seems that the mandatory character of the integration conditions 
included in the Directive caused a deviation of the Directive from the Tampere objectives. 
The new approach to integration adopted in the Directive appears to be not as constructive 
and effective as the approach used in Tampere. The former appears to be civic integration and 
condition-based, and the latter seems to be inclusive and right-based. 
The scholarly work on the integration measures of the LTR Directive has mainly criticised 
the Directive for not genuinely granting LTRs free movement rights and equal treatment in 
the host State, and for failing to promote integration.3 This chapter will contribute to the 
existing literature by examining the deviation of the Directive from the initial plan (the 
Tampere Programme), in terms of facilitating the integration of LTRs.  
The structure of the chapter will be as follows. First, the concept of integration of migrants 
will be explained, followed by an analysis of different approaches to the integration of 
migrants. Secondly, the evolution of the integration and immigration policies of the Union 
with regards to TCN residents will be reviewed, particularly, the changes in the EU’s 
competence in the fields of migration and the treatment of migrant residents. Thirdly, the 
Tampere Programme will be analysed, and those objectives of the Programme which are 
particularly relevant to the integration of LTRs in the EU’s society will be identified and 
compared with the Directive, in order to benchmark the extent to which the Directive is in 
line with the objectives of the Programme with regards to the integration of TCN residents. 
 
1 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. 
2 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, Brussels 
3 S Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Non-EU Nationals and Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents: Five Paces Forward and Possibly Three’ [2005] Common Market 
Law Review 1011, 1023; W Maas, ‘Migrants, States, and EU Citizenship’s Unfulfilled Promise’ (2008) 12 
Citizenship Studies 583. 
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Finally, having concluded that the provisions of the LTR Directive are not capable of 
achieving those objectives of the Tampere Programme with regards to the integration of TCN 
residents in the receiving society, I will discuss why the approach to integration 
recommended in the Tampere Programme was more effective, and that the Union should 
follow that approach. A number of reasons to support this claim will be discussed in section 
6. For instance, it will be argued that TCN residents not only reside in the society of the host 
State, but they are also part of the society of the Union; the Union should do its part in 
creating a link between LTRs and the Union. It is in the EU’s interest to protect the 
effectiveness of its immigration policy by limiting the use of disproportionate and 
discretionary integration conditions for the applicant of an EU legal status. 
Moreover, any LTR may become an EU citizen by acquiring nationality of their host State. It 
is in the EU’s interest to start the process of inclusion (e.g. the sense of belonging to the 
Union) of LTRs in the EU’s society as soon as possible (e.g. once a TCN becomes a long-
term resident in the Union). By the time they become EU citizens, it may be too late for 
starting that process.  
Thirdly, the enhancement of TCN residents’ integration into the Union society has social and 
economic benefits for the Union.  
Lastly, in the EU immigration policies adopted after Tampere, the Member States keep 
defining priorities similar to those of the Tampere Programme. The objectives being repeated 
for almost two decades now, show that the LTR Directive and similar pieces of legislation 
that have been adopted, concerning, inter alia, the integration of TCN residents, have failed to 
address the issue and this matter is still on the priority list of EU immigration policy. 
2. The Concept of Integration  
The integration of migrants, or ‘the integration of immigrants into the institutional and social 
fabric of receiving societies’,4 does not have a single, clear and comprehensive definition. In 
the words of Murphy ‘integration is a chaotic concept: a word used by many but understood 
differently by most’.5 The concept has been described as ‘the process of economic mobility 
 
4  C Murphy, ‘Immigration, Integartiona and Citizenship in European Union: The Position of Third Country 
Nationals’ 8 Hibernian Law Journal 155, 155. 
5 C Murphy, Immigration, Integration and the Law : The Intersection of Domestic, EU and International Legal 
Regimes (Ashgate 2013) 11. 
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and the social inclusion of newcomers’.6 Moritz Jesse provides a similar definition: 
‘integration in the context of immigration means nothing more than the inclusion of 
immigrants into the receiving societies’.7 Jesse defines the integration of migrants in very 
simple terms as dealing ‘with the question how to organise, administer, and include 
newcomers into an existing group, which forms the receiving society’.8  
What is shared between all these definitions is that integration is a two-sided process – the 
migrants, on the one side, and the receiving society, on the other side. Thus, the two-sided 
nature of integration should be considered in any integration policy, taking into account that 
both sides have an interest to protect and both sides are part of the process of integration and 
hence they have a responsibility in the process. As a result, an effective integration policy 
must facilitate newcomers and the native society to get together as the members of the same 
society, in a mutually respectful and fruitful way, by which the interests of both sides are 
protected. 9 However, as will be explained below, states adopt different models and 
approaches to the integration of migrants into the receiving society. 
2.1. Models of integration 
2.1.1. First model of integration: Civic Integration 
The first model of integration is built on conditions, tests, and formal integration 
trajectories.10 Migrants are required to meet certain conditions to earn certain rights. The 
migrants will usually be denied those rights until they satisfy the conditions specified by 
law.11 Several problems can be identified in this model of integration.  
First, in this model of integration, rights are the prize for integration, rather than rights being 
a tool for integration.12 Those states which adopt this model of integration assume that 
integration is a concept which can be taught and tested, and being included and involved in 
the society is not a necessity for the integration of migrants. This method of integration is 
entirely built upon satisfying certain integration conditions such as multiple-choice questions. 
 
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Immigration, Integration and Employment (Brussels, 
COM (2003) 336) 17. 
7 M Jesse, The Civic Citizens of Europe : The Legal Potential for Immigrant Integration in the EU, Belgium, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom (Brill 2017) 24. 
8 ibid 14. 
9 ibid 25. 
10 ibid 15. 
11 For instance, sitting a multiple-choice test. 
12 S Carrera, ‘Integration of Immigrants in EU Law and Policy: Challenges to Rule of Law, Exceptions to 
Inclusion’ in L Azoulai and K De Vries (eds), EU Migration Law - Legal Complexities and Political Rationales 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 149-186. 
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It ignores other elements of integration,13 such as legal status, rights, equal treatment with the 
host state nationals, and a welcoming society. 
 Jesse argues that civic integration which is achieved by testing, imposing conditions, and 
penalising the failure to comply with the conditions may not contribute to the inclusion of 
migrants, and even will eventually lead to disintegration by fostering intolerance, divisions, 
and fragmentation within society.14  
It is interesting that migrants may even be required to prove that they are integrated into the 
society of a state before their arrival. This means that migrants may need to prove their 
integration into a society in which they have never been.15 Such an approach to the 
integration of migrants into the society is problematic, as it demonstrates that states may use 
integration conditions as part of the process of application for a residence permit, as a way to 
control immigration, rather than to enhance the inclusion of migrants.16 
The second problem with this model of integration is that the focus of civic integration 
method is entirely on law and enforcement. The states which deploy this model of integration 
assume that inclusion of migrants can be ordered and enforced by law. 17 It is, of course, 
correct to say that law is central in the process of integration because law can determine who 
the ‘others’ are by defining who ‘belongs’ in law to the state and its society.18 Nevertheless, 
law, on its own, cannot also create a welcoming society.  
One might argue that obligatory integration conditions such as requiring migrants to learn the 
language of the host state will be beneficial to the migrants themselves. This is logical, as 
first, not being familiar with the local language affects the attitude of locals towards the 
migrants;19 and secondly, language proficiency is likely to improve the migrants’ 
employability, and thus to increase their chance of economic mobility and social inclusion. 
Nevertheless, the logic should not be extended to other life aspects, such as the knowledge of 
 
13 Jesse, (n 7) 15. 
14 ibid. Jesse reaches this conclusion based on the findings of Kostakopoulou in D Kostakopoulou, ‘The 
Anatomy of Civic Integration’ (2010) 73 The Modern Law Review 933. 
15 Wet inburgering in het buitenland (Integration Abroad Act) 2006 (The Netherlands); Loi no 2007 - of 20 
November 2007 (France); Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufenthalts - und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien Europaische 
BGB1. 1, 1970 (Germany 2007). LTRs will never be in such a situation. For further discussion on integration 
requirement before arrival see: K De Vries, Integration at the Border: The Dutch Act on Integration Abroad and 
International Immigration Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013). 
16 Jesse (n 7) 26. 
17 ibid 15. 
18 E Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity (Kluwer Law International 2004) 4. 
19 Jesse (n 7) 17. 
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the society and its values. These are concepts and matters with which migrants will inevitably 
become familiar, if provided with a sufficient opportunity of inclusion; a migrant is not 
needed to be forced to learn about life aspects in a society in which they live. They can learn 
about life aspects in a state in the same way citizens learnt them. Moreover, forcing migrants 
to prove their language proficiency damages the relationship of trust and acceptance between 
the migrants and the receiving society, which can consequently have a negative impact on the 
inclusion of migrants.20   
The third problem with the model of civic integration is the balance of responsibility. The 
migrants are responsible for acquiring integration. It is the migrants who must ensure that 
they satisfy the integration conditions, or they will be denied rights. So this model of 
integration ignores the crucial part of any integration policy identified earlier (i.e. that 
integration is a two-way process, on the one side is the migrant and the other side the state 
and a welcoming society). The balance of responsibility to facilitating/acquiring integration 
will be discussed further in the context of Tampere Programme and the LTR Directive on 
page 33.  
Due to the above problems, I recommend the second model of integration which I now 
discuss in detail.  
2.1.2. Second model of integration: Inclusion 
The second approach to integration of migrants is facilitating the inclusion of migrants into 
the receiving society. This approach to integration has as its point of departure that it is not 
possible to order newcomers to become ‘one of us’; integration is achieved by treating them 
like ‘one of us’. This model of integration focuses on providing migrants with equal 
opportunities with citizens to participate in the host society.21 The wider the range of areas 
available to them to participate, the higher the level of inclusion. This approach to integration 
is built on the notion of being accepted in the society, and accept the rules and values of that 
society.  
Jesse compares the inclusion of migrants in the receiving society with joining a circle of 
friends. A potential member would want to be accepted and respected by the members of the 
group and become a friend amongst friends. This will mostly depend on the circle to open up 
 
20 Jesse (n 7) 17–18. 
21 B Gosh, ‘The Challenge of Integration: A Global Perspective’ in R Süssmuth (ed), Managing Migration: The 
European Union’s Responsibilites Towards Immigration (Gütersloh 2005) 19–20. 
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a bit and make room for the newcomer. Without the willingness of the members, the 
newcomer will never become a member, not even by unilaterally learning the language nor 
by unilaterally adhering to their culture.22 This comparison made by Jesse has some shared 
factors with social cohesion, which has been defined as ‘the willingness of people in a  
society to cooperate with each other in the diversity of collective enterprises  that members of 
a society must do in order to survive and prosper’.23 Putting it differently, social cohesion, or 
willingness of the members of the society to accept and welcome the newcomers is a 
necessity for the inclusion of migrants.  
Of course, an integration policy cannot socially include migrants into the society or force 
members of the society to accept the migrants, nevertheless, it creates the ‘potential for 
inclusion’ of migrants.24 Legislation can reduce the factors of ‘otherness’ and enhance the 
inclusion of individuals into the host society by providing more opportunities for migrants, 
regardless of their nationality, to actively participate equally with other members of that 
society. If the host state legislation provides migrants with the opportunity to participate in 
different aspects of life in its society, and their rights, particularly the right to equality, are 
protected, then there should be no need to require migrants to ‘integrate’ into society.25 
In the next section I provide a brief review of the key developments in the immigration policy 
and integration framework of the Union. The changes of EU law in relation to TCNs has 
already been investigated in a number of studies.26 Thus I intend to shed some light only on 
the key developments in EU immigration policy that led to the adoption of the Tampere 
Programme and, subsequently, the LTR Directive. 
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3. EU integration policy – same goal, two opposite approaches 
Facilitating the integration of migrants through granting rights in the host State has been a 
long tradition in EU law. Since the establishment of the internal market, those Member State 
national workers (and later all nationals) who moved from one Member State to another were 
guaranteed a secure residence status, family reunification and equality rights.27 Both secure 
residence for workers, even after the end of their professional life, and the right to equal 
treatment with nationals, were supported by the EC Treaty provisions and secondary 
legislation complementing them.28 This approach to integration has also been applicable to 
the family members, regardless of nationality, who are also granted access to the labour 
market, to education, and equal treatment with nationals.29 
Moreover, for this category of migrants (EU citizens and their family members), it is assumed 
that residence always results in their integration into the host State, and no further measure is 
necessary to facilitate or test their integration. A secure permanent residence status under EU 
law is automatically acquired by EU citizens after a period of five years of lawful residence 
in the host State.30 Acquiring this secure residence status is not subject to additional 
integration conditions. With regards to EU citizens and their family members (even if they 
are TCNs), residence is the decisive factor for gaining permanent residence in the host State. 
There is also a correlation between the length of residence of EU citizens in the host State, 
and the strength of rights and security of residence in the host State. For instance, the 
derogation grounds which can be used against a mobile EU citizen who has a 10-year history 
of residence in the host State are less – and the severity more – than the grounds which can be 
used against a citizen with only 5 years or a few months residence history.31The longer the 
length of residence, the stronger is the security of residence, which is an essential part of 
integration of migrants into the host State.32  
 
27 M Jesse, ‘The Value of “Integration” in European Law-The Implications of the Förster Case on Legal 
Assessment of Integration Conditions for Third-Country Nationals’ (2011) 17 ELJ 172, 172.        
28 For instance, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), Articles 12 and 39, and Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community, Articles 6,7,8. 
29 Family members’ integration was one of the aims of Regulation 1612/68. The right to free movement and 
residence of Union citizens and their family members are now governed by Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 
492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 
30 Article 16 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77 (the Citizens’ Rights Directive). 
31 ibid, Article 28: public health, public policy and public security before 5 years; after 5 years serious grounds 
of public policy and public security; after 10 years imperative grounds of public security only.   
32 Jesse, (n 7) 
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The EU has for decades followed this inclusive, rights-based, approach to the integration of 
mobile EU citizens. The use of this approach, however, is limited to such citizens and their 
family members. When it comes to the integration of TCN residents who are not family 
members of EU citizens, this unconditional, rights-based, approach changes to a conditional, 
sanction-based approach governed by national legislation which vary from one Member State 
to another.33 Non-EU citizen migrants are often labelled as ‘foreigners’ linked to integration 
problems and crises. Member States usually take for granted that holding nationality of a 
Member State is the criterion for integration, and those not holding nationality of a Member 
State face problems of inclusion, identity, and participation in the host society.34 Each 
Member State also uses its own integration policy according to its understanding from the 
integration of migrants.  
Since the creation of the EU policy framework for migrants’ integration, however, there have 
been attempts to take the treatment of TCN residents to European level. The first attempts for 
taking the treatment of TCN residents to European level can be traced back to 1974 when the 
Commission proposed an Action Programme in favour of TCN Migrant Workers and their 
Families.35 In the Action Programme, the Commission called the imbalance between 
obligations and rights of foreign migrant workers, ‘intolerable’ and ‘dangerous for the 
Community’. It proposed ‘the progressive elimination of all discriminations against them in 
living and working conditions, once … they have been legally admitted to employment in the 
Community’. In this document, the Commission also called for a European-level 
coordination between Member States in adopting ‘policies of assimilation or integration of 
migrant workers and their families’. The Commission named non-discrimination and equal 
treatment as the essential ingredients for inclusion.36 Later, the Commission added two other 
factors to the essential ingredients for the integration of migrants: a welcoming society, and 
recognising that this welcoming society also plays a role in the process of integration.37  
The scope of this Action Programme was limited to living and working conditions (not other 
areas) of TCN workers (i.e. not all TCN residents), nevertheless, the Programme was too 
 
33 Draft Final Synthesis Report of answers received to the Commission questionnaire (MIGRAPOL 9) on 
policies concerning the integration of immigrants, 6th Immigration and Asylum Committee, 7 April 2003, 
MIGRAPOL 21 rev1, DG Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels. 
34 S Carrera, ‘“Integration” as a Process of Inclusion for Migrants? The Case of Long-Term Residents in the 
EU’ (2005) 219 CEPS Working Document 5.  
35 Action programme in favour of migrant workers and their families. COM (74) 2250 final, 14 December 1974, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 3/76.  
36 Jesse, (n 7) 2. 
37 Commission Communication on a Community Immigration Policy, COM 2000 757, 19.  
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advanced for its time. The Member States were not ready to accept such an advanced 
approach to the integration of TCNs – integration through equal rights. The Council took note 
of the Programme in a Resolution;38 however, the Member States repeated their traditional 
position on integration, and emphasised that the inclusive approach to integration is reserved 
for Member State nationals. The Council simply underlined the importance of undertaking 
appropriate consultation on migration polices in relation to third-countries, while it reiterated 
that equal treatment is reserved for Member State nationals. At that time, no further steps 
were taken following the adoption of the above Resolution, apart from a short Directive on 
the education of the children of migrant workers (Member State nationals only).39  
After a decade, in 1985, the Commission in a Communication expressed its objective to 
provide TCN workers and their family members residing in the Community,40 with the same 
protection in the field of social security as Community nationals. The Commission also 
expressed its intention to provide an appropriate framework for a process of information and 
consultation between the Member States and the Commission, in the field of TCN migration 
policies. Moreover, the Commission recommended that the policies of Member States to 
integrate migrants and their families should not focus only on tendencies towards 
discrimination or racism, but also on ‘putting the foreign population on a stable footing’:  
the policies of Member States show the gradual development of a determined policy 
to integrate the immigrant and his family. This policy must not only overcome 
tendencies towards discrimination, even racism at times, among the population of the 
host country. It must also overcome certain obstacles to putting the foreign population 
on a stable footing.41  
Moreover, the Commission recommended that all migrants and their family members acquire 
an adequate knowledge of the language of the host country, while the latter also recognises, 
first, ‘the important role … played by the language and culture of origin in the social 
insertion of immigrant workers and the families, where successful integration depends on the 
interrelationship between the host culture and the culture of origin’; and secondly, 
bilingualism and biculturalism as ‘a necessary instrument in the integration process and a 
source of enrichment for local cultures’. Based on this Communication, the Council adopted 
 
38 Action programme (n 33). 
39 Directive EEC/486/77 - OJL199/32 1977. 
40 Commission Communication, Guidelines for a Community policy on migration, COM (85) 48 final, 7 March 
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a Resolution which confirmed the Commission’s desire to give everyone in the Community, 
‘an equal opportunity of deriving advantages and making a contribution’.42  
The other action taken at the European level in relation to the integration of TCN migrants 
was the November 1991 Commission Communication on Immigration.43 The document 
acknowledged that security of residence is necessary for any successful integration policy.44 
It also argued for granting rights (including equality of treatment) to migrants, and imposing 
the obligation on them ‘to adapt’ to the lifestyle of the host society.45  
Next, was the Treaty of Maastricht which brought a significant change in EU immigration 
policy. It built the Union on three ‘pillars’ and brought immigration of TCNs under Title VI 
of the newly-introduced ‘third pillar’. Actions in matters falling within the ‘third pillar’, 
namely Justice and Home Affairs, comprised coordination, possibly resulting in 
intergovernmental measures, such as a common position, taking a joint action or adopting a 
convention by the Council. Community measures, such as Directives, Decisions and 
Regulations could also be adopted following a Commission proposal if all the Member States 
endorsed the proposal unanimously. The Treaty of Maastricht declared that developing a 
common policy on the immigration of TCNs, particularly the conditions of their entry and 
residence on the territory of the Member States, to be of common interest to the Union. 
After the Treaty of Maastricht, the cooperation between the Member States on the policies 
regarding migration into the EU was strengthened compared to the pre-Maastricht era, 
however, the cooperation under Title VI TEU was still at the ‘intergovernmental’ level rather 
than the ‘supranational’ level.46 The locus of the competence in the policy area was still with 
the Member States and not the EU. The role of the European Parliament and the power of the 
ECJ were also limited.47 The adopted conventions and decisions were ‘soft law’ and not 
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binding on the Member States. Nor did they have direct effect and, thus, could not be relied 
on before national courts. They were merely instruments of international law.  
The results of the intergovernmental cooperation under the Maastricht regime were rather 
poor, particularly due to the structural deficit of third pillar decision-making.48 The absence 
of the European Parliament in the decision-making process, the lack of clearly defined aims 
for the cooperation, and the absence of judicial supervision, meant that the cooperation which 
was formed following the Treaty of Maastricht became ineffective, undemocratic and 
inconsistent.49 Instead of developing a principled, coherent and integrated policy for 
managing migration in line with the Union’s interests and working towards TCN migrant’s 
integration into the EU’s society, this cooperation focused on restricting migration from 
outside the Union.50  
The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in May 1999, was a turning point in the EU’s 
competence on migration and its relevant matters. It brought this area of EU law within the 
shared competence of the EU and the Member States, by moving this policy area from the 
Third Pillar to the First Pillar of the EU.51 Unlike the Third Pillar, within which cooperation 
between the Member States was intergovernmental, in the sphere of the First Pillar, the EU 
could promulgate supranational legislation in the field of migration. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam set a five-year deadline for the EU to adopt a common policy on the conditions of 
entry and residence of TCNs in the Member States.52 Consequently, the status of having a 
common policy on immigration was changed from a common interest to a mandate for the 
EU. 
In addition to requiring the EU to adopt measures defining the conditions of entry and 
residence of TCNs in a Member State, the Amsterdam Treaty instructed the EU to establish 
an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU, where TCNs could freely move between 
the Member States. Article 73J of the Amsterdam Treaty obliged the EU to abolish the 
internal border controls for TCNs. This was in practice inevitable once the border controls for 
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EU citizens were abolished as one could not distinguish TCNs from EU citizens and enforce 
the controls for TCNs only. Paragraph 4 of Article 73K of the Treaty of Amsterdam also 
required the EU to adopt measures defining the conditions under which TCNs who were 
legally resident in a Member State, might reside and possibly settle in the other Member 
States. Until that time, only those who were nationals of an EU Member State, those (either 
Union citizens or TCNs) who were related to a national of a Member State, TCNs linked to 
an EU employer, and TCNs who were nationals of a country with an association agreement 
with the EU, could qualify for intra-EU freedom of movement. The Treaty of Amsterdam, 
nonetheless, introduced a new criterion for qualifying for autonomous freedom of movement 
within the EU: residence rather than nationality. The Amsterdam Treaty recognised that this 
freedom should be extended to TCN residents, whatever their nationality is. The Treaty, thus, 
signalled a change in the EU’s traditional approach, according to which freedom of 
movement for persons should be limited to EU citizens and those TCNs who are somehow 
affiliated to an EU citizen. This could lead to the creation of a new privileged group of TCNs 
under EU law, based on the person’s residence. This category of TCNs – TCN residents – 
would be able to directly derive free movement rights from EU law; they would not be 
required any more to be either a family member of an EU citizen, an employee of an EU 
company or a national of a country with an association agreement with the EU, to be able to 
move and reside freely across the EU. Accordingly, the changes brought by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam indeed constituted a significant progress towards the extension of the freedom of 
movement within the EU to TCNs.  
The new objectives defined by the Treaty of Amsterdam for the EU were not limited to 
ensuring the free movement of TCNs in the EU, but also they included ensuring protection of 
rights for TCNs in the second Member State. In other words, the EU was required to adopt 
measures for safeguarding the rights of TCNs in the host Member State. The structural 
changes brought to EU immigration policy by the Amsterdam Treaty enabling the EU to 
adopt supranational legislation, together with the mandate to ensure the free movement of 
TCNs and the protection of their rights in the host State, provided the basis for the expansion 
of the competence of the EU to the integration of mobile EU citizens to TCN residents. 
Nevertheless, the Amsterdam Treaty was carefully drafted in a way that the provisions 
requiring the EU to ensure the protection of rights of resident TCNs, did not amount to a 
declaration of equality between TCN migrants and EU citizens. The Treaty did not introduce 
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a prohibition of discrimination against resident TCNs on the basis of nationality.53 The 
extension of the free movement rights of EU citizens to TCNs without ensuring their equal 
treatment with other migrants – including migrant EU citizens – would place TCNs in an 
unequal position to migrant EU nationals in terms of employment, access to education and 
recognition of qualifications. This would discourage TCNs from moving from the Member 
State in which they are already resident, to other Member States. Such a limited extension of 
rights in the second Member State meant that the EU’s approach to the integration of TCN 
migrants remained unchanged: rights, particularly the equal treatment with nationals of the 
host State, is reserved for EU citizen migrants.   
The Amsterdam Treaty maintained the unanimity rule for decision making in the field of JHA 
for five years after its coming into force. This meant that until 2004, any decision in this field 
would, still, have to be agreed upon by all of the Member States involved. While this could 
delay a significant improvement in EU immigration policy, and undermine the process of 
shifting immigration matters from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar, it, nonetheless, seemed 
to be sensible. Taking the control from the Member States on such sensitive issues would 
seem to be impossible without accepting a transitional period, so they could adapt themselves 
to the new system provided by the JHA policy area. Refusing to make provision for this 
transitional period could encourage the Member States to completely opt out of the JHA 
policy area.54   
Overall, while the Treaty of Amsterdam endorsed the traditional inequality between TCNs 
and EU citizens, it, at least, brought freedom of movement for TCNs within the EU, within 
the EU Treaty framework. It provided the EU with the competence to adopt legally-binding 
measures harmonising – and probably facilitating – the entry, residence and movement of 
TCNs in the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty did not directly refer to the integration of TCN 
residents thus it was not clear whether the Treaty provides the EU with the legal basis for 
adopting legislation with regards to this matter. The Tampere conclusions, however, clarified 
the situation by providing ‘the political foundation for the launch of a common immigration 
policy and a “vigorous [European] integration policy”’.55 The Programme bridged the gap 
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between a broadly defined aim set by the Amsterdam Treaty and detailed legislation to 
achieve that aim.  
3.1 Overview of the Tampere Programme 
The Tampere Programme outlined a number of general principles that would guide JHA 
policy between 1999 and 2004. For the very first time, a common, multiannual, programme 
with a series of objectives and deadlines was established on policies as sensitive as the 
integration of TCN migrants. One might wonder why a policy guidance which was in place 
over a decade ago might still matter today and would form the core of a PhD thesis in 2018. 
The answer is that the objectives established in Tampere are still on today’s EU agenda: 
Achieving the Europe 2020 objectives of employment, education and social inclusion 
will depend on the capacity of the EU and its Member States to manage migrants’ 
integration, ensuring fair treatment of third-country nationals and granting rights, 
opportunities and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.56 
Hence, the objectives of the Tampere Programme are not outdated aims belonging to the 20th 
century. They are, rather, linked to today’s strategic plan of the Union.  
3.2 Objectives of the agenda 
The Tampere Programme had 62 objectives with two of them being directly related to the 
integration of TCN residents in the Member States. The first relevant objective of the 
Programme is objective number 4 which, inter alia, made the Member States responsible for 
developing a common approach for ensuring the integration of TCN lawful residents into the 
society of the Union: 
A common approach must … be developed to ensure the integration into our societies 
of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union.57 
The second relevant objective is objective 18, which recommended to the Union to ‘ensure 
fair treatment’ of TCN residents in the territory of its Member States. The objective calls for 
a ‘more vigorous’ integration policy which should, first, aim at granting TCN residents rights 
and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens; and secondly, enhance non-
 
56 Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals’, COM 
(2011) 455 final, Brussels. 20 Jul 2011, SEC(2011) 957 final, < https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/immigration/docs/2011_commission_staff_working_paper_on_integra
tion.pdf> last accessed on 6 Dec 2017.  
57 Tampere Programme, paragraph 2. 
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discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and 
xenophobia: 
The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside 
legally on the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy 
should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.58 
Two interesting points in relation to these objectives are (i) the emphasis of the European 
Council on a common approach by the Member States and (ii) that the second model of 
integration, namely, the inclusive, rights-based, model – as identified above in section 2.1.2 – 
was chosen by the European Council for facilitating the integration of TCN residents in the 
Union.  
The Programme was an indication of a change in the approach of the Member States to the 
integration of non-EU citizens. The Tampere Programme ‘stressed equal opportunities and 
equality as key aspects of TCNs’ integration’.59 The traditional approach according which a) 
facilitating the integration through granting rights to enhance the integration of migrants 
works only for EU citizens, and not TCNs; b) the integration of TCN residents is a matter for 
the Member States, seemed to be replaced by a new common approach to the integration of 
TCN residents entailing inclusion of these migrants into the society, providing them with 
equal opportunities and rights with the nationals of the host State, as well as with mobile EU 
citizens. 
The other important point about the Tampere Programme was the balance of responsibility 
which was discussed earlier on page 23. In the Programme, the responsibility of integration 
was not on the shoulders of migrants, but rather on the Member States. The Programme 
expressed that it is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure the integration of TCNs 
into the Union society. As discussed on page 23, civic integration model which impose the 
responsibility on migrants to acquire integration, ignores the crucial part of any integration 
policy identified earlier (i.e. that integration is a two-way process, on the one side is the 
migrant and the other side the state and a welcoming society). 
 
58 Tampere Programme, paragraph 18.  
59  For more on the Race Equality Directive see S Morano-Foadi, ‘Third Country Nationals Versus EU Citizens: 
Discrimination Based on Nationality and the Equality Directives’ [2010] Social Science Research Network 1, 
45. 
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The next key point in the Tampere Programme was that no condition other than lawful 
residence was recommended to be imposed for acquiring rights and obligations comparable 
to those of EU citizens; in other words, under the Programme, a TCN who resides lawfully in 
the territory of the Union, should acquire those rights and obligations without needing to 
satisfy any other conditions. In the context of integration, this would mean that TCN residents 
could become ‘one of us’ by virtue of simply having lawfully resided in the Union. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Programme did not call for harmonisation of 
integration measures across the Union, most likely due to the lack of competence in the 
domain of integration of TCNs. It simply called for the Europeanisation of the integration 
policy, in terms of approach and direction, rather than harmonisation of legislation covering 
TCNs’ integration into the host society.  
Overall, the Tampere Programme seemed to be a clear U-turn in the approach of the Union to 
the integration of TCN residents. The Programme proposed granting TCN residents rights 
and imposing on them obligations comparable to those, respectively, enjoyed by and imposed 
on EU citizens. The Programme was an ‘ambitious political statement towards the 
inclusiveness of migrants’.60 It defined a clear mandate for the Union with regards to the 
integration of TCN residents. An ambitious policy with clear mandates and a clear deadline 
seemed to be the right first step of ‘good policy-making in JHA’.61 However, there seems to 
be a deviation from this policy, at least as regards the adoption of the LTR Directive. In the 
next two sections, I will analyse the Directive, and examine the extent to which the Directive 
is different, both in language and approach, from the Tampere Programme, with regards to 
the integration of TCN residents.  
4. Integration condition of the LTR Directive 
The LTR Directive is one of the main pieces of EU immigration legislation aimed at 
facilitating the integration of TCN migrants. The Directive recognises the integration of 
LTRs as ‘a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective 
of the Community stated in the Treaty’.62 The Directive was a major shift in the Member 
States’ approach to the treatment of TCN residents – a shift from an extreme reluctance to 
 
60  S Carrera, ‘“Integration” as a Process of Inclusion for Migrants? The Case of Long-Term Residents in the 
EU’ (2005) 219 CEPS Working Document 5, 2. 
61 J Apap, ‘Towards Closer Partnerships - Requirements for More Effective JHA Cooperation in an Enlarged 
EU’ (2004) 211 1. 
62 The LTR Directive, Recital 4. 
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accept any change in the treatment of TCNs, to making the fair treatment of TCN residents a 
priority.63 The Directive, therefore, highlighted a change in the priorities of the Union in 
terms of the treatment of TCNs, as measures adopted by the Council until 2003 generally 
aimed at ‘curbing irregular immigration’ from outside the Union.64 The word ‘integration’ is 
explicitly mentioned five times in the Directive: two times in the Preamble and three times in 
the text. The ECJ has also confirmed that the integration of TCNs settled in the EU is the 
main objective of the Directive.65  
In its preamble, the LTR Directive recognises that equality of treatment with EU citizens 
would enhance the integration of LTRs: 
In order to constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of long-term residents 
into society in which they live, long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment 
with citizens of the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters, 
under the relevant conditions defined by this Directive.66 
In the main body of the Directive, however, enjoying this equality of treatment has been 
made dependent on the choices of the national legislators,67 as Member States may require 
TCNs who intend to apply for the status of long-term residence to comply with integration 
conditions imposed by national laws (Article 5.2). These integration conditions which can be 
imposed on applicants as mandatory requirements were initially introduced as ‘integration 
measures’, but during the Council negotiation, they were changed to ‘integration conditions’ 
in order to please specific Member States – Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands – by 
allowing them to protect pre-existing norms of national legislation.68 If it was possible to 
interpret measure as an action by the host State, it is clear that condition is a requirement 
which the TCN must satisfy. The three Member States which inserted a provision on 
integration conditions to the LTR Directive, appear to be concerned that TCN residents are 
unwilling to accept western values, and participate in the society’s life.69   
 
63 R Bieber and J Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union. The Development of the Third Pillar 
(Interuniversity Press 1995), 4. 
64 F Trauner and I Kruse, ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A New Standard EU Foreign 
Policy Tool?’ (2008) 10 European Journal of Migration and Law 411, 413–414. 
65 For instance, cases C-502/10, Singh para 45; C-508/10, Commission v Netherlands para 66; C-571/10, 
Kamberaj, para 90.  
66 Recital 12. 
67 Article 5(2).  
68 Jesse (n 7) 183; for a summary of the negotiations see: European Council, Document 12217/02, Brussels, 23 
September 2002; for a detailed study of the negotiations within the Council, see S.Carrera (n 14).   
69 Kostakopoulou, (n 14) 936. 
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4.1 Discrimination and exclusion in the name of integration  
The LTR Directive’s integration conditions have been generally criticised and described as 
the 'Achilles heel' of the Directive.70 A number of studies also demonstrate that in all Member 
States, the imposition of integration requirements is counterproductive to the process of 
integration of migrants into their society.71   
The integration conditions are not defined in the LTR Directive. They are rather governed by 
national legislation. As also noted by Boelaert-Suominen there are no express limits on the 
integration conditions of the Directive.72 Each Member State is free to adopt its own 
integration conditions laid down in its national immigration legislation.73 Consequently, 
integration measures vary in each Member State. For example, in France, applicants sign a 
long-term contract for integration classes, while in Germany applicants only sit a test. This 
means, first, that there is no uniformity in the implementation of the same Article of the 
Directive. Secondly, applicants are treated differently depending on where they apply, while 
they all rely on the same EU legislation. Thirdly, Member States are free to raise the bar so 
that certain ‘undesired’ TCNs are simply unable to acquire the status. This difference in the 
method of delivering integration measures casts doubt on the intention of Member States to 
facilitate the integration of LTRs:  
it is difficult to see why some countries should have higher requirements than others 
for the same need, these differences throw doubt on the argument that immigrants 
need the knowledge they are required to demonstrate in order to successfully 
integrate.74  
Moreover, the LTR Directive allows different treatment of applicants on the basis of their 
nationality. Member States are free to exempt nationals of certain (non-European) countries 
from the requirement of integration. For instance, as noted by Carrera, nationals of the US, 
Canada, Japan and many more countries are ‘held to be perfectly integrated into the values 
and symbols of the receiving country’ when applying for a residence permit in Germany and 
 
70 Boelaert-Suominen (n 3) 1023. 
71  A Bocker and T Strik, ‘Language and Knowledge Tests for Permanent Residence Rights: Help or Hinderance 
for Integration?’ (2011) 13 European Journal of Migration and Law 157, 179. 
72 Boelaert-Suominen (n 3) 1023. 
73 As we will see in chapter 5, the only limitation to these conditions is that the conditions do not undermine the 
effectiveness of the Directive.  
74 Bocker and Strik (n 71). 
37 
France.75 In his opinion, this differential treatment in the personal scope of the integration 
conditions and the exemption of certain categories of (‘Western’, highly skilled and rich) 
foreigners from the obligation to meet the integration conditions ‘leads to the incompatibility 
of civic integration measures with the principle of non-discrimination’.76 In 2008, Human 
Rights Watch published a report on the Dutch integration test abroad, criticising the blanket 
exemption for some nationalities and not others.77 The report argued that the test was 
disproportionate in its aims and nature, constituting a violation of Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Protocol 12 of that Convention.78 
It may be argued that the purpose of integration conditions is to provide migrants with 
‘sufficient knowledge’ about the life and society of the host State. In France, for example, 
when applying for the status of long-term residence, TCN migrants are required to sign an 
integration contract,79 which includes an ‘information session on life in France’,80  and aims 
to ‘provide the signatory with knowledge about practical life in France and access to public 
services, including training and employment, housing, health, early childhood and child care, 
school, as well as community life’.81 In Germany, the integration programmes aim to provide 
applicants for the status of long-term residence with ‘basic knowledge of the legal and social 
order and the living conditions in the federal territory’.82 It is, nonetheless, hard to explain 
how a migrant who has resided in a country for at least five years, still needs to be taught the 
basic knowledge of the living conditions in that country.83 
Applicants for the status of long-term residence are also required to cover the costs of the 
integration conditions imposed on them. This means that, first, the responsibility of the 
integration is on the migrants rather than the Member States; secondly, the migrant’s 
financial status will be linked to their ability to be recognised as one of ‘us’ and thus deserve 
the rights ‘we’ enjoy.  
 
75 S Carrera and A Wiesbrock, ‘Civic Integration of Third-Country Nationals: Nationalism versus 
Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy’ (2009). 
76 ibid. 
77 Human Rights Watch (2008), “The Netherlands: Discrimination in the Name of Integration, 
Migrants Rights under the Integration Abroad Act”, Human Rights Watch, New York, 14. 
May < https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/netherlands0508.pdf > last accessed on 25/01/2018.  
78 Together with Article 8 ECHR (right to family life). 
79 Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration. 
80 Decree 2006-1791, Article L. 311-9. 
81 Decree 2006-1791, Article R. 311-25.  
82 Aufenthaltsgesetz, Section 9(2). 
83 Unless they have been excluded from the society, which is again the result of the society not being 
welcoming. This issue is unlikely to be resolved by teaching basic knowledge about the society to migrants. 
Recalling the Jesse example, a circle of friends should open up a bit and make room for the newcomer.  
38 
The economic self-sufficiency condition and having health insurance suggest that the LTR 
Directive’s purpose, inter alia, is to keep those who are not considered economically viable, 
out as unwanted, which is often the purpose of civic integration.84 Moreover, Member States 
are free to impose financial sanctions on those who fail to meet the integration conditions. 
For example, those who fail the integration tests in the Netherlands, may be issued with a 
‘fine’.85 In other words, the Directive allows the Member States to adopt a civic-integration 
approach to the integration of TCN residents, which is based on conditions, and sanctions for 
failure to satisfying those conditions.  
5. Comparing the LTR Directive with the Tampere Programme 
In this section I shall examine the extent to which the LTR Directive is in line with the 
Tampere Programme, which was in place as EU immigration policy when the Directive was 
adopted.  
The first difference between the Tampere Programme and the LTR Directive appears to be 
the approach of these two documents to the integration of TCN residents. The former stressed 
equal opportunities and equality of treatment with EU citizens as key aspects of TCNs’ 
integration; the latter sets integration as a condition for access to equal opportunities and 
equality of treatment. In the Programme, integration is the result of extending certain rights 
of EU citizens granted to TCN residents; in the Directive, integration is a condition for 
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In addition, each of these documents employs a different migrant integration model (of the 
two models seen earlier). The Tampere Programme is based on the second model of 
integration, namely the inclusionary model of integration, which provides for the grant to 
TCNs of rights and obligations similar to those enjoyed by EU citizens, while the LTR 
Directive employs the first model of integration, namely ‘civic integration’, entailing no 
admission without integration.  
The Tampere Programme signalled a departure from the assumption that granting rights for 
enhancing the migrants’ integration works only for EU citizens. The Programme sees 
comparable rights and responsibilities as a way to facilitate the integration of non-EU citizens 
too. In the LTR Directive, however, we do not see such an assumption. Like all the years 
before the Tampere Programme, the Directive assumes that non-EU citizens are not 
integrated in the host society until they can prove otherwise. The Directive allows Member 
States to ‘teach and test’ TCN residents and, if they successfully pass, only then give them 
the rights defined in the LTR Directive. In other words, the inclusionary approach 
recommended by the Programme was not followed in the Directive.  
The next difference between the Tampere Programme and the LTR Directive is the balance 
of responsibility. The Programme places the responsibility of ensuring and facilitating the 
integration of TCN residents on the Member States, while in the Directive, all the 
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responsibility is on the TCN resident who wishes to apply for the status of long-term 
residence.  
We can see a further deviation in the LTR Directive from Objective 4 of the Tampere 
Programme. The objective called for a common approach by the Member States to the 
integration of TCN residents, while the Directive allows Member States to adopt different 
positions on this matter in their implementing legislation.  
Additionally, Objective 18 of the Tampere Programme called for ensuring that TCN residents 
are treated fairly. Nevertheless, requiring TCN residents to comply with integration 
requirements which may vary depending on the Member State in which they apply, is 
discriminatory. It is not fair treatment either, as there is another category of migrants in the 
host State – mobile EU citizens – who regardless of the real extent of the link they have 
established with the host State, are presumed to be integrated, and thus are automatically 
granted the rights for which LTRs have to apply and meet conditions, simply because of their 
(non-EU) nationality. One might, rightly, argue that EU citizens enjoy the right to be 
protected from discrimination on the grounds of nationality and this is the reason that EU 
citizens cannot be required to comply with integration measures. However, first, the 
argument here is not about protection against discrimination. It is rather about ‘fair treatment’ 
of TCN residents, as recommended by the Programme. It is hard to justify this difference in 
treatment between two categories of migrants, one which has at least resided lawfully in a 
Member State for five years, while the other one might have just arrived. EU citizens may be 
required to meet integration conditions (e.g. length of residence) in order to enjoy rights, 
however, here I am talking about integration conditions, such as classes and exams. EU 
citizens may never be required to satisfy such conditions. They are assumed to have perfectly 
integrated into the host State to enjoy basic rights such as a residence right – and later enjoy 
more rights by virtue of length of residence – while LTRs, in addition to satisfying the 
residence requirement – which was considered to be enough by EU immigration policy for 
acquiring those rights – must prove their integration into the host State. Moreover, we should 
not forget the rationale and purpose behind extending rights and obligations of EU citizens to 
TCN residents. The purpose of extending the rights of EU citizens to TCN lawful residents 
was to enhance their integration into the host society. Nevertheless, the approach in the 
Directive widens the gap between the status and rights of TCN residents and the status and 
rights of EU citizens, which clearly would not contribute to the integration of LTRs.  
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The Tampere Programme was a political document which defined the priorities in the area of 
EU immigration policy. The Programme was the European Council meeting’s statement of 
intention, with vague and general objectives. It is of course not unlikely that in adopting a 
legal document such as the LTR Directive, the language and terms used in those vague and 
general objectives are changed, even significantly. It would be unrealistic to expect the 
Directive to use the exact terms and language of the Programme.  
Nevertheless, the Tampere Programme was the overarching EU immigration policy when the 
LTR Directive was adopted. The Directive could at least be expected to be in line with those 
chief objectives rather than going to a different direction from the initial goal set by the 
Programme. The initial aim of the Programme, as noted earlier, was to facilitate the 
integration of TCN residents to the host society, not setting integration as a condition for 
acquiring those rights. The Directive shifted from facilitation of integration, to requiring 
proof of integration, and even further, to imposing sanctions for failure to prove integration. 
Thus, the Directive seems to be contradicting the objectives of EU immigration policy.  
Furthermore, the Directive does not seem to be capable of achieving coherency in EU 
immigration policy, as prescribed by the Tampere Programme. By ‘coherency’ I mean that 
the various components of the immigration policy should support, and not undermine, the 
EU’s defined goals on enhancing integration.86 
Another deviation of the LTR Directive from the Tampere objectives is the shift in the 
responsibility of the Member States as regards the integration of TCN residents. While the 
Programme considered the integration of TCN residents as a two-way process (where both 
the host State and migrants have a responsibility) and emphasised the responsibility of the 
Member States, the Directive makes the integration of TCN residents a one-way process in 
which only the migrants have the responsibility. 
In addition, the inclusionary approach adopted in the Tampere Programme (i.e. that all those 
who have resided in the Union for a certain time should be granted the rights of EU citizens) 
is absent from the LTR Directive. This approach has been replaced with an exclusionary 
approach, according to which no TCN enjoys the rights of EU citizens unless he/she satisfies 
the integration conditions.  
 
86 J Niessen and T Huddleston, The Legal Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009). 
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Furthermore, the inclusionary method of facilitating integration used in the Tampere 
Programme was changed to a mandatory, sanction-based, method in the LTR Directive. 
Using this restrictive conditionality, may undermine social cohesion and inclusion, as well as 
the migrants’ basic rights (e.g. residence).87 The integration of TCN residents was originally 
seen in the Programme as a matter of equality.88 Enhancing their integration was also seen as 
a goal for EU immigration policy. Now, in the Directive, integration is not treated as a matter 
of equality. It is not treated even as a remuneration prize, but as a requirement which imposes 
costs on TCN residents. While the Programme insisted on removing the factors of otherness 
between EU citizens and TCN residents, the Directive treats TCN residents like ‘others’ and 
‘newcomers’. The deviation in the Directive is clear when it allows the Member States to 
require TCN residents who have resided for at least five years in a Member State (equal to 
how long EU citizens must reside in the host State to acquire permanent residence) to attend a 
course entitled ‘Law and Citizenship Newcomers’ in the Netherlands,89 or ‘welcome and 
integration contract’ in France.90 The approach to integration has moved away from focusing 
on security of residence, access to rights, and the inclusion of TCN residents into society, to 
integration as a condition with which access to rights can be restricted.91  
It is difficult to see why a method of integration works for one category of migrants (mobile 
EU citizens and their family members) but not for the other (TCN migrants). EU citizens are 
assumed to have integrated into the society of the host State after five years residence, while 
TCNs who have resided in the EU for the same number of years must still prove their 
integration. It has been suggested that the Member States may use the integration conditions 
as a tool to exclude certain undesired TCNs by raising the bar of integration requirements.92 
The method of integration adopted in the LTR Directive suggests that Member States still see 
TCN residents as suspects who are not willing/not capable to be included in the society: 
‘When a comparison is made between the first proposal of the Commission for a 
directive on long-resident third country national and the final directive as adopted it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Member states consider third country 
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nationals even after five years stable and lawful residence in the Union an intrinsically 
suspect category’.93 
Although the adoption of the LTR Directive was a beneficial step towards developing a 
common EU immigration policy, as recommended by the Tampere Programme, the lack of 
legal certainty in relation to the integration clauses of the Directive appears to cause a 
deviation from the Programme. The Directive allows the Member States to adopt their own 
legislation on the integration of TCN residents, which of course may vary from one State to 
another. TCN residents in different Member States are, therefore, treated differently. Treating 
applicants for the same EU status (derived from EU legislation) differently, simply because 
of the Member State of application seems to be contrary to the need to ensure the fair 
treatment of TCN residents, which was underlined by the Member States in Tampere. 
5.2 Why deviation? 
The deviation of the LTR Directive from the objectives of the Tampere Programme can be 
attributed to a number of internal and external factors.  
The first cause appear to be the desire of the Member States to control migration of non-EU 
citizens.94 The proposal for the LTR Directive was based on for the ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
legal regime governing the migration of TCN residents.95 This transfer of legislative power to 
the supranational level could mean that the Member States lose one of their sovereign 
powers: control over the migration of non-EU citizens. By the inclusion of the integration 
conditions, the Member States managed to retain their control.  
The second  cause of the deviation could be to do with the terms used in the Tampere 
Programme. The clauses of the Programme were ambitious, but also ambiguous. They were 
vaguely formulated, which left room for the Member States to change the proposal for the 
LTR Directive in a way they desired. These last two causes together are not the recipe for an 
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vaguely formulated plan 
+ 
the Member States’ reluctance to interpret the plan in a liberal way 
≠ 
rights-enhancing legislation 
The last internal cause which can be identified for the deviation is the legislative procedure 
that was in place when the LTR Directive was negotiated and adopted. At that time, the 
European Parliament did not have much say in adopting legislation in the area of 
immigration. In addition, the voting system in the Council was based on unanimity. All 
Member States had to agree upon the terms of the proposal and, thus, every Member State 
had a veto, which made reaching an agreement in the sensitive area of immigration of TCN 
residents even harder.  
The major external cause of the deviation was the 9/11 attacks in 2001 which occurred 
between the adoption of the Programme in 1999 and the adoption of the Directive in 2003. A 
number of states introduced legislation to respond to the fear caused by the attacks – 
legislation, which was generally security-conscious and exclusionary.96 This will be 
discussed further on page 156 in chapter 5, where I analyse possible cause and cures for the 
deviation together.  
5.3 Despite the deviation, does the Directive facilitate the integration of TCN 
residents?   
The LTR Directive provides LTRs with a secure residence status, which is crucial in the 
process of the integration of migrants.97 Those TCN residents in a Member State, who 
manage to satisfy the conditions for acquiring the status, will enjoy protection against 
expulsion (Article 12). The host State may withdraw the secure residence status in very 
limited circumstances, such as where the LTR constitutes an actual and sufficiently serious 
threat to public policy or public security (Article 12). These grounds are similar to the 
 
96 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, in the UK and the Patriot Act, in the United States. In October 
2001, five weeks after the attacks, Congress passed the 342-page Patriot Act; removed restrictions on wiretaps, 
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grounds which can be used against EU citizen migrants. However, LTRs who remain outside 
the Union continuously for twelve months will lose the status (Article 9C).98 This possibility 
of withdrawal of status within a relatively short period of absence makes the status and the 
security of residence attached to it unstable and not so secure.  
Having said that, the status of long-term residence is permanent and may be withdrawn only 
in limited situations.99 Therefore, it seems that the LTR Directive provides a satisfactory 
secure residence status in the host State and the major deviation of the Directive from the 
Tampere Programme is related to the procedure before the acquisition of the status, 
particularly the integration conditions.  
Overall, the LTR Directive provides its beneficiaries with the essential element of integration, 
namely, a secure resident status; nevertheless, due to the lack of other elements of integration, 
such as equal treatment with other members of EU society (EU citizens) and not being 
considered different until proven to be one of us, the status is not capable of facilitating 
integration of TCN residents, at least by the same way as prescribed by the Member States in 
Tampere.  
5.4 Interim conclusion: discrimination and exclusion in the name of integration 
In this section, the Tampere Programme and the LTR Directive were compared. The 
approach of the Programme to the integration of TCN residents in the Union, seems to follow 
the second model of migrants’ integration (inclusion). The Programme considers that the 
integration of TCN residents will be facilitated by granting them the rights and obligations 
granted to other members of the society (i.e. EU citizens). On the contrary, the LTR Directive 
sets the integration as a pre-condition for enjoying the rights of EU citizens (civic integration 
model). The Directive allows the Member States to require TCN residents to prove their 
integration to the host society, in order to enjoy those rights. Moreover, the language of the 
two documents is different, and shifts from encouragement to sanctions. The balance of 
responsibility has also shifted from the host State in the Tampere Programme, to migrants in 
 
98 EU citizens who are permanent residents in a Member State also lose their status after an absence of 2 years 
from the Member State, however, they do not lose their status of EU citizenship and can return to the Member 
State. 
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or public security. 
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the LTR Directive. Thus, there is a significant deviation in the Directive from the directions 
given in the Programme.  
Nevertheless, despite these deviations, the Directive provides successful applicants with a 
secure residence status and a series of rights which were previously reserved for EU citizens.  
6. Why not the same method of integration for EU citizens and TCN residents? 
EU citizens automatically acquire the right of permanent residence once they have resided 
legally for a continuous period of five years in the host State.100 This also applies to their 
TCN family members.101 This right is not subject to further integration conditions, such as 
integration contracts or multiple-choice question tests. Thus, first, EU citizens are assumed  
not to face any issue of inclusion or integration in the host society which requires further 
measures; secondly, it is not the nationality of the migrant which causes the assumption of 
integration, as TCN family members of EU citizens are also assumed under EU law to have 
integrated into the society.  
In respect to EU citizens, the approach to the correlation of rights and integration is similar to 
the one recommended in the Tampere Programme: enjoying rights will facilitate integration. 
Directive 2004/38 – which governs the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States – utilises the 
right of permanent residence in the host State in order to enhance the integration of mobile 
EU citizens into the society of the host Member State:  
In order to be a genuine vehicle for integration into the society of the host Member 
State in which the Union citizen resides, the right of permanent residence, once 
obtained, should not be subject to any conditions.102 
Thus, the rights which are the cornerstone for the integration of EU citizens and their TCN 
family members, are often subjected to formal integration conditions for TCN residents.103 
The paradox in the approach of the Member States to the integration of migrants (EU citizens 
and their TCN family members) might have an obvious legal reason which is the protection 
of EU citizens and their family members from discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
 
100 Art 16.1 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
101 Directive 2004/38, Art 16.2. 
102 The Preamble to Directive 2004/38, Recital 18.  
103 Jesse, (n 7) 172. 
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Nevertheless, assuming that a method of integration works for one category of migrants and 
yet not for the others, does not seem to have any logic to it.  
It might be argued that this sectorial approach to migration is legal. It might also be argued 
that this differentiation in treatment is due to the fact that migrants are subject to different 
laws and, thus, their different treatment is justified. While this difference in treatment is 
generally justified, as well as legal, one should not forget the logic behind the adoption of the 
LTR Directive and the introduction of the LTR status. Moreover, Member States justifies 
their approach to the integration of LTRs by expressing the concern that TCN residents who 
are LTRs may not be willing/able to integrate into the receiving society. Nevertheless, the 
logic behind this justification may also be used for TCN residents who are family members of 
EU citizens, as well as TCNs who are scientist. If the issue is the migrant’s nationality, why 
just some TCNs are subject to civic integration and the rest are presumed to be willing/able/ 
to smoothly integrate into European society.  
The concern of the Member States (e.g. Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands) that TCN 
residents are unable or unwilling to accept the receiving society’s values, adapt to a new way 
of life also seems irrelevant, as if the second method of integration (facilitating inclusion by 
providing right of residence and equal treatment with the host State nationals) works for TCN 
family members of EU citizens, it will work for other TCN residents too. Furthermore, it is 
not only illogical to resist the same method of integration to be used for TCN residents, but it 
seems to be in the EU’s interest to adopt the inclusion method of integration for LTRs, for the 
following reasons.   
First, TCN residents not only reside in the society of the host State, but they are also part of 
the society of the Union; the Union should do its part in creating a link between LTRs and the 
Union. Moreover, any LTR may become an EU citizen by acquiring nationality of their host 
State. It is in the EU’s interest to start the process of inclusion (e.g. the sense of belonging to 
the Union) of LTRs in the EU’s society as soon as possible (e.g. once a TCN becomes a long-
term resident in the Union). By the time they become EU citizens, it may be too late for 
starting that process. by providing LTRs with the right to equal treatment with other members 
of the society, the Union shows its commitment to the inclusion of its permanent members 
into the society. Omitting their inclusion into the society could lead to ‘social dumping’ 
within the Union. 
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Even if LTRs do not become EU citizens, they are still residents of the Union and officially 
permanent members of its society. The Union should do its part in the integration of its 
permanent members. It is in the EU’s interest to protect the effectiveness of its immigration 
policy by limiting the use of disproportionate and discretionary integration conditions for the 
applicant of an EU legal status. 
Secondly, the enhancement of TCN residents’ integration into the Union society has social 
and economic benefits for the Union. ‘A successful and efficient integration strategy of 
migrants would serve as a fundamental element that not only addresses the challenge of 
maintaining social cohesion, but also enhances the EU’s overall economic welfare and the 
functioning of the internal market.  
Thirdly, in EU immigration policies adopted after Tampere, the Member States keep defining 
priorities similar to those of the Tampere Programme. The objectives being repeated for 
almost two decades now, show that the LTR Directive and similar pieces of legislation that 
have been adopted, concerning, inter alia, the integration of TCN residents, have failed to 
address the issue and this matter is still on the priority list of EU immigration policy. 
7. Concluding Remarks: Integration, aim or condition 
In this chapter I have looked at the integration of TCN residents, particularly LTRs. It was 
discussed that the integration of migrants has neither a formula, nor can it be ordered. It 
occurs when migrants are engaged in different aspects of life in the receiving society. This is 
where legal instruments can play a role in facilitating this social phenomenon, by providing 
the opportunity for migrants to be involved in aspects of the host society’s life.  
Two different approaches to integration were identified: (1) civic integration, and (2) 
inclusion of migrants into the receiving society. The Union utilizes the first approach for the 
integration of TCN residents, and the second one for the integration of EU citizens: satisfying 
conditions is the foundation of integration for the former category of migrants, and enjoying 
rights, especially the security of residence and equal treatment with the host State nationals, is 
the cornerstone of the integration of EU citizens. For decades the EU has followed the 
inclusion method of integration for EU citizens. It was illustrated that the Tampere 
Programme recommended the application of this method of integration also to the integration 
of TCN residents. In other words, the Programme signalled the end to the traditional 
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approach of the Member States towards facilitating integration of migrants, by granting rights 
to enhance the integration of TCNs as well. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of the LTR Directive with the Tampere Programme, 
demonstrated that there is a deviation in the Directive from what the Programme 
recommended with regards to the approach to the integration of TCN residents. We saw that 
the two documents are different, or even contradictory, in relation to this matter. On the one 
hand, in the Programme, an inclusionary, encouraging, rights-based approach was suggested, 
whilst, on the other hand, an exclusionary, mandatory, sanctions-based approach was adopted 
in the Directive. The inclusionary approach in the Programme was translated to exclusion 
until discretionary conditions are satisfied. A concept which was understood in the 
Programme as the participation of TCN residents in the society, access to rights, non-
discrimination, and promoting social inclusion, has now become a condition for access to 
rights. 
It was demonstrated that while the LTR Directive provides its beneficiaries with a secure 
residence status, which is essential in the process of migrants’ integration, the integration 
conditions of the Directive, in relation to which the Member States maintain major discretion, 
are capable of undermining the effectiveness of the Directive and the effectiveness of the 
Programme.   
I have mostly argued that the same method of enhancing integration which is used for EU 
citizens and their family members can/should be used for LTRs too. In addition, the Union 
should play a more active role in the integration of LTRs. The Union does not have the 
competence to adopt legislation in this area, and I am not suggesting that integration 
measures should be harmonised across the Union: first, because the EU does not have such a 
competence, and, secondly, because integration measures should be designed according to 
local needs, considerations, and conditions. However, at least a common direction, approach, 
and understanding of integration of LTRs should be agreed between all Member States, and 
the Union becomes the coordinator of the Member States’ integration policies.
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Chapter 3 - Free Movement of LTRs to a second Member State  
1. Introduction  
In chapter two, I discussed those two objectives of the Tampere Programme which 
recommended the adoption of a more vigorous integration policy based on a common 
approach,1 aiming to grant TCN residents rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens. It was concluded that the 2003 Long-term Residents Directive (the LTR Directive) is 
neither able to ensure a common approach to integration will be adopted by the Member 
States,2 nor its own approach to integration is in line with the approach of the Tampere 
Programme.  
This chapter and the next intend to examine the extent to which the LTR Directive is capable 
of giving long-term residents (LTRs) rights and obligations comparable to the rights enjoyed 
by Union citizens, and the obligations imposed on them. If the provisions of the LTR 
Directive extend the rights granted to EU citizens to LTRs, then it can be said that the 
Directive is in line with this part of the Tampere Programme. To be comparable with the 
rights of EU citizens, the rights of LTRs should, at least, include the ‘core’ rights of EU 
citizens.   
This chapter analyses the first set of core rights of EU citizens: the right to freely move 
within the Union, and the right to reside in any Member State. These rights have been 
supplemented by the right to equal treatment with the nationals of the host Member State in 
similar situations. The primary aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the LTR 
Directive is capable of providing LTRs with the right to free movement within the EU, 
residence in another Member State, and equal treatment with the nationals of that State.  
Directive appears to be a revolutionary step towards extending these rights to non-EU 
citizens, nevertheless, as will be illustrated in this chapter, free movement rights of LTRs and 
EU citizens are not identical, and indeed are different in nature. It will be argued in section 
5.1 that the extension of these rights to LTRs makes sense both from the economic point of 
view as well as the integration one. It is not economically justifiable because personal market 
freedoms which have traditionally been available to economically active individuals 
 
1 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, Brussels 
2 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. 
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(Member State nationals only) for economic purposes of the Treaties,3 if extended to LTRs, 
they can also be economic actors in the internal market and contribute to those economic 
aims. It will be demonstrated that the free movement of LTRs poses no additional security 
risk as LTRs are already within the EU’s borders and are free to move within the Schengen 
area. 
In addition, this chapter considers the LTR Directive’s capability to approximate the various 
national legislation on the conditions of entry and residence of LTRs to a second Member 
State (i.e. a Member State other than the one in which they have acquired the long-term 
residence status), as recommended by the Tampere Programme. It will investigate to what 
extent are the Member States free to apply their national immigration laws on the conditions 
of entry and residence of a TCN who has already acquired the status of long-term resident in 
another Member State (first Member State). 
This chapter is structured as follows. I will begin by briefly analysing the rights of EU 
citizens to freely move to another Member State, reside there, and enjoy equal treatment with 
the nationals of that State (Section 2). The section that follows (Section 3) explores the 
position of LTRs with regards to these rights: do LTRs enjoy a similar right to move freely 
and reside in the territory of a second Member State, and enjoy equal treatment with the 
nationals of that State? In section 4, the results of sections 2 and 3 will be compared, in order 
to examine the extent to which the rights of movement and residence granted by the LTR 
Directive to LTRs are ‘comparable’ to the rights of EU citizens. Section 5 of the chapter 
explains why the Union should ensure LTRs enjoy the free movement and residence rights 
which are similar to those of EU citizens. Parts of this chapter (sections 2 and 3) may appear 
descriptive. Nevertheless, having these descriptive sections is necessary as 1) this thesis for 
the first time is providing a detailed analysis of the rights of LTRs who have different statuses 
(employed, self-employed, self-sufficient) and compare them with what EU citizens enjoy. 2) 
it was not possible to answer the normative questions of section 5 without having these 
mostly descriptive sections. In other words, it was not possible to have normative arguments 
in favour of further extension of LTRs’ rights without knowing their current position in the 
second Member State.   
 
3 Although today, the provisions may not serve purely economic purposes (especially since citizenship provision 
have been added to the Treaty), personal market freedoms, inter alia, still have economic aims.  
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2. Freedom of movement of EU citizens 
The right of free movement and the right of residence, which enable Member State nationals 
and their family members to freely move to other Member States and reside there, have been 
described as the most important rights the Union confers on its citizens.4 These rights have 
been supplemented by the right to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of the host State, 
in situation that fall within the scope of EU law.  
This section does not intend to provide a detailed account of the historical development of the 
rights of free movement and residence;5 rather, it seeks to offer a summary of these rights, as 
well as an analysis of the current legal regime governing these rights, to a level that is 
necessary for comparing these rights of EU citizens with what the LTR Directive has granted 
to LTRs. 
Member State nationals may derive the rights of free movement and residence from two 
different sources: a) the ‘personal market freedoms’ (Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU); b) 
citizenship of the Union and, in particular, Article 21 TFEU. The former grant the ‘activity-
oriented’6 rights of free movement and residence to Member State nationals that are 
economically active in a cross-border context, whereas, the latter grants the status-oriented 
rights of free movement and residence to economically inactive Member State nationals,7 
merely because they are citizens of the Union. 
I will examine these rights separately based on their source, by dividing this section into two 
parts; the first analyses the rights which economically active Member State nationals derive 
from the personal market freedoms, and the second will focus on the rights of economically 
inactive Member State nationals stemming from the citizenship provisions of the Treaty.    
2.1 Freedom of movement for economically active Member State nationals  
This section is devoted to the analysis of the rights of Member State nationals who move to 
the territory of another Member State in order to exercise an economic activity there. In other 
 
4 F Rossi dal Pozzo, Citizenship Rights and Freedom of Movement in the European Union (Kluwer Law 
International 2013) 51.  
5 For such accounts, see E Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union : Barriers to Movement 
in Their Constitutional Context (Kluwer 2007); A Tryfonidou, The Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s 
Market Freedoms (Hart Publishing 2016). 
6 The term is borrowed from Dimitry Kochenov. See D Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European 
Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ (2008) 15 Columbia J. Eur. L. 169, 194. 
7 Economically active Member State nationals are still able to rely on the citizenship provisions and derive the 
free movement rights from them, however, the lex specialis principle applies to the situations which have 
already been covered by the personal market freedoms, and hence, the latter situations are governed by these 
provisions.   
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words, it examines the rights of economically active nationals who are involved in a cross-
border economic activity.  
Member State nationals derive from the personal market freedoms the rights to freely move 
and reside in the territory of any Member State of the Union, for the purpose of pursuing an 
economic activity there. Various types of economic activities are covered by the personal 
market freedoms: employment (Articles 45-48 TFEU), permanent self-employment (Articles 
49-55 TFEU), and providing service as well as receiving services (Articles 56-62 TFEU). 
These provisions regulate (and facilitate) the free movement of economically active Member 
State nationals within the Union, because, inter alia, exercising economic activities in a 
cross-border context contribute to the economy of the Member States,8 and, also, they 
contribute to the establishment and development of the internal market, as an area in which, 
inter alia, the free movement of persons is ensured.9 
 In addition to the rights of movement and residence in a second Member State, nationals of 
the Member States enjoy the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality and 
this derives from all the personal market freedoms and is further elaborated in secondary 
legislation supplementing them.10 There is, also, a self-standing prohibition of discrimination 
on the ground of nationality in all situations falling within the scope of EU law, which is laid 
down in Article 18 TFEU.11 Any measure of the host State which, directly or indirectly, 
discriminates against nationals of other Member States is prohibited.   
‘Discrimination occurs when comparable situations are treated differently, or non-comparable 
situations are treated equally’12 (although the latter, does not always amount to 
discrimination)13. Discrimination may be direct or indirect. The former refers to a different 
and usually less-favourable treatment which is directly based on nationality, while the latter 
refers to imposing a condition which is prima facie nationality-neutral (i.e. also applies to 
 
8 For a detailed analysis of the purposes and functions of the personal market freedoms see: E Szyszczak, 
‘Building a Socioeconomic Constitution : A Fantastic Object ?’ (2012) 35 Fordham Int’l LJ 1364, 1370. See 
also A Tryfonidou (n 5) for an analysis of the impacts that the introduction of the Union citizenship has had on 
these personal market freedoms. 
9 Article 26(2) TFEU.  
10 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77 (the Citizens’ Rights Directive); Regulation 
492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 
11 The Personal market freedoms include a prohibition of nationality discrimination, and thus, Article 18 TFEU 
is rarely used in the context of personal market freedoms as lex generalis. An example of such use is Case 
186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195. 
12 Spaventa (n 5) 17. 
13 Case C-13/63 Italy v Commission [1963] ECR 337. For examples of non-comparable situations treated 
equally which do not amount to discrimination, see Spaventa (n 2) 17.  
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nationals of the host State) but meeting it is harder for nationals of other Member States.14 It 
is important to distinguish between the different types of discrimination because the grounds 
on which different forms of discrimination can be justified are different, depending on the 
type of discrimination. A directly discriminatory measure may be justified only on the 
general grounds specified in the Treaty (public policy, public health, public security (the so-
called ‘Treaty derogations’)), whereas, a measure which is found to be indirectly 
discriminatory, can also be saved if such a measure is ‘objectively’ justified.15  
Without the right to equal treatment, the mere rights of free movement and residence would 
have been meaningless.16 If Member State nationals were not protected against nationality 
discrimination in the second State, exercising the free movement rights would not be 
attractive enough for them to abandon their home State, and move to a State where they are 
treated as second-class residents (nationals of that State are given priority). 
 
It can be understood from the Court’s judgments that the Court has been aware of the 
devastating effect that the feeling of being treated less favourably, could have on Member 
State nationals’ willingness to move or on their genuine enjoyment of free movement rights. 
The Court has adopted a teleological approach, which aims to achieve the full effect of the 
personal market freedoms, rather than a literal approach to the interpretation of these 
provisions. In its judgments the Court has (almost always)17 sought to ensure that Member 
State nationals do not face any obstacle which may impede their free movement, or hamper 
their smooth integration into the host State. As a result, as we will see, the personal market 
freedoms have been extensively developed, both in terms of material scope,18 and personal 
scope.19 
I shall now examine the rights of the first category of economically active Member State 
nationals who may derive the rights of free movement and residence within the Union from 
the personal market freedoms: ‘workers’.  
 
14 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Oxford University Press 2013), page 278. See also Case C-278/03 
Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-3747, 246-7. 
15 Judge-made and non-exhaustive list of non-economic grounds that can justify indirectly discriminatory (on 
the ground of nationality) and non-discriminatory obstacles to free movement of EU citizens.  
16 F Touboul, ‘Le Principe de Non-Discrimination et Les Travailleurs Frontaliers’ (2002) 462 Revue du marche 
commun et de l’Union Européenne 619. See also Article 26(2) TFEU. 
17 For a detailed analysis of the judgments of the Court on the rights of workers and other economic actors, see 
Tryfonidou (n 5) 73-115; Spaventa (n 5) 32-156.  
18 Case C-15/96 Kalliope Schöning-Kougebetopoulou v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1998] ECR I-47. 
19 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745. On the development of personal and material scope of the 
personal market freedoms see: E Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood despite the Trees ? On the Scope of Union 
Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13. 
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2.1.1 Freedom of movement of workers 
Article 45 TFEU concerns the freedom of movement of workers:  
‘Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union’ (Article 45(1).  
The term ‘worker’ is not defined in the Treaties or secondary legislation. It is the Court that 
decides who is capable of falling within the definition of worker and thus can enjoy the 
freedom of movement of workers.20 Therefore, it is the EU – not the host State – that decides 
who can enjoy this freedom as a worker.   
According to the Court in the Lawrie-Blum case, a ‘worker’ is a Member State national who 
[i] for a certain period of time performs services [ii] for and under the direction of another 
person [iii] in return for which he receives remuneration.21 In other cases, such as Levin, the 
Court has held that as long as the work constitutes an ‘effective and genuine’ activity,22 the 
rate of income, duration of employment, type of job,23 intention of the applicant and whether 
the person is working part time or full time,24 are all irrelevant. Trainees,25 and even those 
who are employed but still do not earn enough to cover their living expenses and, thus, need 
to claim social assistance benefit,26 are all held to fall within the definition of ‘worker’ for the 
purpose of Article 45 TFEU and therefore enjoy the rights conferred on workers.  
The freedom of movement of workers, as listed in Article 45 TFEU, entails the right to 
accept offers of employment actually made;27 the right to free movement to the territory of 
Member States for this purpose; the right to reside in a Member State for the purpose of 
employment (Article 45(3)). Workers are also protected against any nationality 
discrimination, both as regards access to employment and during employment (Article 45(2)). 
As we will see below, and as and the Court has acknowledged, the rights of Member State 
nationals are not limited to what is listed in Article 45 TFEU; 28 their rights are, actually, 
 
20 Case 75/63 Hokstra v Bestuur der Bedriifsverniging Voor Detailhandel en Ambachten [1964] ECR 177. It 
should be emphasised here that the ECJ decides who is capable of being a worker, and it is the national courts 
that apply the criteria established by the ECJ on the facts of the case in order to decide whether the applicant is a 
worker. See, for instance, case C-357/89 Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECR I-
1027. 
21 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [1986] ECR 2121, para 17. 
22 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris Van Justice [1982] ECR 1035.  
23 Case C-357/89 VJM Raulin v Netherlands Ministry for Education and Science [1992] ECR I-1027. 
24 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg (n 21). 
25 ibid.  
26 Case 139/85 Kempf v Staatssecetaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741. 
27 The word ‘entails’ has been italicised to show that the list of rights is not exhaustive – but merely an 
indicative – list.  
28 Kempf (n 26) para 13.  
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more far reaching than the literal interpretation of the provision may suggest. For instance, 
although, Article 45 TFEU only makes reference to the right to ‘accept offers of employment 
actually made’, the Court has made it clear that Member State nationals also enjoy the right 
to seek employment in another Member State.29 Nevertheless, those who search for 
employment in another Member State, and are not ‘actual’ workers yet, hold a semi-worker 
status and may derive only some of the rights enjoyed by fully-fledged workers under Article 
45 TFEU.30 Providing Member State nationals with an opportunity to search for employment 
in another Member State is ‘necessary’ for the full effect of the freedom of movement for 
workers, 31 as it is not always possible to find employment in another Member State without 
moving there and actively seeking employment.  
 
The rights which Member State nationals derive from Article 45 TFEU are complemented by 
a number of pieces of secondary legislation. Regulation 492/11 on the free movement of 
workers within the Union, and Directive 2004/38 (the Citizens’ Rights Directive) are the 
most important ones,32 which together with the Treaty provisions, and the Court’s judgments 
comprise the legal framework which governs the rights of workers.   
 
The right to free movement – entry and residence for up to three months 
Workers may directly derive the right to freely move to the territory of the host State from 
Article 45 TFEU. The Court has also confirmed in a number of cases,33 that the only 
condition for enjoying such a right is that the person is a ‘worker’ within the meaning of 
Article 45 TFEU.  
In addition to the right of free movement which workers may derive from Article 45 TFEU, 
Article 6 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive provides all Member State nationals with an 
unconditional right of entry and residence in any Member State for an initial period of up to 
three months. Obviously, workers also fall within the beneficiaries of Article 6 of the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive, and thus, enjoy the rights it grants to all Member State nationals. 
 
29 Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497; Antonissen (n18). 
30 See Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; Joined Cases C-22 & 23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze 
[2009] ECR I-4585. 
31 Royer (n 29).  
32 ibid.  
33 See for example Case C-363/89 Roux v Belgium [1991] ECR I-273; Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-
345.  
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In order to enjoy these rights, Member State nationals may not be required to comply with 
any formality (e.g. obtaining a visa before travelling, obtaining a residence permit upon entry, 
or registering with the immigration authorities), other than holding a valid identity card or 
passport.34  
 
The right of residence – beyond three months 
After the expiry of the initial period of residence, the host State is allowed to require Member 
State nationals to register with the competent authorities.35 At this stage, Member State 
nationals may be required to demonstrate their status as a worker by producing proof of 
engagement in an economic activity as an employee (i.e. a contract of employment or a letter 
from an employer in the host State).  
It should be noted here that requiring Member State nationals to register their presence with 
the authorities of the host State does not mean that Member State nationals need to comply 
with this requirement in order to acquire the right of residence. The right of residence of 
workers is a fundamental right derived directly from the Treaty provisions and as such it 
cannot be conditional upon complying with requirements imposed by national or secondary 
EU legislation.36 Such a right of residence already exists, however, Member State nationals 
may be required to register with the authorities and produce evidence of employment, in 
order to prove the existence of this right.37 Therefore, a Member State national who has been 
offered employment, is able to accept the offer and start working, with no delay or waiting 
time for approval of their right to work or residence permit.  
Moreover, the registration certificate is not constitutive of the right of residence of workers, 
but it is, rather, declaratory of such a right.38 Therefore, a failure to comply with the 
condition would never lead a Member State national to lose their right of residence in the host 
 
34 As we will see later in the subsequent sections (Section 2.2 in particular), failure to produce the prescribed 
documents would not be a ground for refusal of entry, and if entry is refused, it would amount to a breach of 
Article 6 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive.  
35 Citizens’ Rights Directive, Article 8(1).  
36 Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, paras. 15-16. See also G Davies, Nationality 
Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The Hague, Kluwer, 2003) 188. 
37 See Royer (n 29). 
38 Case 157/79 Pieck [1980] ECR 2171.  
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State, while proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions may be imposed on them for 
such a failure.39  
The right of residence in the second State for job seekers is notably narrower than what 
‘actual’ workers enjoy. For instance, they have a limited time to find employment and if they 
fail to change their status to an actual worker, they are no longer considered covered by EU 
law and they may be asked to leave the host State.40 The time limit depends on the national 
rules of the host State, but it cannot be less than three months. At the end of the allowed 
period, job seekers would not be automatically asked to leave, rather, they will be given the 
opportunity to show that they still have a genuine chance of being engaged in the market of 
the host State and that they are actively seeking employment.41 
 
Access to the second State labour market 
As explained earlier, it would appear meaningless to grant the rights of movement and 
residence to Member State nationals if they are treated in the host State like ‘foreigners’, or 
‘second-class residents’ (i.e. a priority is given to the host State nationals). The right to equal 
treatment with the nationals of the host state sits at the heart of the freedom of movement for 
workers (and, generally, persons). Any nationality discrimination (discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality) of Member State nationals in the second Member State is prohibited 
under Article 45 TFEU. This prohibition is stated in paragraph 2 of the Article, which comes 
before the paragraph which grants the rights of free movement and residence, which 
demonstrates the importance of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of 
nationality for the effectiveness of the freedom of movement of workers. A number of 
Directives and Regulations have been adopted to, inter alia, give effect to Article 45(2) 
TFEU, most of which have been repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 
492/11.42  
 
39 Citizens’ Rights Directive, Articles 5(5), 8(2).   
40 If the job seekers are not dependent on social assistance (i.e. if they have sufficient financial resources), they 
would be able to continue their residence by relying on other Treaty provisions, for example the citizenship 
provisions. 
41 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745; Case C-344/95 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I-1035, 
para 18. This rule has also been included in the secondary EU legislation: Article 14(4)(b) Directive 2004/38.  
42 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77; Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 
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Nationality discrimination is prohibited both as regards the eligibility of the worker for an 
employment (access to the labour market), and as regards treatment during employment. 
Migrant Member State nationals have the right of access to a post with the same priority as 
the nationals of the host State (Article 1 Regulation 492/11). This principle has been 
reiterated in Article 24(1) Directive 2004/38. Therefore, applying a special recruitment 
procedure when it comes to nationals of other Member States, imposing additional 
requirements on them, or offering them a contract of employment with conditions different 
from those offered to host State nationals are all not permissible (Article 3(1) Regulation 
492/11).  
Both directly and indirectly discriminatory measures are prohibited.  
 
a) Directly discriminatory measures 
Imposing conditions or criteria which are discriminatory on the grounds of nationality of the 
applicant for a post are directly discriminatory and are a breach of Article 45 TFEU (and 
Regulation 492/11 and Directive 2004/38), and therefore prohibited. Such measures may be 
justified only if they fall within one of the grounds provided for in the exhaustive list of 
derogations in Article 45(3) – public policy, public health, and public security.  
A few examples of directly discriminatory measures are an Italian rule limiting the access to 
employment in private security firms to Italian nationals;43 national measures limiting the 
number of non-national workers coming to the second State, or requiring a ratio of national 
employees to non-national employees.44 Additionally, limiting access of nationals of other 
Member States to the labour market of the second State, by imposing a resident labour-
market test on them is also directly discriminatory, and thus, prohibited.    
 
b) Indirectly discriminatory measures 
Measures which are applicable irrespective of nationality but their exclusive or principal aim 
or effect is to keep nationals of other Member States away from the employment offered are 
indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality. Such measures violate the principle of 
 
43 Case C-283/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4363.  
44 Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359.  
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non-discrimination under Article 45 TFEU (as well as Regulation 492/11),45 and therefore are 
prohibited. Indirectly discriminatory measures, however, may be saved either by one of the 
Treaty derogation grounds (similar to directly discriminatory measures), or the objective 
justifications.46  
Famous examples of the measures held by the Court to be indirectly discriminatory are, the 
refusal by an Italian employer to take into account a German applicant’s previous 
employment in Germany 47 and making entitlement to a job-seeker’s allowance conditional 
upon a requirement of being habitually resident in the host State (though this condition was 
found to be justified).48 The latter example might seem to be not related to the access of 
Member State nationals to the labour market of a second State, however, measures like this, 
potentially hinder employment in other Member States by taking the opportunity from 
Member State nationals to move to a second State and seek job, and undertake employment 
there.   
Imposing a language requirement on an applicant for a post is another example of an 
indirectly discriminatory measure as, while it does not refer to the nationality of the applicant, 
it potentially excludes the workers from other Member State whose mother tongue is not the 
language of the host State. Such a measure may not be imposed on a worker in order to ‘save’ 
the labour market of the host State from nationals of other Member States. However, if the 
nature of the work requires an adequate knowledge of the language of the State concerned, 
language requirements can be justified. This was at issue in Groener, 49 where a Dutch 
national was refused a permanent post at a design college in Ireland because she did not 
speak Irish Gaelic. The Court held that requiring lecturers in public vocational education 
schools to have a certain knowledge of the Irish language was a necessary measure for 
furtherance of the Government policy to promote the use of the Irish language as a means of 
expressing national culture and identity. The Court also held that the level of linguistic 




45 Regulation 492/11, Article 3(1)(b).  
46 Kalliope Schöning-Kougebetopoulou (n 17). 
47 Case C-419/92 Scholz [1994] ECR I-505, para. 11.  
48 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703. 
49 Case 379/87 [1989] ECR 3967.  
50 This principle is also consolidated in secondary legislation: (Article 3(1) Regulation 492/11). 
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c) Non-discriminatory measures which hinder market access 
In addition to the discriminatory measures (directly or indirectly), there are measures which 
prima facie seem entirely neutral and non-discriminatory, but still affect the access of 
migrant workers to the host State labour market. These measures may also amount to a 
violation of Article 45 TFEU,51 if they constitute an ‘obstacle’, ‘barrier’, ‘restriction’, or 
‘impediment’ to the exercise of the freedom of movement of workers,52 or if they place 
migrant workers ‘at a disadvantage’.53   
A non-discriminatory obstacle to the free movement of workers may be saved if it is 
proportionate, and objectively justified.54  
 
d) Permissible limitations  
Although discrimination against EU citizens in relation to access to the market of the host 
State is prohibited, jobs in the public service may in certain circumstances be reserved for the 
nationals of the host State.55 Similar restriction may be imposed on the self-employed and on 
service providers, to be engaged in activities which ‘are connected, even occasionally, with 
the exercise of official authority’.56 This nevertheless, does not mean that Member State 
nationals can be excluded from undertaking an employment merely because the employer is 
the State.57  It is the nature of the employment which must be taken into account. The 
derogation is limited to employments which constitute a direct and specific connection with 
the exercise of public service. 58   
2.1.2 Freedom of establishment  
In addition to the freedom of movement for the purpose of undertaking employment, 
nationals of a Member State may exercise their freedom of movement to other Member States 
 
51 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
52 For an analysis of the Court’s approach to neutral measures, see Barnard (n 14) 281–2. 
53 Case C-40/05 Lyyski [2007] ECR I-99. 
54 ibid, para. 37; Case C-379/09 Casteels [2011] ECR I-1379, para 30. 
55 TFEU, Article 45(4).  
56 TFEU, Article 51. 
57 The Court established a test for employment in the public service in Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium 
[1980] ECR3881. The employment ‘must involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers 
conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public 
authorities. Such posts in fact presume on the part of those occupying them the existence of a special 
relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the foundation of the bond 
of nationality’. 
58 Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, para. 45; Commission v Italy (n 37) para. 20.   
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for pursuing self-employed economic activities on a permanent basis. This category of 
Member State nationals is covered by Chapter II of the TFEU, Article 49 TFEU in particular, 
which provides them with the freedom of establishment, allowing them to establish 
themselves in another Member State for an indefinite period, and enjoy equal treatment with 
the nationals of that State. 
Like the provisions on the freedom of movement of workers that do not define ‘worker’, the 
provisions on freedom of establishment do not offer a definition of the ‘self-employed’, and 
thus, it was left to the Court to determine who falls within the personal scope of these 
provisions. The Court has characterised a self-employed as a Member State national who 
works [i] outside any relationship of subordination concerning the choice of that activity, 
working conditions and conditions of remuneration; [ii] under that person's own 
responsibility; [iii] in return for remuneration paid to that person directly and in full.59 
Setting such broad criteria for qualifying as a self-employed, ensures a greater number of 
Member State nationals are able to rely on the provisions on the freedom of establishment. 
This has also been emphasised by the Court in the Gebhard case:  
‘the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is therefore a very 
broad one, allowing a Community national to participate, on a stable and continuous 
basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to 
profit therefrom, so contributing to economic and social interpenetration within the 
Community in the sphere of activities as self-employed persons’.60  
The main criteria established by the Court for distinguishing between employment and self-
employment are [i] the duration of the activity (i.e. being stable and not temporary), and [ii] 
the level of control that the person has on the activity (i.e. whether the work is subject to the 
direction and control of another person or not).  The self-employment must, like employment 
in the freedom of movement for workers, constitute an ‘effective and genuine’ activity.61 
Article 49 TFEU grants Member State nationals the right to take up and pursue activities as 
self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings; setting-up of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any 
Member State, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals. 
 
59 Case C-268/99 Jany and others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615, paras. 34 and 70-1.  
60 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, para. 25.  
61 ibid.  
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The rights under Article 49 TFEU have been supplemented by detailed pieces of secondary 
legislation, such as Directive 73/148 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Union for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and 
the provisions of services,62 which has now been repealed and replaced by the Citizens’ 
Rights Directive. I shall now consider the rights of the self-employed under Article 49 TFEU, 
as well as the details of these rights provided for by the Directive.  
 
The right to free movement – entry and residence up to three months 
Member State nationals who exercise an economic activity which falls within the scope of 
Article 49 TFEU, have the right to enter the territory of other Member States and establish 
themselves there.  
Moreover, self-employed Member State nationals, like all Member State nationals, are 
provided (by Article 6 Citizens’ Rights Directive) with an unconditional right of entry and 
residence in any Member State for an initial period of up to three months. They may not be 
required to comply with any formality, other than holding a valid identity card or passport.  
 
The right of residence – beyond three months 
Member State nationals have the right to continue their residence after the expiry of the initial 
unconditional period of residence, as long as they retain the status of the self-employed. They 
may be required by the host State to register their presence with the competent authorities, 
prove that they are pursuing an economic activity within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU, 
and obtain residence documents. However, again, this does not mean that Member State 
nationals must prove their eligibility for the right of residence in the host State for acquiring 
such a right.63 The residence documents issued after registration also have merely probative 
value and are not constitutive of the right of residence.64 Furthermore, a failure to comply 
with the registration requirement, per se, may never lead to the loss of the right of residence, 
 
62 [1973] OJ L172/14.  
63 Roux (n 33), para. 11.  
64 Royer (n 29), para. 31. 
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as this is a fundamental right conferred on Member State nationals by a Treaty provision; the 
host State may only impose proportionate penalties for such a failure.65  
 
Access to the host state labour market  
Article 49 TFEU requires the host State to treat the self-employed migrants equally with its 
own nationals. Self-employed Member State nationals are protected against any nationality 
discrimination.   
 
a) Directly discriminatory measures 
Adopting directly discriminatory measures on the grounds of nationality (measures which 
explicitly (i.e. on their face) treat nationals of other Member States less favourably than the 
nationals of the host State) is contrary to the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 
49 TFEU, and is therefore, prohibited. Such measures may be justified only by reference to 
one of the Treaty derogations provided in Article 52 TFEU – public policy, public health, and 
public security.  
An example of a measure held by the Court as directly discriminatory is, a Belgian rule 
which prevented a Dutch lawyer from practising, because he did not hold the Belgian 
nationality.66  
 
b) Indirectly discriminatory measures  
Imposing a condition, which is applicable irrespective of nationality, but in reality, can more 
easily be satisfied by the nationals of the host State, also, amounts to discrimination (albeit 
indirect one), and is prohibited unless justified. Indirectly discriminatory measures may be 




65 Roux (n 33), para 12.  
66 Reyners (n 88). 
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c) Non-discriminatory measures which hinder market access 
Measures which are entirely neutral among the nationals of the host State and the nationals of 
other Member States, but constitute an obstacle to the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment, also breach the principle of equal treatment. Such measures are also 
prohibited, and may be saved if they are proportionate, and objectively justified.  
A famous example of a measure held by the Court to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment is imposing a condition to register with the local 
regulatory/professional/governing bodies.67  
2.1.3 Freedom to provide and receive services 
The next category of Member State nationals who derive rights from the personal market 
freedoms is service providers. Articles 56 TFEU concerns this category of Member State 
nationals and bestows on them the freedom to provide services in a cross-border context: 
‘… restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other 
than that of the person for whom the services are intended’.68  
Article 57 TFEU then provides the criteria for economic activities to be considered as 
services: 
‘[s]ervices shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the Treaties 
where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons’. 
In other words, services are the residual of any economic activities that are not governed by 
other market freedoms. The economic activities must however, be temporary to fall within 
the material scope of the provisions on the freedom to provide services.69   
Furthermore, service recipients also fall within the personal scope of Article 56 TFEU, 
although the provision does not expressly refer to recipients. This was asserted in secondary 
legislation (Directive 73/148, now repealed by the Citizens’ Rights Directive)70, and 
 
67 Gebhard (n 60).  
68 TFEU, Article 56.  
69 See for instance, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 28.  
70 [1973] OJ L172/14. 
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confirmed by the Court in the joint cases of Luisi and Carbone,71 where the Court held that 
the freedom to receive services from a provider established in another Member State was the 
necessary corollary of the freedom to provide services, which fulfils the objective of 
liberalising all gainful activity not covered by the free movement of goods, persons and 
capital.72 Thus, both service providers and recipients who, respectively, temporarily provide 
and receive in a service across borders, may derive rights from the provisions on the freedom 
to provide and receive services.  
The provisions on the freedom to provide services do not explicitly refer to the rights of 
movement and residence for the service providers/recipients. Nevertheless, it does not mean 
that the freedom to provide and receive services does not entail the rights of movement and 
residence for service providers/recipients. As any restriction on the freedom to 
provide/receive services in a second Member State is prohibited by Article 56 TFEU, the 
restriction on the residence of the service provider/recipient in the second State is also 
prohibited, if this residence is for, or necessary for, the purpose of providing/receiving a 
service which falls within the scope of these provisions.  
Moreover, Member State nationals who need to move to other Member States for the purpose 
of providing/receiving a service, can derive a right of residence in the host State from the 
provisions of the Citizens’ Rights Directive (i.e. the right to entry and residence up to three 
months from Article 6, and the right of residence beyond three months from Article 7).73 The 
Directive does not expressly refer to service providers, however, the provisions cover all 
Member State nationals, and hence, the service provider/recipients are also able to rely on the 
Directive’s provisions and enjoy the rights of free movement and residence.  
 
Access to the market of the host State (where the service is delivered)  
The service providers (and recipients) are protected against any nationality discrimination. 
Any measure which may impede their freedom to provide/receive services are also prohibited 
as we will see below.  
 
 
71 Cases 286/82 and 26/83 [1984] ECR 377. 
72 ibid. para. 10. 
73 Directive 2004/38, Articles 6 and 7.  
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a) Directly discriminatory measures 
Any direct discrimination based on the nationality of the service provider/recipient is 
prohibited, as was also the case with the other freedoms that we examined earlier. Therefore, 
those who exercise their rights stemming from the personal market freedoms, must be treated 
equally with the nationals of the host State. However, such a basic protection does not 
address all issues which a service provider/recipient might face in the host State. The service 
providers/recipients are established in a Member State, and temporarily provide/receive 
services in another Member State. Hence, they are already subject to the rules of the first 
State (the State where their business is established), and when they move to the second State, 
if they are imposed the conditions with which domestic providers (i.e. providers who are 
established there) are also required to comply (and thus the conditions are not directly 
discriminatory), the migrant service provider would face a double burden, as they, now, must 
comply with the conditions imposed by two states. The Court has recognised this issue in the 
Säger case.74 It held that: 
‘a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject to 
compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of 
all practical effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to 
guarantee the freedom to provide services’.  
The Court in another case,75 held that Article 56 TFEU does not only prohibit direct 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, but also it prohibits any discrimination on the 
grounds of place of establishment.  
An example of a directly discriminatory measure, which was held to violate Article 56 TFEU, 
can be found in the FDC case.76 At issue was a rule which made the permission to distribute 
dubbed foreign films in Spain conditional on distributing a Spanish film at the same time. 
The rule was held to breach (what is now) Article 56 TFEU ‘because it gave preferential 
treatment to the producers of Spanish films over producers established in other Member 
States, since only Spanish producers had a guarantee that their films would be distributed’.77  
 
74 Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221. 
75 Case C-288/89 Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007, para. 10.  
76 Case C-17/92 FDC [1993] ECR I-239.  
77 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Oxford University Press 2013) 383.  
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Directly discriminatory measures may be justified only by reference to one of the derogation 
grounds provided in the Treaty in Article 52 TFEU (public policy, public health, and public 
security).  
   
b) Indirectly discriminatory measures  
Measures which are indirectly discriminatory or impose a dual burden on foreign service 
providers/recipients are also caught by Article 56 TFEU. In the case of Gouda,78 it was held 
that: 
‘[i]n the absence of harmonization of the rules applicable to services, or even of a 
system of equivalence, restrictions on the freedom guaranteed by the Treaty in this 
field may arise in the second place as a result of the application of national rules 
which affect any person established in the national territory to persons providing 
services established in the territory of another Member State who already have to 
satisfy the requirements of that State's legislation’. 
The Court continued that measures prohibited by (now) Article 56 TFEU may be justified on 
the grounds of public interest (in addition to public policy, public security, and public 
health).79 
An example of prohibited indirectly discriminatory measures is the national rules which 
require service providers to be authorised by the governing bodies of the host State.80 Such a 
measure may make market access harder or even impossible for those who are established in 
a Member State and want to occasionally provide services in other Member States, as it 
would not be practical for such service providers to register with the relevant governing 





78 Case C-288/89 [1991] ECR I-4007, para. 12.  
79 ibid. para 13. The Court provided a list of public-interest grounds in its judgment.   
80 See for instance, Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755.  
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c) Non-discriminatory measures which hinder market access 
Measures which are neutral but liable to hinder the exercise of the freedom to provide/receive 
services, also breach Article 56 TFEU. This was asserted by the Court in Säger, where it held 
that:  
‘Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against 
a person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of 
any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services 
and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede 
the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he 
lawfully provides similar services’.81  
 
Measures which are not discriminatory but impede freedom to provide/receive services may 
be justified on the Treaty derogation grounds and the judge-made objective justifications.82 
However, the steps taken to protect the public interest must be appropriate for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it.83   
2.2. Freedom of movement for economically inactive nationals (as a citizenship right) 
So far in this chapter, I have considered the rights that Member State nationals derive from 
the personal market freedoms of the Treaty. As mentioned before, the rights which Member 
State nationals derive from the personal market freedoms are activity-oriented rights and, 
thus, only those Member State nationals who are engaged or intend to engage in a cross-
border economic activity may rely on these provisions and enjoy the rights of free movement, 
residence and equal treatment with the nationals of the host State in a Member State other 
than the one of their nationality.84  
I now turn to consider the status-oriented rights of Member State nationals which they derive 
from the citizenship provisions of the Treaty. 
 
81 Säger (n 74), para. 12. 
82 The Court provided a list of public-interest grounds in its judgment in Säger (n 74). These grounds are in 
addition to public policy, public health and public security grounds.  
83 Joint Cases C-369 and 376/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453, para. 35.  
84 Case C-281/06 Jundt v Finanzamt Offenburg [2007] ECR I-12231, para 17.  
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The status of citizenship of the Union was introduced to EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht 
by, what is now, Article 20(1) TFEU which provides that ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby 
established’ and continues by defining the criterion of access to the new status: ‘[e]very 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. Then in its 
second paragraph Article 20 TFEU provides a (non-exhaustive) list of rights that the status of 
EU citizenship entails. One of these citizenship rights is ‘the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States’, which has been characterised as a ‘primary right’ 
by Advocate General La Pergola in his opinion in Martínez Sala.85  
Article 21(1) TFEU provides more details of the rights of free movement and residence of 
EU citizens in the second Member State: ‘[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. These rights are ‘subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give 
them effect’. The most important piece of legislation which provides extensive details of the 
free movement and residence rights of EU citizens, 86 as well as details of the limitations and 
conditions of these rights, is the Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38.87  
Before moving to consider the details of the rights of free movement and residence of EU 
citizens laid down in the Citizens’ Rights Directive, there is another important right of EU 
citizens stemming from the citizenship provisions that needs to be mentioned here: the right 
to equal treatment.  EU citizens enjoy a general protection against nationality discrimination 
when they exercise their right to free movement, 88 provided for in Article 18 TFEU:  
‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited’. 
The above citizenship provisions are found in Part Two of the TFEU entitled ‘Non-
discrimination and Citizenship of the Union’. Article 18 TFEU is the first provision of this 
 
85 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-269, para. 18. 
86 Family members of an EU citizen (as defined in Articles 2(2) and 3(2) Citizens’ Rights Directive) may also 
indirectly derive rights from the Directive, and accompany or join their EU citizen family member in the second 
State.   
87 Davies has argued that a right granted by the primary law of the Union, should/may not be dependent on the 
conditions defined in secondary legislation. See Davies (n 36) 188. 
88 It is generally the exercise or the intention of exercising the right to free movement that brings a situation and 
the EU citizen involved, within the scope of EU law, and triggers Article 18 TFEU. However, a situation may 
also fall within the scope of Article 18 TFEU even if the EU citizens involved, has not or does not intend to 
exercise the right to free movement in the foreseeable future. See Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421. 
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part. It is placed before the citizenship provisions which illustrates the importance of the right 
to non-discrimination against on the grounds of nationality.  
After briefly reviewing the citizenship provisions which together grant the rights to free 
movement, residence, and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality to all EU citizens, 
we can now proceed to the analysis of the details of these rights. 
 2.2.1 The right of entry and residence for up to three months 
Following the abolition of the border controls between the Member States (with the 
exceptions of UK, Ireland and recently-joined Member States), everyone (obviously 
including EU citizens) may freely move between the Member States within the Schengen 
area without passing a border check.89 In addition to this possibility that is available to 
everyone present in the EU (but may be limited in certain cases),90 EU citizens are 
guaranteed a right to freely move between the Member States (as will be seen below). EU 
citizens’ right of free movement is also not limited to the Schengen-area States (six states less 
than the EU), but applies to all States in the Union.  
EU citizens may rely on different provisions in order to enjoy the rights of entry and 
residence within the Union. Above all, they may derive the right from Article 21 TFEU 
which is a directly effective provision;91 thus, EU citizens are able to enforce the provision 
before their national courts and enjoy the right to move to, and enter a Member State other 
than their home State, and reside there for an indefinite period of time. An EU citizen does 
not need to satisfy any condition in order to acquire the rights of movement and residence 
provided for in Article 21 TFEU. These rights are free-standing, fundamental rights,92 and 
their existence cannot be questioned.93 The exercise of the rights however, may be limited if 
the EU citizen does not satisfy the conditions laid down in the Treaty (the conditions, 
 
89 Regulation 562/2006/EC of the European Parliament and council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).  
90 Border controls may exceptionally and temporarily be reintroduced for responding to threats to public policy 
or internal security: ibid Article 23.  
91 This was established in Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, which has been reflected in Article 
25(1) Citizens’ Rights Directive. For a detailed analysis of the consequences of direct effect of Article 21 TFEU, 
see Rossi dal Pozzo (n 4) 54. 
92 For a detailed explanation of the differences between fundamental and other rights see C Hilson ‘What’s in a 
Right? The Relationship between Community, Fundamental and Citizenship Rights in EU Law’ (2004) 29 
European Law Review 636, 646 – 49. For a detailed explanation of the consequences of recognising the right to 
free movement as a fundamental right by the Court, see Tryfonidou (n 5) 38.  
93 Baumbast (n 91).  
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limitations, and derogations to the citizenship right of free movement will be discussed later 
in this section).94 
The other provision from which EU citizens may derive the rights of entry and residence in 
the host State is Article 6(1) of the Citizens Rights’ Directive. The provision provides all 
Union citizens with the rights of entry and residence in a Member State other than the one of 
which they are national, for a period of up to three months. It iterates that no condition or 
formalities (other than holding a valid identity card or passport) may be imposed on the 
Union citizens who exercise this initial three month rights of entry and residence. Put 
differently, an EU citizen may never be required to obtain an entry visa or comply with 
equivalent formalities. After entry, however, they may be required to register their presence 
in the host State with the immigration authorities. Failure to comply with this requirement 
may make the person concerned liable to proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions’,95 
but it never constitutes a reason for deportation.96 
In addition to the above sources of free movement rights for EU citizens, the right has been 
recognised in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’ or ‘EUCFR’) as a 
fundamental right.97 The Charter is legally binding since 2009 and has the same legal value as 
the Treaties.98 
As mentioned before, unlike the rights stemming from the personal market freedoms, the 
right to free movement and residence which EU citizens derive from the citizenship 
provisions are not dependent on the beneficiary’s economic status. The citizenship provisions 
are detached from any economic considerations. Rather, they are linked to the nationality of 
the beneficiary. Any national of a Member State may rely on Article 21 TFEU.  
2.2.2 The right of residence beyond three months 
After the initial period of residence in the host State, during which EU citizens may only be 
required to produce identity cards and in specific Member States register their presence with 
 
94 For further analysis of the distinction between the ‘existence’ and the ‘exercise’ of the right to free movement 
and residence see Y Borgmann-Prebil, ‘The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship’ (2008) 14 ELJ 328, 341-
342; J Shaw, ‘A View of the Citizenship Classics: Martínez Sala and Subsequent Cases on Citizenship of the 
Union’ in M Poiares Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law 
Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 358 and 361; A Wiesbrock, ‘Free Movement 
of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union: The IlLusion of IncLusion’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 455. 
95 Directive 2004/38, Article 5(5).  
96 Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185. 
97 The Charter, Article 45(1). 
98 TEU, Article 6(1). 
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the host State’s authorities, for residence beyond three months EU citizens may be asked to 
fulfil further conditions.  
Economically inactive EU citizens may derive the right of residence beyond three months 
from Article 7 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive if they are economically self-sufficient, i.e. 
have enough financial resources to support themselves and their family members without 
becoming a burden on the welfare system of the host State, and are covered by 
comprehensive health insurance for the period of their residence.99 Students may also enjoy 
the right of residence beyond three months, if they can assure the relevant national authority 
that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members without 
becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host State during their period of 
residence.100 The host State may require migrant EU citizens to register their residence with 
the relevant authorities,101 and obtain a registration certificate (not a permit).102 At the time of 
registration, the host State can verify that economically inactive EU citizens who intend to 
continue residing on its territory meet the conditions specified in Article 7 of the Citizens 
Rights Directive. However, requiring economically inactive EU citizens to comply with these 
formalities and prove that they are self-sufficient, does not mean that they are required to do 
so in order to acquire their right of residence. Economic self-sufficiency is not a condition for 
acquiring the right of residence. EU citizens, regardless of their financial status, have been 
assumed to have a right of residence in the territory of another Member State,103 and it is the 
host State that must rebut this presumption.   
In order to rebut the above presumption, the host State must prove that the economically 
inactive EU citizen has become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the 
State. Seeking social assistance in the host State, per se, is not enough to make an EU citizen 
 
99 Citizens’ Rights Directive, Article 7(b). 
100 ibid, Article 79(c). 
101 ibid, Article 8(1).  
102 ibid. Article 8(2).  
103 Although the Court has almost in every case (e.g. Baumbast) emphasised on this assumption and confirmed 
that the self-sufficiency is not a condition for acquiring the right of residence by economically inactive EU 
citizens, in a recent judgment (Case C-333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358), it took a different view. Due to the 
mixed signals given by the Court in its judgments, it is too early to conclude that the self-sufficiency is, now, a 
condition to the right of residence of these EU citizens, when the majority of the judgments confirmed 
otherwise. For further analysis of the judgment see S Peers, ‘Benefits for EU Citizens: A U-Turn by the Court of 
Justice?’ (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 195. 
74 
an unreasonable burden on the social assistance of the host State; the host State must also 
prove that limiting the right of residence of the EU citizen is proportionate.104  
Overall, citizens automatically enjoy the right of residence in the host State, and such a right 
is not conditional. The exercise of the right may be limited, however, if the conditions 
specified in the Citizens’ Rights Directive are not satisfied. Yet, the right of residence of an 
EU citizen in the host State may not be limited merely because he/she does not meet the 
conditions specified in the Citizens Rights’ Directive. The limitation must also be 
proportionate.105   
2.2.3 Protection against discrimination 
Economically inactive EU citizens may exercise their rights of movement and residence in 
the host State without suffering any nationality discrimination or facing any obstacle to the 
exercise of their rights of movement and residence. Being the subject of nationality-
discriminatory measures in the host State obviously makes the exercise of the rights to free 
movement and residence less attractive for EU citizens, thus, such measures are capable of 
impeding the exercise of these rights by EU citizens. Unjustified measures which impede the 
exercise of the rights of movement and residence by EU citizens have been declared by the 
Court to be caught by Article 21 TFEU.106  
2.3 Summary of the rights of movement and residence of EU citizens (economically 
active and inactive)  
This section sought to provide an overview of the rights of EU citizens to move from one 
Member State to another and reside on its territory. The section may seem descriptive, 
however, having a descriptive section on the rights of EU citizens is necessary, first, in order 
to compare these rights with the rights of LTRs and establish the extent to which the LTR 
Directive has effectively granted LTRs rights comparable to those of EU citizens; secondly, 
to examine which rights of EU citizens can/should be extended to LTRs.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis in this section is that EU citizens derive 
the rights to free movement and residence within the territory of the Union from two different 
 
104 The condition of proportionality for limiting the right of residence of an EU citizen who has recourse to 
public funds was first established in Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-61933, para. 31, and was later 
confirmed in Trojani (n 69), para 45. 
105 See e.g. the facts in Baumbast (n 91). 
106 Cases C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763; C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191; Case C-353/06 Grunkin 
and Paul [2008] ECR I-7639; Case C-56/09 Zanotti [2010] ECR I-4517; Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein 
[2010] ECR I-13693; Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn [2011] ECR-3787. 
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sources. The first source is the personal market freedoms which provide economically active 
EU citizens with the rights of movement and residence. An EU citizen can only derive rights 
from these provisions if they are engaged in an economic activity. The rights stemming from 
these provisions can be called ‘activity-oriented’, as it is the activity of the EU citizen which 
enables them to derive rights from these provisions.  
The second source of rights of movement and residence for EU citizens is the citizenship 
provisions of the Treaty. EU citizens enjoy these rights as a result of holding the status of EU 
citizenship; thus, the rights stemming from these provisions can be called ‘status-oriented’.  
EU citizens who exercise or intend to exercise their rights of movement and residence, 
whether such rights are activity-oriented or status-oriented, will be protected against 
nationality discrimination in the host State. 
An important characteristic of the free movement and residence rights of EU citizens clarified 
in this section is that the existence of these rights of EU citizens may never be questioned. EU 
citizens are presumed to have the rights of movement and residence and the burden to rebut 
this presumption is on the host State, should it want to restrict the exercise of the right by the 
EU citizen. 
It can also be concluded that the provisions do more than just prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of nationality. They promote the exercise of the free movement rights. The ECJ has 
also followed this approach. The Court not only intends to remove the obstacles from the way 
of mobile EU citizens, but also tries to make free movement more attractive for them.107  
The next section aims to provide a brief analysis of the intra-EU mobility rights of LTRs.  
3. Freedom of movement of third-country national long-term residents 
While TCNs can directly enjoy the freedom of movement of goods and capital, they have 
generally been excluded from the personal scope of the provisions on the freedom of 
movement of persons.108 TCNs may neither rely on the personal market freedoms, nor 
 
107 F Goudappel, The Effects of EU Citizenship: Economic, Social and Political Rights in a Time of 
Constitutional Change (TMC Asser Press 2010) 59. 
108 Case C-230/97 Awoyemi [1998] ECR I-6781, para 29. 
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(obviously) rely on the citizenship provisions, as holding the nationality of a Member State is 
a condition for falling within the personal scope of these provisions.109  
Even those Treaty provisions which could potentially be interpreted in a way which extends 
their personal scope to TCNs, and thus enable TCNs to rely on those provisions, were read by 
the Court as applicable only to EU citizens. For instance, Article 45 TFEU which reads that 
‘[f]reedom of movement for “workers” shall be secured within the Union’, can be interpreted 
as covering every worker, regardless of nationality. Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that 
the Article is only applicable to workers who hold the nationality of a Member State,110 and, 
thus, TCNs continued to be excluded from the freedom of movement provisions.  
LTRs, however, as the Tampere Programme provided, were supposed to be granted a right to 
free movement and residence ‘comparable’ to that enjoyed by EU citizens.111 This milestone, 
if reached by the LTR Directive, could be a revolution in the concept of Union citizenship, as 
it would mean that holding the nationality of a Member State was no longer the sole way to 
the enjoyment of the free movement rights reserved for EU citizens.  
The expectation that LTRs will be granted rights of free movement and residence similar to 
what EU citizens enjoy, was raised with reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union in the preamble to the LTR Directive. Article 45(2) of the Charter 
confirms the possibility of extension of the freedom of movement and residence within the 
Union, to TCNs who are legally resident in a Member State: 
Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaties, 
to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State.112 
A reference to the Charter in the preamble to the LTR Directive could create an expectation 
that Article 45(2) of the Charter would be taken into account in adopting the Directive (i.e. 
the freedom of movement and residence within the Union would be extended to LTRs). 
Moreover, Recital 18 of the LTR Directive states that the conditions subject to which LTRs 
acquire the right to free movement should not prevent LTRs from contributing to the 
effective attainment of an internal market as an area in which the free movement of persons is 
 
109 The only exception to this general exclusion is TCN family members of migrant EU citizens. This category 
of TCNs when accompany their EU citizen family member, (indirectly) derive the right of movement and 
residence from the Treaty provisions.    
110 Case 238/83 Meade [1984] ECR 2631. 
111 Tampere Programme, para 18. 
112 The Charter, Article 45(2). 
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ensured. These two indications in the preamble to the Directive are enough to expect the 
Directive to grant LTRs a right to free movement similar to what EU citizens enjoy.  
In this section, I analyse the rights which the LTR Directive bestows on LTRs to move and 
reside in a second Member State. In order to make the comparison of the rights of LTRs with 
the rights of EU citizens, I will analyse the rights of economically active and inactive LTRs 
separately, starting, again, with the rights of the economically active. 
3.1 The rights of economically active LTRs 
The right of entry to a second Member State, and residence for up to three months 
Entering a second Member State and short stays of up to three months are not covered by the 
LTR Directive. The movement of LTRs is governed by the ‘Schengen acquis’ on border 
controls,113 which governs the movement of non-EU citizens between the Schengen States.114 
The acquis has, inter alia, abolished the border controls between the Signatory States, and 
created an area where the freedom to travel is guaranteed for every person, regardless of 
nationality. Thus, LTRs, like other TCNs can travel within the Schengen Area and stay in any 
of the Signatory States for up to three months. This means that LTRs do not enjoy any special 
right of movement between EU Member States.  
  
Residence in a second Member State beyond three months 
Chapter 3 of the LTR Directive concerns the right of residence of LTRs in the second 
Member State for more than three months. Article 14 of the Directive provides that: 
A long-term resident shall acquire the right to reside in the territory of Member States 
other than the one which granted him/her the long-term residence status, for a period 
exceeding three months, provided that the conditions set out in this chapter are met. 
Paragraph 2 of the Article then provides a list of grounds on which LTRs may reside in the 
second Member State: [i] for exercising an economic activity in an employed or self-
employed capacity; [ii] for pursuing studies or vocational training; [iii] for other purposes.  
 
113 The Schengen acquis is mainly based on the Schengen Convention 1990 (OJ 2000 L 239/19), and the 
supplementary acts adopted by the Schengen Executive Committee after the Amsterdam Treaty.  
114 The Schengen States are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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The list of grounds is comprehensive and covers any reason for which an LTR may want to 
move to a second State. The LTR Directive seems to place LTRs in a position comparable to 
EU citizens, however, it makes the residence of the LTR in the second State subject to 
conditions and limitations, which, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, have not only made 
the free movement rights of LTRs incomparable with the rights of EU citizens, but also have 
made the comprehensive list of grounds for residence of LTRs in the second State practically 
useless.  
 
First condition: the residence/work permit requirement  
LTRs must submit an application for a residence permit to the competent authorities of the 
second State ‘as soon as possible and no later than three months after entering the territory of 
the second Member State’ (Article 15(1) the LTR Directive). The application must be 
processed within four months (Article 19(1) LTR Directive). 
Requiring LTRs to obtain a work/residence permit means that they may not start working in 
the second State before their application for a residence/work permit has been approved. This 
requirement could mean that LTRs who move to a second Member State would be 
unemployed for months; this could be a clear hindrance to the movement of LTRs, as not 
every person is willing/able to be unemployed for months between two employments.  Article 
15(1) of the LTR Directive partly addresses this problem: it provides that LTRs may submit 
their application for a residence/work permit while they are still resident in the first State.  
The possibility to submit the application from the first Member State might solve the problem 
for the employed and self-employed LTRs, who work only for one employer or only in one 
Member State. However, it does not seem to be a practical solution for service providers who 
may want to offer their services in more than one Member State, as, first, an LTR can hold a 
resident permit in one Member State only, thus, they have permission to work and provide 
service in that Member State only.  Thus, an LTR will not be able to offer their service in 
more than one Member State.. Secondly, the recipient of the service would also have to wait 
until the LTR service provider successfully obtains a work permit and then delivers the 
service. There is a good chance that the service recipient seeks an alternative service 
provider, rather than waiting for the LTR’s application to be approved.     
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Moreover, while allowing an LTR to submit an application for a residence/work permit 
before arrival to the second State may solve the problem to some extent, it is not clear if 
eventually the application is approved by that State, and thus, the LTR loses the right of 
residence in the first State, would he/she have to stop working in the first State immediately, 
as the grant of a residence permit in another State invalidates the residence permit of the first 
State with immediate effect. If the LTR continues working in the first State (for instance to 
wrap up his/her pending projects and tasks), would he work illegally (i.e. working while not 
holding a residence/work permit valid for the first State)?   
The total number of residence permits issued for LTRs in the second State may also be 
limited, if such limitation was in place at the time of adoption of the LTR Directive (Article 
14(4) of the Directive). It is not crystal clear whether ‘the time of adoption of the Directive’ 
refers to the time at which the Directive was adopted by the Council in 2003, or whether it 
refers to the time the Directive’s period of implementation ended in 2006. This issue might 
arise later as a question for the Court to decide. Nevertheless, whichever was the intended 
date, there was a delay in the abolition of national quotas on the number of LTR migrants, 
which, potentially, created enough time for illiberal Member States between the first proposal 
(in 2001) and the adoption of the Directive, to place limitations on the number of resident 
permits issued for LTRs, so at the time of the adoption of the Directive, such a quota was in 
place, and thus, the Member States remained able to keep the quotas in place even after the 
adoption of the Directive.  
Other issues arise as a result of the residence/work permit requirement as LTRs already hold 
a residence permit which clearly states: ‘EU residence permit’ (not a residence permit 
referring to one Member State and therefore, limited to that Member State). 
First, requiring a person who already has a residence permit which (as it reads) should be 
valid in the territory of the EU to apply for another residence permit, means that an EU 
residence permit is not valid for residence in the territory of the Union. Rather, the status of 
long-term residence entails a right of residence limited to the territory of the Member State 
which grants the status, rather than a right of residence valid for the whole territory of the 
Union, despite the fact that residence permit is entitled ‘EU residence permit’.  
Secondly, it is not clear what would be the consequences of LTRs’ failure to submit an 
application for a residence/work permit to the authorities of the second State. Would a holder 
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of an ‘EU residence permit’ become ‘illegal’ in the second State, while he/she is still within 
the territory of EU for which he/she has a residence permit? 
 
Second condition: financial resources 
At the time of lodging the application for a residence/work permit, the host State may require 
the applicant to produce evidence of ‘stable and regular resources’ for themselves and for 
dependent family members. The second State ‘shall evaluate these resources by reference to 
their nature and regularity’ and ‘may take into account the level of minimum wages and 
pensions’ (Article 15(2)(a) of the LTR Directive). The applicant may also be required to have 
a comprehensive sickness insurance (Article 15(2)(b)).    
The level of minimum wages and pensions is not harmonised across the Union by EU law; it 
is the national law of the Member States which sets the minimum wage. Allowing the host 
State to evaluate the sufficiency of the financial resources in accordance with national law 
leaves the Member States free to regulate the residence of LTRs in the second State by 
national law, which is an obstacle to the harmonisation of the conditions of residence of 
LTRs across the Union.  
Moreover, making the grant of the right of residence subject to a financial condition, 
indicates that economic considerations play a major role in the existence of the LTRs right of 
residence in a second State (i.e. the grant of the right of residence may be refused due to an 
economic reason – not having sufficient resources in accordance with national law).  
Satisfying the requirement of holding sufficient resources becomes even harder to justify 
when it may be imposed on economically active LTRs as well. First, it is an obvious 
difference in the conditions to which LTRs and EU citizens may be subject. But even more 
importantly, there is a chance that LTRs who have moved to the second State for undertaking 
or pursuing economic activities were not satisfied with their income/earning in the first State, 
and this reason led them to decide to move to another Member State, as EU citizen workers 
are also tempted to move to another Member State to earn more. In other words, LTRs may 
not have earned enough in the first State that is deemed sufficient according to the minimum 
wage threshold of the second State.  
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Third condition: complying with the integration measures and attending language courses 
The migrant LTRs may be asked by the second State to comply with the integration measures 
(again in accordance with the national law), if the LTRs have not already met the integration 
conditions in the first State. This condition undermines the role of residence as a factor in the 
integration of residents in the society, and requires complying with the integration measures 
while the person has already been resident for at least five years in the EU. Diego Acosta 
argues that integration measures in the second State question the value of (at least 5 years) 
residence in the first Member State (given that they acquired the long-term residence status in 
that State). Requiring LTRs to comply with these measures undermines ‘the assumption that 
LTRs have integrated into the EU as a whole’. Acosta argues that the EU long-term residence 
permit (issued after at least 5 years of residence in the EU) should suffice as proof of 
integration in the EU’s society.115  
Residence and its role in the integration of LTRs in the EU was discussed earlier in chapter 2, 
which dealt with the integration measures imposed in the first State; it is enough to repeat 
here that civic integration (i.e. requiring LTRs in the second State to comply with the 
integration measures) does not have a positive effect on the genuine inclusion of LTRs in the 
EU’s society. Such a requirement gives LTRs the message that they are still considered 
‘foreigner’ until they can prove otherwise in the second Member State, or have already 
proven in another Member State. 
Moreover, requiring LTRs to comply with the integration measures in the second State – in 
order to acquire the right of residence – hardly makes sense when migrant EU citizens are not 
imposed a similar requirement. An EU citizen may never be required to prove his/her 
integration into the society of the second State. This is the case even if the EU citizen has 
never lived in the EU.  For instance, a person who was born in the US to Spanish parents and, 
thus, acquired Spanish nationality, and as a result EU citizenship, while he/she has never 
travelled to any Member State and now is immigrating to Germany directly from the US to 
establish in Germany, may never be imposed an integration condition, while such a condition 
may be imposed on an LTR who has lived and worked in Germany for years, and now has 
moved to Austria. As it has been established by the Court,116 it is residence that contributes to 
the genuine integration of migrants into the host State, and holding the nationality of a 
 
115  D Acosta, The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2011) 146–147. 
116 Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; Case C-103/08 Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117. 
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Member State, per se, is not a proof of integration into the society of the host State. The 
longer that the migrants reside in the host State, the more integrated they become in its 
society. Thus, it is hard to explain why an integration condition should be imposed on LTRs, 
while EU citizens may never be imposed such a condition for acquiring the right to reside in 
a Member State other than their own. 
Attending language courses is the other condition which may be imposed on (mobile) 
LTRs.117 Imposing such a requirement on those whose occupation requires adequate 
linguistic knowledge can be justified, however, it does not seem to be necessary for all LTRs, 
such as those who intend to provide a service for a short time in the second State.  
 
Fourth condition: resident labour-market test 
The second State may examine the situation of its labour market and apply its national 
procedures regarding the requirements for, respectively, filling a vacancy, or for exercising 
such activities. For reasons of labour market policy, the second State may give preference to 
Union citizens, to TCNs who are affiliated to EU citizens, and to TCNs who reside legally 
and receive unemployment benefits in that State (Article 14(3) the LTR Directive). In other 
words, LTRs may be required to satisfy a resident labour-market test. They, or their 
employer, may have to prove that there is no EU citizen in the concerned State who can fill 
the vacancy, or provide the service which the LTR wishes to offer.   
The requirement of resident labour-market test makes the privileged status that the LTR 
Directive creates for LTRs, fruitless. A resident labour-market test is what every TCN who is 
applying for a job as a ‘foreigner’ is likely to be required to satisfy. Therefore, in this sense, 
LTRs have not been given a privilege over other TCNs who may come to the Union for the 
first time.  
In addition, the second State is able to restrict the ‘free’ access of LTRs to its labour market 
for the first year of residence, during which restrictions may be placed on the change of 
occupation or employer.118 The host State is also permitted to limit the access of LTRs to 
employment and self-employed activities, if the activity entails even occasional involvement 
 
117 LTR Directive, Article 15(3). 
118 LTR Directive, Article 21(2). 
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in the exercise of public authority.119 The conditions under which economically active LTRs 
gain access to the labour market are also decided in accordance with the national law of the 
State.120 
Kocharov has very rightly observed that imposing these conditions is optional.121 The second 
State may (or may not) exercise its power to restrict the existence of the right of LTRs to 
reside in its territory, or limit the LTRs’ access to the labour market.122 However, as she 
acknowledges, it is more likely that the host State exercises its power  – granted by the LTR 
Directive – to restrict the rights of LTRs, than to grant free access from the first day. 
Moreover, even if all of the Member States voluntarily do not exercise the power the LTR 
Directive grants to impose conditions on the rights of LTRs in accordance with the national 
rules, merely having the discretionary option to apply national law to a situation that falls 
within the scope of the law of the Union is in conflict with the spirit of EU law. Such a 
power, even if not exercised, means that while there is a piece of EU legislation on the rights 
and status of LTRs, national law can potentially limit the rights [attached to the status]. 
Furthermore, the optional limitations are not in line with objective 18 of the Tampere 
Programme: granting TCN residents rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens. They are also not in line with objective 20 of the Programme: approximating 
national legislation on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals. 
Mobile LTRs are not treated equally in all Member States as each State has the discretion  to 
impose conditions in accordance with its national legislation.  
3.2 The rights of economically inactive LTRs 
The criteria for acquiring and exercising the right of residence by economically inactive 
LTRs (e.g. students, self-sufficient) in the second Member State are fairly similar to what 
economically active LTRs must meet.  
In terms of the right of movement between the Member States and the right of entering the 
second Member State, there is no difference between the rights of these two categories of 
LTRs. The movement of both of them and their residence in the second State for up to three 
 
119 ibid. Article 11(1)(a). 
120 ibid. Article 21(2). 
121 A Kocharov, ‘What Intra-Community Mobility for Third-Country Workers?’ (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 913, 919.  
122 The option is available to the Member States only for the first 12 months of LTR’s residence in their 
territory. After the initial 12 months the State is not able to limit the access of LTRs to the State’s labour market. 
See on this:  Acosta (n 115) 146. 
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months, is governed by the Schengen acquis, which was considered before, in the 
economically active LTRs section.  
With regard to the right of residence beyond the initial three months, the conditions which 
economically inactive LTRs must satisfy in order to acquire the right are, also, similar to 
those applicable to economically active LTRs.  
The main difference between the rights of economically active and inactive LTRs is in their 
access to the labour market of the second State. As we saw earlier, the access of economically 
active LTRs to the market of the second State may be limited for a period not exceeding 
twelve months. This limitation may also be imposed on economically inactive LTRs, but 
without a time limit.123 For instance, an LTR who enters the second State and obtains a 
residence permit as a student there, may not have the right to work (even part time) if 
undertaking economic activities is restricted for migrant students in accordance with the 
conditions defined in national law, or there is a maximum amount of hours internationals 
student can work per month. Likewise, a self-sufficient LTR who at the time of applying for a 
residence permit had no intention to work, and so did not apply for a residence permit bearing 
a permission to work, if s(he) eventually decides to work, s(he) may have to lodge a new 
application and obtain a work permit.   
3.3 Summary of the rights of movement and residence of LTRs 
The LTR Directive provides those TCNs who have acquired the status of long-term residence 
in an EU Member State with the right to reside in other Member States. This category of 
TCNs may directly derive a right from EU law which until the time that the Directive was 
adopted, was exclusively reserved for Member State nationals. The list of purposes for which 
an LTR may reside in the second Member State is comprehensive. 
However, the rights bestowed by the LTR Directive on its beneficiaries are subject to 
discretionary , and discriminatory, conditions, which LTRs must satisfy in order to acquire 
the right of residence in the host State. LTRs, like all TCNs, have been presumed to not have 
a right of residence in the host State, unless the LTR successfully rebuts this presumption.  
It was illustrated that LTRs have been seen as a threat to the host State’s labour market, and 
the host State may choose those LTRs whose profession is demanded in the country.  
 
123 LTR Directive, Article 21(2). 
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In this section it was also illustrated that due to the level of discretion given to the Member 
State to apply their national legislation, and as the national law of each Member State is 
likely to be different from the national legislation of the other Member States, the conditions 
of residence of LTRs cannot be harmonised.  
Moreover, until an LTR has successfully satisfied the conditions and obtained the residence 
permit in the second Member State, they do not enjoy a right to equal treatment with the 
nationals of the host State.  
4. Comparing the free movement rights of EU citizens and LTRs 
After analysing the free movement rights of EU citizens and LTRs in the previous sections, 
this section seeks to compare the position of these two groups of migrants in the second 
Member State.  
 
 
Type and  
Length of residence 
 
 
Rights of EU citizens 
 
 




Entry and residence 
up to 3 months 
(tourism and other 
non-economic 
purposes) 
Right of entry and 
residence up to 3 
months 
Right of entry and 
residence up to 3 
months 
No significant 
difference in practice 
– although the source 




Enjoy the rights to 
reside and undertake 
any employment 
other than public 
services – No 
application for right 
to work is required. 
Registration may be 
required. 
Must apply for a 




approved (can take 
up to 4 months). 
Number of LTRs 
moving to the host 
State can be 
restricted. Quota can 
be imposed for jobs. 
Preference clearly 
given to EU citizens. 
The LTR Directive 
grants LTRs an 
entitlement – rather 
than a right – to 
move to a second 







Enjoy the rights to 
reside and 
provide/receive 
services – No 
application for 
exercising an 
economic activity is 
required. 
Must apply for 
permission to 
exercise an economic 
activity (e.g. 
providing services) 
which may take up to 
4 months. 
The LTR Directive 
grants LTRs an 
entitlement – rather 
than a right – to 
move to a second 
Member State for the 
purpose of providing 
services. 
Residence beyond 3 
months – self-
sufficiency 
Enjoy the right to 
reside in the host 
State as long as they 
have a 
comprehensive 
health insurance and 
are self-sufficient. 
Nevertheless, no 
proof or application 
is required. A self-
sufficient EU citizen 
can later start 
employment, 
providing services. 
Must apply for a 
residence permit and 




health insurance. If 
application is 
approved, a residence 
permit will be issued 
which may have 
employment 
restrictions. The 
holder of such a 
residence permit will 
be required to submit 
a new application if 
they intend to start 
employment or 
providing services. 
The LTR Directive 
grants LTRs an 
entitlement – rather 
than a right – to 
move to a second 
Member State. 
 
In respect of the rights of entry and residence of up to three months, practically, there does 
not seem to be a major gap between what EU citizens enjoy and what LTRs enjoy. The 
absence of gap between what the LTR Directive provides and what EU citizens enjoy is not 
because the LTR Directive provides LTRs with the fundamental rights to freely move and 
reside within the Union, like what EU citizens enjoy, but it is because, practically, there are 
no border checks between most Member States; LTRs, like other TCNs, are able to move 
within the border-free area (which does not include all EU Member States).  
With regards to the residence beyond three months in the second Member State, the LTR 
Directive has created a privileged status for LTRs which entails the right of residence in the 
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second Member State. The EU for the first time has distinguished its permanent residents 
from other TCNs, and extended their right of residence from the territory of the Member 
State in which they are resident, to the territory of the Union. LTRs as permanent residents of 
the EU, are not invisible anymore. The EU has recognised that permanent residents must 
have a special status from which they can derive special rights. This obviously must be 
welcomed as the first step towards framing a genuine inclusion of LTRs into the Union 
society. However, the differences between the right of residence of LTRs and EU citizens 
remain substantial. The differences are not only in the extent of the rights that EU citizens 
and LTRs enjoy, but also in the nature of the right of residence that these two categories of 
migrants enjoy in the host State.  
On the one hand, EU citizens enjoy a fundamental right of residence in the host State by 
virtue of their status as citizens of the Union, and the existence of their right of residence in 
the host State may never be questioned. They are presumed to have and to be able to exercise 
such a right and the burden to rebut this presumption is on the host State, should it want to 
restrict the exercise of this right by the EU citizen. On the other hand, LTRs, though hold a 
status under EU law, are deemed not to have a similar right of residence, until they can prove 
otherwise. For LTRs, residence in the second State is a conditional, rather than a guaranteed, 
right as they earn the right of residence, after they comply with the necessary formalities, and 
satisfy the possibly imposed conditions.  
Due to the difference in the nature of the rights of EU citizens and LTRs, the theme of the 
Citizens Rights Directive and the Treaty provisions on the right of residence of EU citizens is 
different from that of the Long-term Residents Directive. The former adopts a right-based 
approach (the existence of the rights is presumed, unless there is a good reason to restrict 
them), while the latter adopts a restriction-based approach (LTRs are presumed not to enjoy 
the right of residence, unless there is a good reason to grant them such a right). The Tampere 
Programme’s objectives suggested that the EU had started to adopt a rights-based approach to 
the free movement of LTRs, however, that approach does not seem to have been 
implemented into the LTR Directive.  
Moreover, the extent to which the second Member State is free to apply national law when 
considering the LTRs applications for a residence permit, as well as the level of discretion it 
has been given to impose discriminatory conditions on the applicants (e.g. on the basis of 
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their occupation) are significant. National legislation does not play such a major role in the 
legal framework that governs the right of residence of EU citizens.  
With respect to access to employment in the second Member State, preference is explicitly 
given to EU citizens; LTRs may be denied permission to undertake an employment if there 
are EU citizens and residents in the host State to fill the vacancy. This has a devastating effect 
on the movement of LTRs to other Member States for the purpose of employment there, as 
movement to other States would not be attractive enough for LTRs, if they are treated as 
second-class applicants for employment.  
Moreover, the LTRs’ access to the second State’s market is subject to complying with the 
formalities and satisfying  discretionary conditions. In granting the right to access to the 
second State’s market, the LTR Directive has not followed the same pattern as the personal 
market freedoms. The former has seen the movement of LTRs as a threat to the second State 
market, whereas the latter see the movement of EU citizens as an opportunity for the 
economy of the Member States. 
Furthermore, the geographical scope of the Directive is different from the geographical scope 
of the provisions on the freedom of movement of EU citizens, as the LTR Directive does not 
apply to all EU Member States. The States of Denmark, Ireland and the UK have opted-out 
from participating in the application of the Directive. It is another major factor which 
prevents the rights of LTRs and EU citizens to be considered as comparable.   
In addition, the situations in which the LTR Directive may be enforced are more limited than 
those in which the provisions on the free movement of EU citizens may be enforced. The 
Directive does not have horizontal direct effect, and thus, it cannot be enforced against 
individual or all legal entities, whereas, free movement provisions which grant EU citizens a 
right of residence (e.g. 45 TFEU) have horizontal direct/semi-horizontal effect in certain 
circumstances, and, thus, can be enforced against legal and natural persons.     
Taking all the fundamental differences listed above into account, the answer to the question 
‘whether the rights of LTRs with regard to free movement are comparable to the freedom of 
movement of EU citizens’ would be in the negative. Neither the LTR Directive is coextensive 
with the provisions that grant rights to EU citizens, nor is the nature of the intra-EU mobility 
rights of EU citizens and LTRs similar.  
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5. Why should the EU ensure that LTRs enjoy the same free movement rights 
that EU citizens enjoy? 
Following the conclusion reached in the previous section that the mobility rights of LTRs are 
not comparable with those of EU citizens, I now intend to analyse the reasons for which the 
Union should extend the freedom of movement within the Union to LTRs. I will examine 
these reasons from two different angles: (1) economically active LTRs should be granted the 
freedom of movement of persons in order to effectively further the attainment of the internal 
market; (2) economically inactive LTRs should enjoy the freedom of movement of persons as 
civic citizens of the Union. 
5.1 Effectively furthering the attainment of the internal market (free movement for 
economically active LTRs) 
One of the Treaty aims stated in Article 26 TFEU is to establish and maintain a properly-
functioning internal market.124 The internal market has been characterised as ‘an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured’.125 The internal market without internal frontiers seems to have been achieved with 
regards to goods. Third-country origin goods, once admitted to one Member State and 
complied with the customs of that Member State, enter in free circulation within the Union. 
Other Member State would not be able to impose any dual burden on the importation of the 
goods to their territories.126 Thus, the Union is genuinely border-free with regards to goods, 
which allows free circulation of third-country-origin goods once admitted to the Union.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to movement of persons and service (particularly service 
providers), there are still internal frontiers within the Union. While Article 26(2) TFEU does 
not refer to the nationality of the persons whose free movement in the internal market must be 
ensured, it is only EU citizens who enjoy the free movement of persons  within the internal 
market. There seems to be no mutual trust between the Member States in the admission of 
TCNs to the Union (similar to mutual trust and recognition with regards to admitted third-
country origin goods). TCNs are still subject to new application and conditions in the second 
Member State, even if they have been admitted to the first Member State and complied with 
the relevant regulations.  
 
124 TFEU, Article 26(1).  
125 TFEU, Article 26(2).  
126 Art 28 (2) and 29 TFEU. 
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The exclusion of non-EU citizens (especially those who are already admitted to the Union on 
a permanent basis) from free movement of persons is problematic for two reasons: 1)  a 
genuine border-free internal market would be partially achieved; 2) the exclusion of non-EU 
citizens does not make sense from the economic point of view. Free movement of persons is 
believed to contribute to the functioning of the internal market. TCNs, including LTRs, have 
been generally excluded from the scope of the provisions on the free movement of persons 
within the internal market. Given the economic rationale of the internal market, by excluding 
LTRs from the scope of the personal market freedoms, the EU has ignored the very rationale 
of the internal market.127 It is simply not possible to justify the exclusion of LTRs from the 
internal market,128 as there is no reason that it is only the free movement of EU citizens which 
makes a contribution to the functioning of the market.  
There is no doubt that the movement of an LTR from a Member State to another, in order to, 
for example, provide a service there, is a movement within the internal market and has effects 
on its functioning (i.e. a service provider has left one part of the market and now provides 
that service in another part of it. The consumers in that part of the internal market now have 
found a new source for the service they need). LTRs play a role in the EU market, exactly as 
much as EU citizens do. LTRs, like EU citizens, undertake employment, provide services, 
receive services, consume goods, and so on. It should be recognised that if a genuine internal 
market is to be built it is not possible to ignore a group of economic actors in the market 
based on their nationality,129 and, especially, when this group of economic actors are 
permanent part of the market. A crucial prerequisite for maintaining a properly-functioning 
internal market is to ensure the free movement of all economic participants in the EU 
market.130 Therefore, it seems to be logical that the EU extends the personal scope of the 
personal market freedoms to LTRs, so at least economically active LTRs will be able to move 
within the internal market. 
 
127 A Evans, ‘Third Country Nationals and the Treaty on European Union’ (1994) 5 Eur. J. Int’l L 199, 207. 
128 D Kochenov and M van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union : Non-Derivative Quasi -Citizenship 
Rights of Third- Country Nationals in the EU’, Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship (Martinus Nijhoff 
2015) 12; S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Free Movement of Third Country Nationals in the European Union ? Main 
Features, Deficiencies and Challenges of the new Mobility Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 791. 
129 For similar view, see inter alia, A Macgregor and G Blanke, ‘International Trade Law & Regulation Free 
Movement of Persons within the EU : Current Entitlements of EU Citizens and Third Country Nationals - a 
Comparative Overview’ (2002) 39 1; R Plender, ‘An Incipient Form of European Citizenship’ in FG Jacobs 
(ed), European Law and the Individual (North Holland,1976). 
130 For a similar view see A Wiesbrock, ‘Granting Citizenship-related Rights to Third-Country Nationals: An 
Alternative to the Full Extension of European Union Citizenship?’ (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration 
and Law 63, 90. 
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Kingreen characterises the market freedoms as the ‘trampoline that gives all participants in 
the EU economy the opportunity to leap over the normative turnpikes between the national 
markets.131 Denying access to such an opportunity to economically active LTRs, as 
permanent participants in the EU economy, may have been accepted in the past, but is not the 
case anymore.132 They now have been recognised by EU law as participants in the EU 
economy whose movement contributes to the effective attainment of the internal market,133 
so they should also be given ‘the opportunity to leap over the normative turnpikes between 
the national markets’.134  
In addition to the extension of the rights of free movement and residence to LTRs which is 
required for accomplishing the project of creating a genuine internal market as an area where 
every economic participant can move freely, the lack of equality with respect to access to 
employment in the second State must also be remedied, as it seems to be capable of 
discouraging LTRs from exercising their free movement rights for the purpose of undertaking 
employment in another State, and hence affects the functioning of the internal market.  
As we saw in chapter 2 (which examined the situation of LTRs in the first Member State), 
and this chapter (which examined the possibility for LTRs to move to other Member States), 
LTRs are in a considerably better legal position, in terms of access to employment, in the first 
Member State than the second Member State. In the first Member State, the LTR Directive 
provides LTRs with protection against nationality discrimination with regards to access to 
employment (Article 11.1 of LTR Directive) while in the second Member States, LTRs 
cannot have access to employment or self-employment activity until/if their application for a 
residence permit has been approved in the second Member State. In other words, exercising 
mobility rights would put them in a, potentially, worse position, and this is likely to impede 
them of moving.135 This is, again, against the rationale of the internal market, as an area in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured. Therefore, simply granting LTRs a right to 
free movement, without a right to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality in the 
second State, does not seem to be sufficient to encourage them to move to the second State. 
 
131 T Kingreen, ‘Fundamental Freedoms’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Hart/Beck 2011) 525. 
132 RA Miller and P Zumbansen (eds), ‘From Persons to Citizens and Beyond : The Evolution of Personal Free 
Movement in the European Union’, Annual of German and European Law: Pt. 2 (2007) 269. 
133 The preamble to the LTR Directive, Recital 18.  
134 Kingreen (n 131)  525. 
135 LTRs who move, lose rights, and EU citizens who move acquire new rights, in some respects even more than 
the host State nationals. On the phenomenon of reverse discrimination see: A Tryfonidou, Reverse 
Discrimination in EC Law (Kluwer Law International 2009). 
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Such free movement rights must be supported by the protection against nationality 
discrimination. By extending the personal scope of the personal market freedoms to LTRs the 
EU can provide them with both of these correlative rights. 
Granting economically inactive LTRs the rights of free movement and residence, however, 
cannot be justified by the internal market rationale. The scope of the personal market 
freedoms can be extended only to economically active LTRs.  
5.2 Facilitating the inclusion of [economically inactive] LTRs as de jure permanent 
members of the society of the Union 
Above, it was argued that economically active LTRs should be granted the activity-based 
rights of free movement and residence within the EU by extending the personal scope of the 
personal market freedoms. In this section I will argue that the EU should also provide 
economically inactive LTRs with free movement rights, similar to what economically 
inactive EU citizens enjoy.  
Since the establishment of the EU (and the EC before that),136 Member State nationals have 
been treated differently from TCNs. This difference was further highlighted by the 
introduction of the status of EU citizenship,137 as the status has become a label which 
distinguishes Member State nationals from ‘others’. While such a label may boost the sense 
of solidarity between Member State nationals, it has a negative impact on the ‘sense of 
belonging’ to the host society on ‘others’ who live in the EU, and consequently on their 
inclusion into the host society. It is not possible to label someone as ‘different’, treat them 
‘different’, and expect them to feel ‘one of us’, and become ‘one of us’. This applies to LTRs 
too. LTRs, who hold the status of permanent resident of the European Union, are still treated 
as individuals who need permission to leave one part of the territory of the Union (first 
Member State) and move to another part of it (second Member State). Given the impact the 
right of residence to the receiving society has on the sense of belonging to the society, LTRs 
are unlikely to have a sense of belonging to the society of the Union while LTRs cannot 
move and reside in the territory of the Union, like other members of the society – i.e. Union 
citizens. 
The mandate imposed on the Union to facilitate the integration of TCN residents, requires the 
Union to recognise the impact that treating this category of TCNs as second-class citizens 
 
136 European Community.  
137 J Shaw, 'The interpretation of European Union citizenship' (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 293-317, 305. 
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(e.g. by excluding them from free movement rights similar to what other members of the 
society enjoy) has on their sense of belonging to the society. The Union should address the 
issue by extending the rights of citizens to permanent residents, which is the effective way of 
inclusion of migrants into society, as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, I am 
not suggesting that the free movement rights of EU citizens which are affiliated to the EU 
citizenship provisions be granted to LTRs (as non-EU citizens). The rights stemming from 
the citizenship provisions are status-based rights and only those who have the status of EU 
citizen should enjoy these rights. Thus, such rights should never be extended to non-EU 
citizens, including LTRs. However, there are reasons which suggest that residence should 
also become a qualifying criterion for eligibility for EU citizenship, so LTRs could also 
obtain the status of EU citizenship and thus, could derive rights from the citizenship 
provisions. These reasons will be briefly explained below but chapter 5 will provide further 
analysis. 
First, the LTR Directive confirmed the membership of LTRs in the Union society. The 
Directive, as well as the Tampere Programme, changed the status of LTRs from de facto 
members of the society to de jure members, who participate and contribute to the European 
society. It is not acceptable that the Union ignores a large part of its population who are 
active parts of its society. LTRs’ rights (and responsibilities) should reflect their established 
membership, participation and contributions to European society.138  
Moreover, citizenship rights stemming from the EU citizenship provisions, should be granted 
to those who have a genuine link with the Union. As Tryfonidou rightly observes, there are 
people who happen to possess EU citizenship (for instance because their parents hold the 
nationality a Member State), but they have never set foot on the territory of the Union.139 
Such people, based on the current eligibility criterion for EU citizenship, are considered to be 
a member of the Union’s society, while LTRs who for a long period of time have resided, 
studied, and worked in the EU, are still considered to be aliens. This is the case because while 
citizenship, per se, does not result in the integration of migrants to the host society, residence 
is capable of creating a strong and genuine link between the host society and the person.140 
The Union by excluding LTRs from the status of EU citizenship ignores the important factor 
of residence in the genuine link between individuals and society.  
 
138 M Bell, ‘Civic Citizenship and Migrant Integration’ (2007) 13 European Public Law 311, 332. 
139 Tryfonidou (n 20) 46.  
140 Bidar (n 116); Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg [2009] ECR I-9621; Gottwald (n 99) in which the Court accepted 
that residence, per se, can establish the connection of migrant with the host society. 
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For the above reasons, residence should also become a qualifying criterion for eligibility for 
the status of EU citizenship, so LTRs after a certain period of time residing in the Union, 
become the Union’s citizens. Consequently, the personal scope of the status-based free 
movement rights stemming from the citizenship provisions of the Treaty is extended to LTRs, 
and economically inactive LTRs would be able to enjoy these rights. The extension of the 
status of EU citizenship to LTRs will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
The chapter had as its aim to examine the extent to which the rights of LTRs are comparable 
with the first set of core rights of EU citizens: the right of free movement to another Member 
State, the right of residence there, and the right to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of 
the host State. It sought to identify the important differences between the rights of LTRs and 
migrant EU citizens in the second Member State, and analyse the reasons for which these 
differences should decrease and consequently LTRs enjoy genuine intra-EU movement 
rights.   
In Section 2 of the chapter, the free movement rights of EU citizens were analysed. It was 
explained that EU citizens can derive these rights from two different sources: a) the personal 
market freedoms, which are source of rights for economically-active Member State nationals; 
and b) the citizenship provisions of the Treaty which grant the rights of free movement and 
residence to economically inactive Member State nationals. It was also said that the rights 
stemming from the personal market freedoms are activity-oriented, and they are, inter alia, 
granted to Member State nationals in order to contribute to the economic aims of the Treaty, 
such as the development of the internal market. Nevertheless, the rights stemming from the 
citizenship provisions are status-oriented rights, and Member State nationals enjoy these 
rights merely because they are EU citizens.  
In Section 3, the rights of LTRs to move to a second Member State and reside there were 
examined; in Section 4, the results of Sections 2 and 3 were compared. In that section, it was 
illustrated that the LTR Directive has provided LTRs with the possibility of directly deriving 
the right of residence within the territory of the Union, from EU law. They now have a 
privileged legal status which enables them to enjoy the right of residence in a Member State 
other than the State that granted them the status. In addition, the law governing the rights of 
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LTRs is now under parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, which is crucial to ensure the fair 
treatment of LTRs. 
However, the LTRs’ right of residence in the second Member State is still inherently different 
in nature from the right of residence of EU citizens. The residence right of the latter is an 
unconditional right, while the rights which the LTR Directive grants to LTRs are conditional 
and subject to the approval of the host State. The existence of the right of LTRs to reside in 
the second State can be limited by the host State, while the existence of the right of residence 
of EU citizens may never be questioned. It was also demonstrated that due to the limited 
geographical scope of the LTR Directive, LTRs may not move and reside in as many 
Member States as EU citizens may reside.  
Regarding the important supplementary right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
in the second State, the position of LTRs entirely differs from that of EU citizens. EU citizens 
enjoy the right to equal treatment with the nationals of the host State (subject to limited 
exceptions, such as the public service/official authority exception), whereas LTRs acquire 
this right after successfully obtaining a residence/work permit in that State.  
Based on the results of the analysis in sections 2, 3, and 4, it can be concluded that the rights 
of EU citizens and LTRs regarding residence and non-discrimination based on nationality in 
the second State, are neither comparable in nature, nor comparable in geographical scope, nor 
comparable in their extent. Therefore, the Tampere Programme’s objective to grant LTRs 
rights comparable to those of EU citizens does not seem to have been effectively achieved. 
The LTR Directive has obviously gone some distance towards accomplishing this intended 
objective; however, due to differences in the nature and scope of the rights it grants to LTRs, 
the rights of LTRs cannot be considered comparable. The main problem obviously lies in, 
first, the lack of mutual recognition of the status and rights of LTRs between the Member 
States which makes it necessary for LTRs to obtain a new residence permit in the second 
Member State; secondly, the possibility with which the host State has been provided to 
impose  discretionary, and discriminatory conditions on LTRs when they apply for a 
residence permit. These two issues in the LTR Directive have also prevented the Directive 
from approximating the various national legislation on the conditions of admission and 
residence of LTRs across the Union. Therefore, the answer to the question of ‘whether the 
LTR Directive has managed to approximate the national legislation in this area, as prescribed 
in the Tampere Programme’ is also in the negative. The Directive allows the Member States 
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to maintain and apply their own immigration rules in considering the LTRs’ application for a 
residence/work permit. 
After it was established that LTRs have not been granted the rights of movement and 
residence in the second State, the reasons for which the Union should ensure LTRs enjoy 
such rights were considered in Section 5. The reasons were analysed from two different 
angles. It was demonstrated that providing LTRs (especially those who are economically 
active) with the rights of movement and residence within the Union is a prerequisite to the 
completion of the internal market project. As explained, it is against the rationale of the 
internal market to exclude LTRs from free movement in the EU. To address this issue, it was 
suggested that the personal scope of the personal market freedoms is extended to 
economically active LTRs, so they also enjoy the activity-based rights granted by these 
provisions to EU citizens. 
Furthermore, it was argued that it is not possible to label LTRs as ‘different’, ‘foreigner’, 
‘alien’, ‘second-class resident’ and expect them to develop a sense of belonging to the host 
society. Removing these labels and genuinely treating LTRs equally with Member State 
nationals, constitutes an efficient instrument for the integration of LTRs into the host society. 
It was thus suggested that the personal scope of the citizenship provisions is extended to 
LTRs as they have established a genuine link with the Union, and are permanent participants 
in its society. The extension of the personal scope of the citizenship provisions to LTRs, 
would enable the economically inactive LTRs to derive the status-oriented rights from these 
provisions and enjoy freedom of movement within the Union.
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Chapter 4 - Political rights of EU citizens for LTRs 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the first set of core rights of EU citizens, namely, free movement 
rights, were analysed. The focus of this chapter is on the second and last set of core rights of 
EU citizens: political rights. According to the Tampere Programme, the legal status of long-
term residents (LTRs) should be approximated to that of EU citizens, and the former should 
enjoy a set of uniform rights similar to those enjoyed by the latter. However, the Programme 
suggested the similarity of rights of LTRs and EU citizens to be only as near as possible. 
Whether it is possible to approximate the rights of LTRs to those enjoyed by EU citizens in 
the area of political rights is one of the questions that this chapter intends to answer. This 
chapter also has another question to answer: why is in the Union’s interest to extend the 
political rights of EU citizens to LTRs?  
The extension of EU citizens’ political rights to LTRs, particularly with regards the right to 
vote, appears not possible as there is no legal basis in the Treaties for such an extension of 
rights. This will of course be a clear and strong obstacle on the way of extending electoral 
rights to LTRs. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, the extension of voting 
rights to LTRs in in the interest of the Union (even though such an extension of rights may 
not happen in the near future for various reasons as will be discussed further). The interests of 
the Union in extending the right to vote to LTRs will be analysed from three different angles.  
The first angle is democracy. It will be argued that the Union can enhance its  democratic 
legitimacy by  granting LTRs certain political rights, particularly the right to vote in the EP 
elections. This is because, following the adoption of the Long-term Residents Directive (LTR 
Directive), LTRs now have the official status of permanent members of the EU society, and 
thus, form part of the EU’s demos. It is the EU’s responsibility to ensure that its de jure 
permanent members enjoy the basic democratic right of voting. Moreover, the exclusion of 
LTRs from voting right would have a negative impact on the Union’s democratic legitimacy 
as a large part of its demos has no say in its decision-making. As Ziegler has noted, Raz 
asserts that political communities – e.g. the Union – have a positive duty to ‘create the 
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conditions of autonomy.1 If, as will be demonstrated, LTRs are part of the Union’s demos, 
the Union owes this duty to LTRs too, and not just to Union citizens.  
The second angle is the enhancement of the integration of LTRs into the Union’s society.  
The EU’s overarching immigration policies – the Tampere agenda and after – assert that the 
rights of LTRs should be approximated to those enjoyed by EU citizens in order to facilitate 
the LTRs’ integration into the host society. Putting it differently, the Union’s immigration 
policy is based on the inclusionary model of integration which is built on removing factors of 
otherness and genuine inclusion of migrants into the society.2 The right to vote, as will be 
illustrated in this chapter, is an essential step in removing factors of otherness and a strong 
sign of inclusion. Therefore, the extension of suffrage to LTRs is in line with the Union’s 
immigration policy documents, and the failure to extend the political rights to LTRs is not 
consistent with the EU’s own immigration policy. The process of LTRs’ integration into the 
society without the extension of suffrage will be partial and deficient. 
The third angle is the balance of role imposed on LTRs with the level of representation 
granted to them. This angle has some similarities with the slogan of ‘no taxation without 
representation’. It will be argued that the Union has imposed certain roles on LTRs, for 
instance, participating in the development of the internal market.3 Nevertheless, when it 
comes to political participation in running and governing this market, LTRs have no role to 
play. If the Union imposes a role on LTRs in the internal market, equal opportunity to have a 
representative in the process of decision-making for that market should also be granted to 
LTRs. Based on the three above angles, this chapter is structured as follows: in section I, the 
political rights of EU citizens will be identified, followed by an examination of the political 
rights of LTRs in order to establish the extent to which the situations of these two categories 
of persons in terms of political rights, is already similar. In the same section, the possibility of 
extending each of the identified political rights already enjoyed by EU citizens to LTRs will 
also be considered in order to filter out those rights the extension of which to the latter is 
practically impossible. The extension of the remaining rights to LTRs will then be considered 
from three different angles in separate sections: (1) from the angle of democracy (section II); 
the three well-known principles of democracy (namely, the principles of affectedness, 
stakeholders, and coercion) will be used to establish whether LTRs form part of the EU’s 
 
1 R Ziegler, Voting Rights of Refugees (Cambridge University Press 2017) 68. 
2 Different models of integration were discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
3 The preamble to the LTR Directive, Paragraph 18. 
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demos; (2) from the angle of the integration of LTRs into EU’s society (section III) in that the 
EU, by granting political rights to LTRs, can enhance the LTRs’ integration into its society; 
(3) the angle of equal rights for equal roles (section IV). The final section (section V) 
contains concluding remarks and suggestions on the extent to which the political rights of EU 
citizens should be extended to LTRs.   
This chapter may appear biased in favour of extending the right to vote of EU citizens to 
LTRs. This is because the chapter examines how extending the right to vote in the EP 
elections is in the interest of the Union, rather than discussing whether this right should be 
extended to LTRs or not. Nevertheless, arguments against extending the right to vote in EP 
elections to LTRs will be presented and discussed as well on pages 117 to 119. For instance, 
it has been suggested that extending the right of vote may result in ill-informed voters.4 It has 
also been argued that granting the right to vote in elections may devalue citizenship of the 
state. It will be illustrated that while these concerns might be valid and relevant to other non-
EU citizen migrants, they are unlikely to be relevant to LTRs. 
2. Political rights of EU citizens 
The status of EU citizenship entails a number of rights for its holders among which are 
political rights. These political rights can be found in Article 20 TFEU, 5 and include: 
a) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to 
address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and 
to obtain a reply in the same language;6 
b) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which 
they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities 
of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; 
c) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in 
municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State.7  
 
4 D Munro, ‘Integration through Participation: Non-Citizen Resident Voting Rights in an Era of Globalization’ 
(2008) 9 Journal of International Migration and Integration 63, 73. 
5 TFEU, Article 20 (2)(b). 
6 These rights are repeated in Article 24 TFEU. 
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The rights to vote and stand as candidates in national elections of a Member State, however, 
are limited to nationals of that State. It has been argued that national-level voting rights are 
withheld until the person has gained enough knowledge about the State to participate in its 
election at the highest level.8  
Moreover, EP electoral rights are concerned with ‘the question of developing a distinctive 
European identity’, whereas the possibility to participate in national elections is concerned 
with ‘national identity’, which can be reserved for nationals. In any event, the merits of the 
above arguments (for the enfranchisement of EU citizens in the national election of the host 
Sate) will not be examined in the thesis, as voting rights in national elections and any 
political right which is not available to EU citizens fall outside the scope of this chapter: the 
thesis focuses on examining whether the rights of LTRs can be approximated to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens and is not concerned with whether the political rights of EU 
citizenship should be further extended (e.g. whether EU citizens should be provided with the 
opportunity to vote in national elections).  
In addition to the above political rights derived from the TFEU citizenship provisions, there 
is another important political right available to EU citizens, and that is the right to call on the 
Commission to introduce a legislative proposal. This so-called ‘Citizens’ initiative’ is laid 
down in Article 11(4) TEU and enables one million citizens of the EU who are nationals of at 
least one quarter of the Member States to call on the commission to take action in the above 
way. It is still in the control of the Commission to officially initiate a proposal; however, EU 
citizens can invite the Commission to propose law.9  
3. To what extent do LTRs also enjoy EU citizens’ political rights 
The main legislation from which LTRs derive rights, the 2003 Long-term Residents Directive 
(LTR Directive),10 is silent on political rights. However, there are other sources which grant 
basic political rights to LTRs, in some cases at the same level as those granted to EU citizens: 
 
7 These rights are repeated in Articles 22 and 23 TFEU. The detailed arrangements whereby citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals may exercise the right to vote and to stand as 
a candidate there in elections to the EP are laid down in Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC. 
8 Munro (n 4) 69.  
9 For a detailed analysis of the mechanism of citizens’ initiative, see: M Dougan, ‘What Are We to Make of the 
Citizens’ Initiative?’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1807. 
10 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. 
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a. The right to petition the EP, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to 
address the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the 
same language. 
Article 228 TFEU provides every natural person residing in the Union with the right to apply 
to the European Ombudsman for matters concerning instances of maladministration in the 
activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.11 Article 227 TFEU also 
provides every natural person residing in the Union, with the right to petition the EP on a 
matter which comes within the Union's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it 
directly.12  
Therefore, the right to petition the EP is available both to LTRs and EU citizens; however, it 
is not unlikely that petitions received from EU citizens are treated differently from the 
petitions submitted by LTRs, taking into account that it is EU citizens who elect the MEPs.13  
With regards to the language used by individuals for addressing an EU institution, as long as 
the language used in a correspondence is one of the EU’s official languages, the addressed 
institution will accept it, and most likely will reply in that language or the language of the 
host State of the individual. Thus, there does not seem to be any difference between LTRs 
and EU citizens in respect of the language they can use to address the EU institutions or 
receive a response. 
b. The right to enjoy diplomatic protection in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented 
Neither the LTR Directive nor any other EU legislation requires Member States to provide 
LTRs or any other TCNs with diplomatic protection, inside or outside the EU. Although 
providing LTRs with such a protection would probably help to solve a problem they may face 
in a third country, the exclusion of LTRs from this right is neither inconsistent with the 
integration aims of the EU’s migration policy, nor is it incompatible with the nature of 
diplomatic protection under international law. It is not inconsistent with the EU’s integration 
policy because the policy’s focus is specifically and exclusively on the integration of 
migrants into the (EU) society while they reside in the EU, not while they are abroad. It is not 
incompatible with international law as, under the latter, it is the person’s state of nationality 
 
11 With the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role. 
12 The right to petition the Commission with one million signatures, which is known as citizens’ initiative, 
however, is limited to EU citizens.  
13 S Song, ‘Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?’ (2009) 13 Citizenship 
Studies 607, 614. 
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that is responsible for protecting him/her.14 In addition, the consular protection of third 
country nationals is outside the scope of Union law.15 
Moreover, in case the authorities of the third country are also involved, it may even be 
practically impossible to offer LTRs diplomatic protection in that country. For instance, when 
an LTR is in police custody, it is only the state of nationality of the LTR will be able to have 
access to the LTR. 
c. Electoral rights in the local and EP elections 
When it comes to the rights to vote and stand in elections, the Treaty does not require the 
Member States to provide LTRs with the right to vote and stand in EP elections and local 
election. In fact, there is no legal basis in EU law for such rights for non-EU citizens, 
especially after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force which clearly and specifically limited 
the MEPs’ role to being representative of Union citizens. The Lisbon Treaty replaced all 
references to the ‘peoples of the States’ with references to ‘Union’s citizens’.16 Hence, even if 
it was possible – prior to this change – to interpret the term ‘peoples of the States’ to include 
TCN lawful residents in the Member States, the new version leaves no place for such an 
interpretation. Moreover, in the current version of the TEU, as amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, ‘peoples of Europe’ has been used with the term ‘EU citizens’ interchangeably.17 
These points confirm that electoral rights are exclusively limited to EU citizens.  
Results – comparing political rights of EU citizens and LTRs 
Comparing the political rights of LTRs with those enjoyed by EU citizens leads to the 
conclusion that in terms of low level political rights, such as the right to petition the EP, it 
does not matter whether the person is an EU citizen or LTR. There does not seem to be a 
considerable difference between these two groups in relation to these particular political 
rights.  
With regards to the right to enjoy diplomatic protection, it is neither necessary nor possible to 
provide LTRs with the protection which EU citizens receive in a third country.  
The most significant difference appears to be in the area of electoral rights – i.e. the right to 
vote and the right to stand in local and EP elections. Generally, electoral rights are considered 
 
14 Under certain circumstances, another state which temporarily represents the state of nationality is responsible 
for providing diplomatic protection to the nationals of that state.   
15 Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] All ER (D) 55 (Sep). 
16 Former Article 189 TEC was replaced by Article 14(2) TEU. 
17 TEU, Article 1.  
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to be the core of citizenship.18 The exclusion of non-citizen residents from suffrage is not 
considered to be a breach of relevant European and international conventions.19  
However, a number of normative claims have been made in favour of the extension of 
electoral rights to non-nationals or so-called ‘alien suffrage’. I now turn to examine these 
claims in the context of LTR rights, but from the perspective of the Union. In other words, 
my question here is how will the EU benefit from extending the political rights of Union 
citizens to LTRs? These benefits will be considered from three different angles: a) enhancing 
democracy in the EU; b) promoting the integration of LTRs into the EU’s society; and c) 
equal participation of LTRs in the political processes of the society of which they are now 
members. 
4. Alien suffrage - Electoral rights for non-citizen residents 
‘The cornerstone of democracy is the right of voters to elect the decision-making bodies of 
political assemblies at regular intervals’.20 In every polity or entity however, this right may be 
limited to a specific group of people: in a company, to its shareholders; in a club, to those 
who pay an annual membership fee; and in general elections, to the citizens of the polity. In 
the EU also the right to cast a vote in the EP and local elections is limited to those who hold 
the formal status of EU citizenship, which – as we saw – is automatically acquired by those 
holding the nationality of a Member State. TCNs, who lack that formal status, are thus 
excluded from electoral participation in these elections.21 As a result, TCN long-term 
residents who live in the EU and are subject to the laws of the Union, are excluded from 
exercising a right which is the cornerstone of democracy.  
The exclusion of non-EU citizens from electoral rights is nevertheless lawful. There is no 
legal basis in the Treaties to extend these rights to non-EU citizens. Indeed, the EU is not the 
only polity which reserves the privilege of voting for its citizens. This is a universal practice, 
which is even endorsed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 
 
18 R Bauböck, ‘Expansive Citizenship—Voting beyond Territory and Membership’ (2005) 38 Political Science 
and Politics 683, 683. 
19 For instance, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights; Article 16 of the ECHR.  
20 R Hayduk, ‘Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the US’ (2004) 26 New Political 
Science 499, at 499. 
21 Some Member States have chosen to grant TCN residents the right to vote in local elections, nevertheless, this 
is not the case in all Member States. Moreover, this extension is not required by EU law as is the case for EU 
citizens.  
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25) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 16).22 Some states have even 
attempted to criminalise voting for non-citizens.23 One reason for the continuing belief that 
citizenship is a sine qua non for political rights seems to be the idea ‘that political power is 
for members only, and that the most fundamental indication of membership is citizenship’.24 
Putting it differently, political rights are available to members, and only citizens are deemed 
to be members.  
Contrary to the legal restrictions on the political participation of non-citizens, normative 
claims, in the terms of ‘alien suffrage’, are made for the extension of electoral rights to non-
citizen residents. The case for alien suffrage is mainly premised on the residence-based 
franchise: the distribution of electoral rights based on residence rather than citizenship only.25 
Much of the debate and academic literature around the concept of alien suffrage focuses on 
the entitlement of non-citizens to electoral rights – and not the responsibility or interest of the 
state to provide non-citizen residents with these rights. 
It has been suggested that in democratic societies non-citizen residents have moral claims for 
enjoying electoral rights similar to those of citizens: 
‘noncitizens have the same stake and interest in a community’s political decisions and 
civic responsibility as that of any citizen. Like other citizens, immigrants tend to 
become involved and invested in their communities’.26 The denial of ‘the right to 
participate in the democratic process is likely to adversely affect these people in social 
and economic terms. People with no say in public elections are less equipped to 
protect their interests. … the disenfranchisement of the resident aliens appears to 
contradict the principles on which democratic societies are founded’.27  
 
22 This endorsement was confirmed in: Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium [1987], Appl. No. 9267/81; 
Sante Santoro v Italy [2004], Appl. No. 36681/97. Other international documents also either do not recognise 
electoral rights for non-nationals, or are not legally binding, such as The Declaration of Human Rights.  
23 Quoted by S Song, ‘Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?’ (2009) 13 Citizenship 
Studies 607, at 614 from  Schuck, P.H., 1998. Citizens, strangers, and in-betweens: essays on immigration and 
citizenship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, at 187. 
24 L Beckman, ‘Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 
153, 155. 
25 A Schrauwen, ‘Granting the Right to Vote for the European Parliament to Resident Third‐Country Nationals: 
Civic Citizenship Revisited’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 201; H Lardy, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Vote’ 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 75. 
26 R Hayduk, ‘Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the US’ (2004) 26 New Political 
Science 499, 508. 
27 L Beckman, ‘Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 
153, 153. 
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In their arguments, scholars assume that non-citizens should be included in the franchise 
either because they have interests to protect,28 or because they are de facto members of 
society,29 and thus should be entitled to participate directly in the formulation of its laws.  
5. Suffrage for LTRs 
The right to vote in the EP elections is significant to LTRs, as their status and rights attached 
to it are governed entirely by EU law. Despite this, like other TCNs, LTRs are excluded from 
participating in European elections. Moreover, as is the case for other TCNs, there is no legal 
basis in EU law for extending the franchise to LTRs. In the absence of legal provisions in 
favour of enfranchising LTRs, there would be no prima facie ground for challenging their 
electoral exclusion. However, the longer people reside in a state, the stronger their claim for 
rights grows.30 Indeed, LTRs have a strong claim to electoral rights in the Union because, 
firstly, LTRs’ most immediate interest is significantly affected by the EU legislation (e.g. the 
LTR Directive). Secondly, LTRs are not simply residents who have resided for a long time in 
the Union – LTRs are also recognised in law as a category of residents who reside 
permanently in the Union, and thus should enjoy certain rights of EU citizens. The legal 
status granted to LTRs has now changed the position of LTRs from de facto members of the 
EU society, to de jure members of the EU society, with a status and rights under EU law. It is 
the EU’s responsibility to ensure that its de jure permanent members enjoy the basic 
democratic right of voting.  
A limited extension of electoral rights to LTRs has already been supported on a number of 
occasions by the EU institutions. The Commission has attempted to encourage the Member 
States to extend voting rights in local elections to LTRs. These attempts have led to the 
adoption of soft law, which may be used to support the claim for enfranchising LTRs. One of 
these pieces of soft law was adopted by the Council in 2004 which is known as ‘common 
basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union’.31 Principle number 
9 of the document asserts that: 
 
28 Hayduk (n 26) 508. 
29 CM Rodríguez, ‘Noncitizen Voting and the Extraconstitutional Construction of the Polity’ (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 30, 36. 
30 JH Carens, ‘On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay’ (2005) 30 Boston Review 16. 
31 Council Document 14615/04 of 19 Nov 2004.  
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Wherever possible, immigrants should become involved in all facets of the 
democratic process. … Wherever possible, immigrants could even be involved in 
elections, the right to vote and joining political parties.  
The EP has also engaged with the issue and backed the enfranchisement of TCN residents – 
though only in municipal elections.32 These documents encouraging the enfranchisement of 
non-EU citizen residents were basically articulated around the integration of migrants into 
society, as the exclusion of non-EU citizens from the political aspect of life in the Union, 
simply ‘reinforces the distance between EU citizens and TCNs’.33 Thus, the EU institutions 
are aware of the benefits of the enfranchisement of TCN residents in elections.  
Nevertheless, LTRs are still excluded from suffrage in the only election held at the EU level. 
Franchise in the EP elections is still heavily linked to the status of citizenship as a matter of 
nationhood,34 and falls exclusively within Member State competence. The fact that 
citizenship of the Union is shaped by national laws is of course a powerful exogenous force 
against the extension of suffrage under EU law.35 However, the extension of the franchise to 
LTRs would be inevitable if we accept that they form part of the EU’s demos in order to 
match the EU’s demos with the holders of electoral rights in the Union, even though it might 
take years or decades, and fundamental Treaty amendments are necessary.36  
Having considered the position of LTRs in the Union with regards to electoral rights, I will 
now move on to discuss why the EU should extend the suffrage to LTRs. This will first be 
examined from the angle of democracy.  
5.1. First angle: Democracy 
In this section, the reasons for which the EU should grant LTRs electoral rights similar to 
those enjoyed by EU citizens are examined from the angle of democracy. This section has 
one main question to answer: why should the EU extend the electoral rights of EU citizens to 
LTRs for the purpose of enhancing its legitimacy and promoting democracy? The main 
 
32 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp. 2/88, at 29 (1988). Also see European Parliament on the Joint 
Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia and an Action Programme by the Council of Ministers, 1989 O.J. 
(C 69) 40, at 42 where the EP calls on the Member States to grant the right to vote in local elections to all 
migrant workers and their families living and working on their territory, regardless of their nationality. 
33 Schrauwen (n 25) 212. 
34 Bauböck (n 18). 
35 J Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of 
Political Space (Cambridge University Press 2007) 41. 
36 J Shaw, ‘Citizenship and Political Participation: The Role of Electoral Rights Under European Union Law’ 
(2010) 2010/22 9. 
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argument here is that by extending these electoral rights to LTRs, in particular by 
enfranchising them, the EU will increase its democratic legitimacy. It will be illustrated that 
LTRs also form part of the Union’s demos; thus, enfranchising them in the EP elections is a 
prerequisite for the Union being a democratically legitimate polity. This is not to say that all 
of the EU’s alleged democratic legitimacy deficit will be remedied by enfranchising LTRs, as 
there are other democratic legitimacy issues to be resolved as well.37 Rather, it is simply to 
say that even if other issues in relation to legitimacy are addressed, still the EU would never 
become a legitimate democratic polity if a high number of permanent members of its society 
continued to have no say in its policy-making process. 
The EU and its Member States have already acknowledged that exercising democratic rights 
in the Union should not be limited to Member State nationals only. For instance, non-citizens 
are provided with the right to apply to the Ombudsman,38 which is described as ‘part of the 
constitutional arrangements underpinning transparency and democracy at the Union level’.39 
Moreover, the Union has acknowledged that extending formal political rights to non-citizens 
would enhance the representativeness and democratic legitimation of policies.40  
Yet, as mentioned before, voting rights in the Union are linked to the citizenship of a Member 
State. This citizenship-based theory of democracy which leaves non-EU citizen residents of 
the Union without a voice in political decision-making in the polity where they live and work, 
gives rise to a problem of democratic legitimacy.41 Because of the lack of the official badge 
of a Member State nationality, these permanent residents are excluded from participation in 
the collective decision-making of the Union, although their basic rights and immediate 
interest are subject to its law. This is the case despite the fact that, as will be demonstrated 
below, LTRs form part of the Union’s demos. I now proceed to examine whether LTRs also 
form part the EU’s demos.  
 
37 Such as the effectiveness of decision-making procedures suggested in David Beetham and Christopher Lord, 
Legitimacy and the European Union (Longman 1998) 25; unelected Council of Ministers although they may be 
elected by national electorates to fulfil an explicitly national, not a European, function – see the same book, page 
26. See also  F Goudappel, The Effects of EU Citizenship: Economic, Social and Political Rights in a Time of 
Constitutional Change (TMC Asser Press 2010) 105; P Craig and G de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law 
(Oxford University Press 1999) pp 23-27. David Marquand coined the famous expression ‘democratic deficit’: 
D Marquand, 1979, Parliament for Europe, Jonathan Cape, London. 
38 TFEU, Article 227.  
39 Shaw (n 36) 8. 
40 Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners. 
41 Song (n 13) 1.  
108 
In order to illustrate that LTRs also form part of the EU’s demos, the principle of 
affectedness, the principle of stakeholders, and the principle of coercion will be employed. 
The former asserts that ‘[a]ll those affected by a political decision should have a say in its 
making’.42 The principle of stakeholders views government as a public company and argues 
that just like in a public company, investment provides stakeholders with a right to vote and 
the power over the company; citizens as stakeholders in the polity, are perceived as voters to 
the extent that they have paid their taxes’.43 The last principle says that all individuals subject 
to state coercion should be given the opportunity to decide how the state’s coercive power is 
exercised.44 
This is not the first time that these principles have been used to support arguments in favour 
of enfranchising non-citizen residents. Scholars in a number of books and papers have 
already suggested the extension of electoral rights to residents who do not officially hold the 
citizenship of the state.45 They even often use the same democratic principles that I have used 
in this chapter. However, this chapter for the first time applies these leading principles to the 
rights of TCN residents in the EU in the light of the EU’s immigration policy (Tampere 
Programme) as well as the LTR Directive.  
I argue that the status of long-term residence that the LTR Directive grants to TCN residents 
makes the latter permanent members of EU society. As permanent members of the society 
whose day-to-day lives are heavily affected by EU law, they must have a say in making that 
law. Because the EU has introduced an EU status which affects the permanent members of 
the EU society, it should provide the affected individuals with the opportunity to have a say 
in making EU law. This is my argument based on the principle of affectedness.  
My argument based on the principle of stakeholders is that LTRs are given a role in the 
development of the internal market.46 This changes their status from passive members of the 
market (i.e. merely consumers), to active members who have an interest and stake in the EU’s 
 
42 C Hilson, ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Affectedness’ in R Bellamy, D Castiglione and Shaw J (eds), 
Making European citizens : civic inclusion in a transnational context (2006) 56. 
43 Beckman (n 27) 159.  
44 S Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (V, Cambridge University Press 2004) 217. 
45 Schrauwen (n 25); ME Hawks, ‘Granting Permanent Resident Aliens the Right to Vote in Local Government: 
The New Komeito Continues to Promote Alien Suffrage in Japan’ [2008] Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 1; 
Beckman (n 27); L Beckman, ‘Who Should Vote? Conceptualizing Universal Suffrage in Studies of 
Democracy’ (2008) 15 Democratization 29. 
46 The preamble to the LTR Directive, Paragraph 18.  
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internal market. LTRs, as stakeholders of a market which is governed by EU law, should be 
given a voice in making that law.  
The argument based on the coercion principle is that LTRs qualify to be a member of the 
demos simply by being subject to the power and the laws of the Union and its Member States. 
Furthermore, the Union and its Member States owe LTRs, as the coercees, the right to have a 
say in making the laws to which LTRs are subject.47 
These three principles will be used to illustrate that LTRs now form part of the EU demos. It 
will then be argued that in order to reduce the Union’s democratic legitimacy, it is logical, if 
not required, for the EU to provide its demos with the opportunity to have its say in making 
decisions in the Union (e.g. voting rights in the EP elections).   
5.1.1. The principle of affectedness – the EU and LTRs 
The principle of affectedness or affected interests was established by Robert Dahl in the early 
1970s: ‘Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to 
participate in that government’.48 It is based on the democratic concept of ‘rule by the people’ 
which sets the relationship between people and governments in democratic societies as 
‘ruling and being ruled in turn’. According to the principle of affectedness, ‘people should 
not be subject to a political rule in which they have no say’.49 Those who are subject to the 
decisions of a legislature must determine the composition of the legislature through their 
votes.50 The exclusion of those people who fall within the scope of the principle of 
affectedness could challenge the legitimacy of the polity, and its democratic functionality: 
‘If a law is to be regarded as a legitimate product of a properly functioning democratic 
process, it is essential that the views of those likely to be affected are canvassed as 
widely as possible’.51  
Indeed, the exclusion of affected individuals from political participation in the EP elections 
also calls the validity of the relevant EU norms into question. Jürgen Habermas suggests that 
‘only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all 
 
47 J Raz, ‘Rights-Based Moralities’ in J Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press 1984) 191. 
48 RA Dahl, After the Revolution?: Authority in a Good Society (Yale University Press 1990) 64–65. 
49 J Carens, (1989) Membership and morality: admission to citizenship in liberal democratic states, in 
W Brubaker (Ed.) Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Lanham 
and New York: University Press of America) 37. 
50 Bauböck (n 18). 
51 Lardy (n  25) 92.  
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affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse’.52 In other words, as Munro 
puts it, ‘laws and policies can make a claim of democratic legitimacy only when those who 
are subject to, or whose interests are affected by, laws and policies have had adequate 
opportunities to participate in the decision-making processes that produce those laws and 
policies’.53 Adequate opportunity to participate in the decision-making practically means 
determining the composition of legislature through elections.54  
The principle of affectedness does not limit the demos to those who have a certain legal status 
(e.g. citizenship of the state). Rather, based on the principle, the demos are those who have 
interests affected by the particular collective decision in question. ‘The principle offers an 
alternative to state-centered conceptions of democracy that define the demos in terms of 
membership in a nation-state’.55 
Of course, it is not possible to include everyone who is affected by the decisions of a 
government or civic society in the process of policy making. It is neither practically possible 
nor logically justified. For instance, when a government is deciding to invade a country, the 
people of the latter are obviously affected by that decision. Does the principle of affectedness 
require that government to consult the people of the targeted country? Moreover, there are 
people who become subject to the laws of a state temporarily, or only marginally. Do these 
people also fall within the scope of the affected interest principle? Including them in the 
demos means an over-inclusive demos, many of whom are slightly or occasionally affected 
by perhaps only relatively few of the government’s decisions, but would have a permanent 
say about the government’s decisions.  
In an attempt to overcome the issue of over-inclusiveness of the principle of affectedness, 
Beckman suggests that the scope of the principle of affectedness should be limited to the 
persons’ territorial position.56 He considers territorial position as a sufficient factor for 
considering who is affected by the government of a territory. Others have suggested that in 
defining the scope of the principle of affected interests, the nature of the affected interests, 
and the extent to which these interests are affected must be taken into account. For instance, 
Song suggests that ‘We might restrict the scope of the principle further, to those who have 
basic or fundamental interests at stake, such that any person whose basic interests will 
 
52 J Habermas, Moral consciousness and communicative action. (MIT Press 1990) 166. 
53 Song (n 13) 66. 
54 Bauböck (n 18).  
55 Song (n 13).  
56 Beckman (n 27) 157. 
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probably be affected by a government’s decisions has a presumptive right to participate in 
that government’.57 Shapiro suggests that ‘those whose basic interests are most vitally 
affected by a particular decision have the strongest claim to a say in its making’.58  
In another attempt to address the issue of over-inclusiveness of the principle of affectedness, 
two decades after introducing the principle, Dahl limited the scope of the principle of 
affectedness by adding the criterion of membership. He suggested that the principle of 
affectedness should cover ‘all adult members of the association’,59 because it is the interest of 
the members of the association or society that are affected by the way that association or 
society is governed. 
So, applying the above views in our context, who is considered to be a member of the EU? 
What can be the criterion/criteria for membership of the EU? Territorial position? Being 
subject to the law of the Union more than just occasionally or temporarily? Having a 
fundamental or basic interest affected significantly by the Union policy? Or, all of these? I 
shall test these limiting criteria introduced by academics in defining the scope of the principle 
of affectedness, by applying them to LTRs.   
Territorial membership which is not temporary: all individuals who are physically present in 
the Union are affected by the legal and political decisions of the EU. This includes TCNs; 
nevertheless, unlike many other TCNs whose presence on the territory of the Union is 
temporary or for a limited time,60 LTRs’ permanent home is the Union. This means that they 
are permanently and continuously affected by EU law. In addition, it is not the length of the 
effect of EU law on LTRs that is significant; the extent of this effect is also significant. The 
rights of LTRs which are affiliated to their legal status are all governed by EU law (the LTR 
Directive). For instance, the right to enjoy equal treatment with the host State nationals, 
which obviously has a considerable impact on various aspects of LTRs’ lives (e.g. their 
working opportunities), stems from the status of LTRs, on which EU law has a significant 
effect. 
 
57 Song (n 13). 
58 Shapiro (n 49) 37.  
59 Dahl (n 48) 129; see also, R Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press 1989) 355. 
60 I say many because TCN family members of Union citizens may also enter and remain in the Union on a 
permanent or at least long-term basis without a deadline to leave. 
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Having shared values with other members: LTRs acquire their status after having lived, 
worked or studied, for at least five continuous years in a Member State.61 During these five 
years, it is inevitable that TCNs’ values are affected by the shared values of the society. Even 
if this does not always happen organically, LTRs can be required to meet integration 
conditions, such as language, knowledge of the society’s history and values, and so on. 
Meeting the conditions before becoming LTRs should address any concern regarding the lack 
of knowledge of LTRs about the values of their receiving society and that they share these 
values with other society members.62  
If having a genuine link with the EU is set as the criterion for the EU’s membership, again, 
LTRs meet it. It is accepted that a genuine link between people and polities is established 
through residence; not merely by holding citizenship.63 Thus, LTRs, who have resided in the 
Union, have a genuine link with the Union and its society.  
LTRs satisfy any condition that can reasonably be assumed to be considered ‘affected’ 
according to the principle of affectedness. As affected individuals, it is hard to exclude LTRs 
from the EU demos and still consider the EU as a polity with democratic values. The Union 
would improve its democratic legitimacy by enfranchising LTRs in the EP elections.  
5.1.2. The principle of stakeholders  
The principle of affectedness is considered vague and over-inclusive by Bauböck. He 
proposed another normative principle on the basis of interest and stake that non-citizens in a 
polity have. He argues that non-citizen residents should be recognised as stakeholders in a 
polity and be granted electoral rights if their ‘circumstances of life link their future well-being 
to the flourishing’ of that polity.64 ‘The notion of stakeholding expresses, first, the idea that 
citizens have not merely fundamental interests in the outcomes of the political process, but a 
claim to be represented as participants in that process. Second, stakeholding serves as a 
criterion for assessing claims to membership and voting rights. Individuals whose 
circumstances of life link their future well-being to the flourishing of a particular polity 
 
61 Minimum 10 years of residence for students.  
62 The existence of the integration conditions is however, problematic. This matter will be dealt with later in 
chapter 6. 
63 Case C-209/03 Bidar v UK [2005] ECR I-2119.  
64 Bauböck (n 18) 686. 
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should be recognized as stakeholders in that polity with a claim to participate in collective 
decision-making processes that shape the shared future of this political community’.65  
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what counts as a stake. Would financial contribution 
count as stake for the purpose of the principle of stakeholders? Would a foreigner who has 
never resided in the EU, but financially contributes to the internal market, and obviously has 
a stake in the EU and its internal market, also be a stakeholder? For instance, a Chinese 
citizen residing in China who establishes a business in an EU Member State and enters the 
market may contribute to the market even more than an EU citizen or an LTR. Does the 
stakeholder principle mean that this person should also have a right to vote in the EP 
elections? 
The answer is no. According to Dahl, to fall within the scope of the principle of stakeholders, 
the person must have something more than merely a financial stake in the polity. Their life 
chances must be at stake. Their fate must be inextricably bound up with the functioning of the 
polity’s institutions.66 Having life chances and future well-being subject to the way a polity is 
run, entitles the individuals to participate in running that polity.67  
Undoubtedly, the life circumstances and future well-being of LTRs are vitally dependent on 
the decisions made by the EU. The way the EU is run has a significant impact on the LTRs’ 
life circumstances. Their life chances depend on the opportunities which EU law – e.g. the 
LTR Directive – offers them. Indeed, the whole existence of the status of long-term residence 
is dependent on the Union and Union law. It is the EU that decides what rights are attached to 
the status of long-term residence, and whether the status should be approximated to the status 
of EU citizenship, or the status should be entirely abolished. 
5.1.3. The principle of coercion  
The third principle of democratic legitimacy used in advocating the extension of electoral 
rights to non-citizens is the coercion principle. The principle is related to the core value of 
liberal and democratic theory of autonomy of individuals and that states cannot invade 
individuals’ autonomy against the latter’s will. All individuals subject to state coercion 
 
65 R Bauböck, ‘Why European citizenship? Normative approaches to supranational union.’ Theoretical inquiries 
in law 8.2 (2007) 453-488. 
66 B Barry, Culture and Equality (Polity Press 2000) 777. 
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should be given the opportunity to decide how the state’s coercive power is exercised.68 
These individuals are presumed to form part of the demos: 
‘[e]very adult subject to a government and its laws must be presumed to be qualified 
as, and has an unqualified right to be, a member of the demos’.69  
As can be seen, the criterion for qualifying to be a member of the demos is being subject to 
the power and laws of the state, not holding its citizenship. Taking into account the fact that 
non-citizen residents are subject to laws to which citizens are not subject (e.g. immigration 
laws), the former are likely to be subject to more actual coercion than the latter.70 This 
additional level of being subject to the coercion of the state, makes the claim of non-citizen 
residents to be part of the demos stronger.  
It is not only non-citizen residents that have a claim to make. The state owes the coerced a 
right to participation too. Abizadeh suggests that individuals subject to laws and power of a 
state are owed a democratic justification,71 for instance a right to participation in the control 
over making those laws or the exercise of power. This right of participation is owed ‘not 
simply in virtue of state laws having causal effects on people’s basic interests, but rather on 
the more restricted basis of being subject to state coercion’.72 Thus, being subject to the laws 
and coercion of the European Union and its Member States not only creates a claim for LTRs 
– as the coerced and thus, demos – to a right of democratic participation in the Union’s 
governance, but also creates an obligation for the Union to provide LTRs with such a right.  
Nevertheless, the application of the principle of coercion on LTRs does not appear to be 
straight-forward. It is not as simple as LTRs being subject to coercion of the Union and the 
latter ownings the former the right to participate in ruling themselves. It is not a situation in 
which migrants are on the one hand and the Union on the other hand. The LTRs’ situation is 
more complex because there is a third-party involved in the coercion of LTRs: the host State, 
which is, itself, sovereign in terms of immigration law and control with regards to TCNs.   
 
68 S Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge University Press 2004) 217; A 
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5.1.4. Interim conclusion: from the perspective of democracy, why the EU should 
provide LTRs with electoral rights, and to what extent? 
In short, LTRs have the same stake and interest in the EU’s legal and political decisions as 
EU citizens. LTRs are also subject to coercion of the Union at least as much as EU citizens 
are. Falling within the scope of all the democratic principles of affectedness, stakeholders and 
coercion supports the view that LTRs are now part of the EU demos. All of these principles 
also support the enfranchisement of LTRs in the EU elections.  
The democratic legitimacy of the EU, therefore, depends on the suffrage of the EU’s demos. 
In order to become democratic, the EU must ensure that the demos has its say in collective 
decision-making processes that shape the shared future of this political community. By 
enfranchising LTRs as part of the demos, the EU would improve its level of legitimacy (but 
only to some extent, as the Union suffers from a democratic deficit in other areas such as the 
fact that the Commission is unelected, and that Union citizens do not have any direct control 
over the Council of Ministers). 
5.2. Second angle: Integration 
This section looks at the reasons why the EU should extend EU citizens’ electoral rights to 
LTRs in order to promote their integration into society. It has two aims: first, it will explore 
the nexus between electoral rights and the integration of migrants; second, it intends to 
illustrate that due to the crucial role which electoral rights play in the integration of migrants 
into the receiving society, the EU – if it intends to achieve its policy in this area – should 
extend the electoral rights of EU citizens to LTRs. The main argument in this section is that 
as the integration of LTRs is a central issue in the EU’s immigration policy, and electoral 
rights play an essential role in enhancing this integration, the EU should provide LTRs with 
electoral rights for the sake of achieving the aims of its own policy.  
Earlier in chapter 2, the concept of the integration of migrants into the receiving society was 
studied. It was said that genuine integration of migrants occurs by reducing the ‘factors of 
otherness’ and treating migrants like ‘one of us’. The exclusion of LTRs from EU electoral 
rights highlights the differences between LTRs and EU citizens, and deepens the gap between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Such an exclusion, as will be illustrated, has a detrimental impact on the 
integration of migrants, whereas the inclusion of LTRs in the electorate would have a 
significantly positive impact on the integration of LTRs into the EU’s society – beyond 
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merely the host State. Now I turn to analyse these positive and detrimental impacts on the 
integration of migrants, and in particular LTRs, into the host society.  
First some consideration must be given to the function of electoral rights in the process of 
integration of LTRs in the host society.  
5.2.1. How do electoral rights improve the depth and speed of integration of 
migrants into society?  
The literature on the integration of migrants into the host society has highlighted the 
importance of political participation in the process of such integration.73 Academics have 
generally viewed the right to vote as a key factor in the integration process. This view has 
also been strongly supported by the EU institutions. The Council recognises the correlation 
between the participation of migrants in the process of making policies which affect them, 
and their integration:  
The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of 
integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their 
integration.74  
Based on this principle adopted by the Council, the Commission adopted ‘A Common 
Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the 
European Union’,75 which encourages Member States to provide TCNs with the opportunity 
to participate in making the policy which affects them.  
In addition, the Commission Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, after 
consultation with the NGOs active in the area of integration of migrants, produced a 
Handbook on Integration for policy-makers (2004 version) and practitioners which 
emphasised the extension of political rights (particularly the right to vote in local elections) to 
TCNs residing in the Member States.76  
It can be said that academics, TCN rights activists, and the EU institutions, all agree on the 
positive impact that the extension of suffrage to non-EU citizens have on their integration. So 
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what has stopped this extension? The issue is probably the lack of competence of the EU. I 
will discuss this issue later in this chapter.  
I have divided the function of electoral rights in the process of integration of LTRs into two 
categories: actual inclusion and emotional inclusion. The actual inclusion, actually increases 
the level of inclusion and involvement of LTRs in the Union political life. In addition to this 
actual inclusion, electoral rights have an emotional impact on LTRs, which do not actually 
increase the level of inclusion of LTRs in the society, but create in LTRs a sense of belonging 
to the EU’s society. 
5.2.1.1. Actual inclusion 
One of the actual and tangible impacts of granting electoral rights to LTRs is engaging them 
in the democratic processes, such as regular elections. Voting is ‘an important means of 
becoming incorporated and engaged in a polity, not merely the outcome of being 
assimilated’.77 Having the opportunity to participate in elections is more likely to make LTRs 
interested in the pre-election debates, to pay more attention to the events around them, and to 
learn more about the society in which they live. Hayduk notes that in the US, non-citizens 
often show more interest and pay more attention to the events around them than many 
affected citizens. This observation is likely to be applicable to LTRs as well. Unlike EU 
citizens who might have no interest in the EU – the low turnout in the EP elections confirms 
this is the case for the majority of EU citizens – LTRs have chosen the EU as their home and, 
thus, they have an interest in it. Their rights are dependent on the EU and the developments in 
EU law. Thus, if LTRs are given a right to vote, one could argue that they are more likely to 
show an interest in learning about the EP elections and more generally about the EU 
democratic norms and practices.  
For a contrary perspective, there are concerns that giving the vote to non-citizens would 
entail the enfranchisement of ill-informed, unaware, and uneducated voters.78 It has also been 
argued that non-citizens may have difficulty in understanding pre-election debates or 
misunderstand the information given to them by the candidates and their parties before 
elections. However, the issue of misunderstanding the debates or information given to voters 
due to lack of language proficiency is unlikely to apply to LTRs. Although it is possible that 
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the mother tongue of LTRs is not the same as the language of the host State, it is unlikely this 
affects their ability to make an informed decision in elections. First, unlike most national 
elections, in the EP elections there are no pre-election debates as such. Parties and their 
candidates campaign along with national elections through local events or leaflets in plain 
language. Moreover, LTRs have lived in the EU for quite a long time, during which they are 
likely to have gained sufficient language skills to understand the speeches and simple leaflets. 
In addition, LTRs may be asked to prove their language proficiency before obtaining their 
long-term residence status. In the unlikely event that a TCN after living, working or studying 
for five to ten continuous years in a Member State, still has not gained basic language skills, 
(s)he may not become a LTR at all. Therefore, while these concerns might be valid and 
relevant to other non-citizen migrants, are unlikely to be relevant to LTRs. 
In addition, all the concerns of enfranchising ill-informed, uneducated, and unaware voters 
apply to EU citizens too. It is not only LTRs who, if enfranchised, may not have acquired the 
skills and knowledge necessary to participate. Munro points that a person who is unwilling to 
acquire basic skills and knowledge about elections and the campaigns is also probably 
unwilling to participate in elections anyway and enfranchising them would, thus, not 
undermine the quality of public policy: 
enfranchising non-citizens will likely entail the enfranchisement of some ill-formed 
and uneducated potential voters. But like ill-informed, uneducated, and unaware 
citizens, these ill-prepared non-citizens will either acquire the skills and knowledge 
necessary to participate or, if they are unwilling to acquire basic skills and knowledge, 
they are probably less likely to participate at all and thus unlikely to undermine the 
quality of public policy.79 
The other concern regarding the extension of voting rights to non-citizens is that by detaching 
the right to vote from citizenship, the legal status of citizenship is devalued. In other words, 
by taking the hallmark of voting rights from citizenship, what would be left of it?80 However, 
as suggested by Raskin, the extension of suffrage to non-citizens, which is ‘sometimes 
derided as a threat to the naturalization process’, can become a pathway to citizenship.81 The 
time that a TCN holds the status of long-term residence would not simply be a waiting time 
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before becoming an EU citizen and then the person starts to learn about the EU norms and 
practices. It would rather become a path to citizenship in which the person (probably a future 
EU citizen) learns about the EU’s function, norms and practices. 
5.2.1.2. Emotional inclusion 
An essential part of the process of integration is creating the feeling of inclusion in the 
society in migrants. The integration of migrants may not be achieved without creating a sense 
of membership and belonging to the society. It is unlikely that the feeling of membership is 
developed in a migrant while his/her voice is not heard by others, his/her preferences are 
ignored, and he/she is treated like a second-class resident. Migrants are unlikely to feel ‘one 
of us’ while we dictate to them their rights and duties, without giving them any say.  
The right to vote is a powerful symbol of inclusion and membership. It turns migrants from 
an ‘alien’ to ‘one of us’; from a foreigner to a permanent member, whose voice is heard and 
whose vote makes a difference; from a second-class resident to equal member of the society. 
‘The community confirms an individual person’s membership, as a free and equal citizen, by 
according him or her a role in collective decision-making’.82 Furthermore, ‘mere possession 
of the right to vote confers social standing and dignity’.83 ‘In a democracy, equal suffrage 
may be an indication of whether individuals are treated properly by institutions and by their 
peers’.84 The right to vote would contribute to the development of the feeling in the migrant 
of being an equal member rather than a second- class resident.  
In contrast, not being on the electoral list is a strong sign of being excluded from the society. 
Those who do not have a right to vote are identified as individuals who are ‘not fully 
respected or not fully a member’.85 The integration of such a person into the host society is 
very unlikely. Full democratic integration requires that ‘potential citizens regard themselves 
not merely as participants in a democratic system but also full-fledged equal members of the 
political community’.86  
Overall, holding the right to vote boosts, both actually and emotionally, the LTRs’ inclusion 
in the society. A sufficient level of inclusion of LTRs in the society is necessary for their 
integration in it. The inclusion of LTRs would be partial and insufficient until they become 
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members of the society through the franchise; as a result, the integration of migrants would 
also be partial and fragile. In other words, the integration of LTRs would not be achieved 
without inclusion, and their inclusion would not be completed without the right to vote.  
Once it is illustrated how electoral rights could contribute to the integration of LTRs into 
society, the reasons why the EU should promote this integration must be considered. 
5.2.2. Interim conclusion: why should the EU grant LTRs voting rights in order to 
promote LTRs’ integration?  
The first and most important reason for the EU to grant voting rights to LTRs in order to 
promote their integration into EU’s society is the achievement of the aims of its own policy. 
Since the Tampere Programme, all immigration policies adopted by the EU focus on 
enhancing the integration of LTRs into the EU’s society. Instead of targeting the smooth 
integration of LTRs by following the Tampere objectives which prescribe the integration of 
non-citizens through reducing the differences between citizens and non-citizens, the LTR 
Directive intends to force LTRs’ integration into society through conditions and tests. The 
current version of the LTRs Directive is dominated by an air of compulsion and forced 
adaptation. This is capable to have a negative impact on the process of integration of LTRs. 
As mentioned earlier (in chapter 2), the integration of migrants cannot be ordered. It occurs 
as a result of the inclusion of migrants – both actually and emotionally – in the society. 
Considering the crucial role that the right to vote plays in the inclusion of LTRs in the society 
and thus their integration into society, the EU for the purpose of achieving its own policy 
would need to clear away the strong point of difference between LTRs and EU citizens. 
The second reason for the EU to extend the right to vote of EU citizens to LTRs is the 
mandate that the EU immigration policies, the Tampere Programme in particular, has defined 
for the EU to approximate the rights of LTRs to those enjoyed by EU citizens, as near as 
possible. This should have been, and still should be, followed by the EU with regards to 
electoral rights. It was illustrated in section (I) that the right to vote is one of those political 
rights of EU citizens whose extension to LTRs faces no practical issue – unlike diplomatic 
protection, for example. Thus, this right is one of those rights of which its extension to LTRs 
is possible.  
One might correctly argue that approximating the rights of LTRs to those of EU citizens’ in 
the area of electoral rights is not plausible as there is no legal basis in the Treaties for 
electoral rights for TCNs. This is a clear and serious obstacle on the way of extending 
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electoral rights to LTRs. Amending the Treaties takes time and more than that, needs political 
willingness. However, first, it is not impossible, taking into account the convincing normative 
arguments which support the extension of the right to vote to LTRs, not only for the benefit 
of LTRs, but also for the benefit of the EU. Secondly, the extension of social and free 
movement rights for TCN residents also did not have a place in the Treaties. It took decades 
until, after several attempts, the legal basis for extending these rights was finally included in 
the Treaties. If that premier fundamental amendment could be made, a second amendment in 
this area is also possible.  
Indeed, as mentioned earlier on page 106, EU soft law already exists for the extension of 
voting rights to non-citizen residents. In a common framework for the integration of TCN 
residents, the Commission recommends the participation of TCN residents in the democratic 
processes.  
The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of 
integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their 
integration.87 
The Commission then elaborates its recommendation: 
Allowing immigrants a voice in the formulation of policies that directly affect them 
may result in policy that better serves immigrants and enhances their sense of 
belonging. Wherever possible, immigrants should become involved in all facets of the 
democratic process. Ways of stimulating this participation and generating mutual 
understanding could be reached by structured dialogue between immigrant groups and 
governments. Wherever possible, immigrants could even be involved in elections, the 
right to vote and joining political parties. When unequal forms of membership and 
levels of engagement persist for longer than is either reasonable or necessary, 
divisions or differences can become deeply rooted. This requires urgent attention by 
all Member States.88 
The recommendation, known as the Common Basic Principles on Integration, was supported 
by the Member States and reaffirmed by the Council. The support may be interpreted as the 
willingness of the Member States to accept that LTRs are members of the society and should 
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have a say in the formulation of policy which directly and significantly affects them (i.e. EU 
law). It might appear that there is a good chance that an attempt to extend voting rights of EU 
citizens to LTRs could eventually succeed, and this chance would even be boosted more by 
the changes in the EP powers since last time that an amendment was made to the Treaties 
regarding TCN residents (the Amsterdam Treaty). The EP which has new powers in the area 
of Justice and Home Affairs, has always supported granting electoral rights to TCN residents. 
Nevertheless, given the current political reality, and, in particular, in view of the rise of right-
wing populist governments in a number of Member States, any development in the rights of 
LTRs might be postponed. 
The third reason for the inclusion of LTRs in the EU electorate is the opportunity that the EU 
has to develop a connection with people who will probably be future EU citizens. Union 
citizenship through naturalisation in a Member State is available to LTRs. At some point in 
the future, many LTRs may become Member State nationals and consequently EU citizens. 
However, that time might be too late to develop a close connection between the Union and 
LTRs who would then be EU citizens. Such individuals, if already treated as second class 
residents under EU law whose will and preferences are ignored by the EU, would be unlikely 
to have any interest in establishing a connection with the EU after they become official 
members of the Union. The EU by establishing a connection with LTRs and treating them 
like its members, would be able to encourage LTRs to maintain their already established 
connection with the EU even after they become Member State nationals. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that the process of LTRs’ 
integration without the voting rights would be partial and deficient. The EU has chosen a 
method of integration of which granting similar rights of citizens to non-citizens is core. In 
line with the Tampere Programme, the EU should approximate the rights of LTRs to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens in all areas. To some extent the social and economic rights of LTRs 
have been approximated to those enjoyed by EU citizens, but in terms of electoral rights no 
major step has been taken, especially at the European level.  
5.3. Third angle: Equal participation 
In this section, the reasons for the EU to extend the electoral rights of EU citizens to LTRs 
are considered from the angle of equal participation for all members. It will be argued that 
LTRs are now members of the EU society and it is in the interest of the EU to ensure that all 
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of its members are adequately represented. Therefore, the EU should provide an equal 
opportunity to participate in elections for LTRs, as members of the EU society.  
It will also be argued that the roles assigned to LTRs in the LTR Directive must be in balance 
with the rights granted to them. LTRs are given a role in the economy of the Union, equal to 
what EU citizens have, but the political rights of the former are far from equal to those of the 
latter.  
5.3.1. Are LTRs members of the EU society? 
The legal status granted to LTRs assign some of the roles of EU citizens onto LTRs. For 
instance, the LTR Directive assigns LTRs a role which only EU citizens had: participating in 
and contributing to the internal market. This is a role which no other TCN has,89 not even 
family members of EU citizens. In terms of rights attached to the status of LTRs, they enjoy 
some advantages which only EU citizens had – for instance, the right to equal treatment with 
nationals of the host State. The LTR Directive for the first time provided its beneficiaries 
(who are non-EU citizens) with the opportunity to directly derive free movement and equal 
treatment rights from EU law. Even TCN family members of EU citizens enjoy these rights 
only as a derivative right, because of their connection to EU citizens.  
There is no doubt that EU citizens are members of the EU society. The legal status of LTRs 
imposes roles that only members have. A legal status which imposes roles on certain 
migrants that only members would otherwise have, is not a mere immigration status. It is a 
membership status. It is a clear indication that LTRs are not considered aliens any more. 
Rather, they are members of the society.  
LTRs are not only de facto permanent members of the society, but also, after the Union 
directly granted them a permanent legal status with membership attributes, they have become 
de jure members of the society. Despite their membership status and role in the Union, LTRs 
are denied practical access to the benefits of membership. The approach of the EU to LTRs is 
similar to the UK’s approach after the Second World War to Italians who were settled in the 
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UK and acquired the country’s nationality. These Italian-British nationals were relied upon to 
provide services as soldiers but at the same time they were seen as enemies.90  
5.3.2. Why the Union should provide LTRs with political participation opportunities  
Political participation ‘refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the 
management of collective affairs of a given political community’.91 Political participation 
provides people with a voice in forming the laws which will subsequently govern their 
lives.92 It can be in the form of voting or running for elections, or public consultation and 
other and less conventional types of political activities such as protests, demonstrations, sit-
ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, etc.93  
Most of these means of political participation are available to LTRs. Even the public 
consultations held by the Commission are open to LTRs (and other TCNs). However, LTRs 
do not enjoy equal participation opportunities with other members of the society (i.e. EU 
citizens) with regards to voting rights. As Song acknowledges, without voting rights, 
individuals are vulnerable, even if political participation through other ways is possible for 
them.94 It is because in the Union, which is built on representative democracy, those 
individuals who do not have representatives in the policy-making institutions such as the 
European Parliament, are left without a say in the process of Union’s policy-making. Those 
who are in charge of representing members of a society (e.g. MEPs or members of national 
parliaments) would only feel concerned about representing the people who have elected them 
and would elect them again in the following elections.  
It can be said that having representatives in the EP is more important for LTRs than EU 
citizens; as the latter, if they were not able to elect MEPs, at least have representatives in 
other institutions of the Union (e.g. the Council) elected through national elections; LTRs, in 
contrast, are generally excluded from national elections. Enjoying electoral rights is, 
therefore, key in effective representation of LTRs in the EU institutions. In addition, the right 
to vote affects other rights too.95 The denial of the right to participate in the democratic 
 
90 Shaw (n 35) 56. 
91 R Bauböck, Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation (Amsterdam 
University Press 2006) 84. 
92 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2009) 222–3. 
93 Bauböck (n 91) 84.  
94 Song (n 13) 614. 
95 JP Gardner (ed), ‘Hallmark 3: Right to Vote’, Citizenship: The White Paper (Institute for Citizenshp Studies 
1997) 39. 
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process is likely to adversely affect the migrants’ lives in social and economic terms.96 
‘People with no say in public elections are less equipped to protect their interests’. 97  
There are various reasons for the EU to balance the political opportunities between LTRs and 
EU citizens by granting LTRs the electoral rights enjoyed by EU citizens. First, LTRs as 
members of the society have a legitimate claim to equal membership and equal political 
participation opportunities. Once it is accepted that LTRs are members of the EU society, it 
becomes the EU’s duty (or at least interest) as a democratic polity to provide all of its 
members – including LTRs – with an equal opportunity to participate in the society’s political 
life. 
Secondly, the EU has assigned LTRs duties and roles. The imposed roles must be 
proportionate to the granted rights. As Schrauwen has rightly observed, resident TCNs have a 
role to play in the Lisbon Strategy, and its successor ‘Europe 2020’, which set out to enhance 
the competitiveness of the Union. It is therefore justifiable to ask whether the economic 
participation role assigned to resident TCNs has consequences for their political participation 
rights. Putting it differently, LTRs are permitted to participate where there is a benefit for the 
EU, whereas, where there is a benefit for LTRs, they have been denied the possibility to 
participate.    
This argument brings to mind the slogan of ‘no taxation without representation’.98 If it is 
translated into the context of the EU-LTRs relationship, it can be argued that while the EU is 
not a State, it has assigned LTRs economic roles which directly and indirectly contribute to 
the economy of the Union and its Member States. As a result of these, LTRs should be given 
presentation in the EU institutions.   
Thirdly, LTRs’ physical presence in the EU demands their compliance with the legal and 
political decisions of the EU. Their exclusion from formal participation in the law and policy-
making processes violates a core principle of democratic legitimacy.99 In other words, LTRs 
are ruled by EU citizens. This rule of citizens over non-citizens constitutes a form of 
‘tyranny’ of the majority on the minorities,100 which violates a ‘principle of political justice’ 
– namely, ‘that the processes of self-determination through which a democratic state shapes 
 
96 William Cobbett, from Advice to Young Men and Women, Advice to a Citizen (1829), cited in Leslie J 
Macfarlane, The Theory and Practice of Human Rights (Maurice Temple Smith, 1985)142.  
97 Beckman (n 27) 153. 
98 James Otis used the slogan for arguing for the representation of the British Colonies in the Parliament. 
99 Munro (n 4) 66. 
100 Ziegler (n 1) 83. 
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its internal life, must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women who live within 
its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to local law’.101  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter started by comparing the political rights of EU citizens with those which LTRs 
enjoy. The main and important difference between the rights of these groups was found in 
relation to electoral rights. In the EU, like most polities, these rights are associated with 
citizenship status. Only those who have the polity’s citizenship enjoy electoral rights.  
However, it was illustrated that the extension of EU citizens’ electoral rights to LTRs is in the 
interest of the EU. It was argued that the EU would benefit from the enfranchisement of 
LTRs in the EP elections. These benefits were examined from three angles.  
The first angle was democracy. By reference to the leading democratic principles of 
affectedness, stakeholders, and coercion, it was illustrated that LTRs now form part of the EU 
demos and thus the EU’s democratic legitimacy would increase if a larger portion of its 
population is enfranchised. It was also said that as long as twenty million of its demos are 
excluded from the basic democratic rights, the EU will not be a fully democratic polity.   
The second angle adopted in this chapter was promoting the integration of LTRs into society. 
It was shown that electoral rights are essential for the achievement of the integration of 
LTRs; and the EU, if it intends to accomplish its own-defined mission set out in EU 
immigration policies since 1999, must enfranchise LTRs.  
The third angle used in this chapter was the right to political participation for LTRs as 
members of the society. It was argued that imposing economic roles (discussed in chapter 3) 
on LTRs which are identical to the roles defined for members of the EU society (i.e. EU 
citizens) make LTRs members of the society. Moreover, the political rights available to LTRs 
must be in balance with the economic roles imposed on them. It was then concluded that the 
EU, as a democratic institution, must provide all of its members with an equal opportunity to 
participate in political processes.  
It was not for the first time that arguments were made in favour of or against suffrage for 
TCN residents in the EU; however, this chapter focused exclusively on LTRs, not all TCN 
residents generally. Moreover, all political rights enjoyed by EU citizens (e.g. the right to 
 
101 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books 1983) 60–63. 
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petition the EP; the right to receive diplomatic protection in a third country) are the subject of 
this chapter, rather than only electoral rights.102 In addition, the point of view from which I 
looked at the LTRs’ rights was predominantly that of the EU, and not that of the LTRs.  
The arguments made in this chapter or elsewhere in favour of the extension of the franchise 
to LTRs at the European level – from enhancing the integration of LTRs to boosting the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU – deserve careful consideration. So, where have the 
problems arisen? Why have all the attempts by the Commission and the EP to enfranchise 
LTRs failed?  
The main issue, without a doubt, is the lack of legal basis for granting electoral rights to non-
citizens, which is unlikely to be solved in the foreseeable future, considering there is no sign 
of political will to make any change in the Treaties in this regard. Thus, in the next chapter, I 
will consider other options which are more plausible. For instance, a change in the method of 
determination of membership for the Union’s society and deriving rights from EU law. The 
Union has adopted a nation-state membership. Like a national government, the EU has linked 
its membership to (Member State) nationality; those who lack the nationality of a Member 
State, cannot be a member of the EU society 
A nationality-based membership criterion, however, does not seem to be appropriate for the 
EU as a supranational organisation. A supranational organisation requires a supranational 
membership model too.103 Moreover, with the current criterion in place, many of those who 
are actually members of the EU society and have a genuine link with the EU, are deprived of 
the advantages of EU membership. LTRs are among these individuals. As held by the ECJ, a 
genuine link between individuals and the polities is established by, inter alia, long residence, 
and not citizenship per se.104  LTRs who have resided in a Member State for at least five 
years, and thus, have established a genuine link with the EU, are still treated as aliens. 
Whereas individuals who happen to have the nationality of a Member State, for instance 
through their parents, but have never set foot on the Union’s land, or have lived all or most of 
their lives out of the EU, are all considered to be members of the Union and close enough to 
the EU to choose MEPs and the way law affects the EU’s actual members – including LTRs. 
 
102 For example, Schrauwen (n 25) 1. 
103 This will be discussed further in chapter 5.  
104 Bidar (n 63). 
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One might characterise the EU as a club, which has a membership criterion, and that criterion 
is holding the nationality of a Member State. However, it is not possible for a liberal and 
democratic organisation to ignore its permanent residents. The exclusion of LTRs from the 
membership of the EU, as an organisation with liberal and democratic values, counts as a 
‘political tyranny’, using the words of Walzer.105 The exclusion of LTRs from access to full 
membership rights, and electoral rights as a result, subjects a part of the population to 
legislation without representation. 
One may wonder whether EU Member States would give up their control over who holds EU 
citizenship. Member States may have reasonable concerns – in particular, security concerns – 
over who enters the free circulation of people in the EU. However, these concerns do not 
apply to LTRs. They are already part of the free circulation. Moreover, Member States are 
still the gatekeepers of the status of long-term residence, and the hegemonic role of the 
Member States in controlling who enjoys EU citizenship rights will not change. To obtain 
long-term residence status, a TCN has to be approved by a Member State, and may have to 
pass economic, security, and social checks.  
It may also be argued that granting electoral rights as a privilege of citizens to non-citizens 
would devalue the status of citizenship.106 We saw similar claims were made against the 
extension of the right to equality with the host State national, to resident aliens.107 The claims 
that were made on the basis that the right is attached to the status of EU citizenship and the 
extension of that right would diminish the worth of citizenship, we now know to be wrong 
and the extension of the right to TCNs has not had any known impact on the value of that 
right. If the extension of such an important right could occur without devaluing EU 
citizenship, electoral rights could also be extended without any impact on the value of the 
status.  
Overall, enfranchising LTRs is supported by leading democratic principles, integration 
policies, and legitimate claims to equality. The enfranchisement of LTRs is not only a claim 
by LTRs but is also a duty for the EU owed to LTRs. The EU should also extend the 
franchise to LTRs in the EP elections, in order to take a step towards its democratisation 
 
105  M Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books 1983) 60–63, 29. 
106 See for example, US Senator Dianne Feinstein: ‘Allowing noncitizens to vote . . . clearly dilutes the promise 
of citizenship’ quoted in Hayduk (n 73) 126.  
107 P H Schuck, Citizens, strangers, and in-betweens: essays on immigration and citizenship (Westview Press 
1998). See also, Hayduk (n 73) 126. For counterarguments, see Song (n 13) 615. 
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(section I), towards the achievement of the aims of its own immigration policy (section II), 
and towards equal treatment of all members of its society (section III).
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In chapters 3 and 4 the rights of long-term residents (LTRs) were compared with the rights 
that EU citizens enjoy under EU law, in order to examine the extent to which the 2003 Long-
term Residents Directive (LTR Directive)1 is capable of achieving two of the objectives of 
the Tampere conclusions:2 a) ‘A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting 
them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens’;3 b) ‘A person, who has 
resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-
term residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which 
are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. the right to reside, receive 
education, and work as an employee or self-employed person, as well as the principle of non-
discrimination vis à vis the citizens of the State of residence’.4  
It was illustrated in chapter 2 that third-country nationals (TCNs) may be subject to 
discretionary integration conditions which may vary from a Member State to Member State. 
After these conditions are met and the status of long-term residence is granted, the LTR 
Directive has secured the rights of residence and equal treatment with the host State nationals 
for LTRs in the first Member State.5 In chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the same rights of 
residence and equal treatment as those enjoyed by EU citizens were also secured to some 
extent in the second State for LTRs (although these rights are still different in nature to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens).6 Again, these rights are subject to conditions which vary from 
Member State to Member State, and LTRs enjoy these rights only after the status of long-
term residence is (re)granted by the second State. Therefore, although the Directive to certain 
extent is capable of providing LTRs with the rights that Union citizens enjoy as regards 
residence and equal treatment, what the Directive bestows on LTRs is far from ‘comparable’ 
 
1 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. 
2 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, Brussels. 
3 Tampere Programme, Objective 18.  
4 ibid, Objective 21. 
5 First Member State means the State which grants the status of long-term residence for the first time.  
6 Second Member State refers to the State to which an LTR moves, after acquiring the status in the first Member 
State.   
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to what is enjoyed by EU citizens. The position is even worse with regards to political rights 
which fall entirely outside the scope of the LTR Directive, and thus the latter is not capable of 
approximating the political rights of LTRs to those of EU citizens. 
Using the above conclusions as my point of departure, this chapter aims to examine another 
objective of the Tampere conclusions: ‘the legal status of third country nationals should be 
approximated to that of Member States' nationals’.7 The questions which this chapter intends 
to answer are, first, considering the rights bestowed on LTRs by the LTR Directive, is the 
Directive capable of ‘approximating’ the status of long-term residence to that of EU 
citizenship? Secondly, why is it in the EU’s interest to approximate these statuses, or at least 
to extend the rights of EU citizens to LTRs? In previous chapter, the reasons for which the 
Union should extend the rights of LTRs to what EU citizens enjoy were analysed. This 
chapter goes beyond just rights. It examines the Union’s interest in approximating the status 
of LTRs to that of EU citizens – and not just their rights.  At the end of the chapter, possible 
ways to approximate these statuses will be discussed. It will be argued that the best possible 
way for the Union to treat its permanent residents is what was agreed in the Tampere 
Programme, namely, a legal status and rights for LTRs ‘as near as possible’ to those of EU 
citizens.  
It will be argued that because TCN permanent residents have the EU status of long-term 
resident, treating them differently from EU citizens is no longer justified. It will also be 
argued that having no competence with regards to the integration of migrants is not an issue 
for the EU. The Union did not have such a competence with regards to the integration of 
mobile EU citizens and, yet, the Union has taken action to promote the integration of EU 
citizens in the host State; in fact, the lack of competence with regards to the integration of 
mobile EU citizens into the receiving society was never a concern for the Union, due to the 
reasons which will be discussed later. 
2. EU citizenship status 
In this section I will briefly explain what actually EU citizenship is, particularly, how it is 
different from – and more than – just a series of rights. As Article 21 TFEU states, ‘Every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. Holding the 
nationality of a Member State is the sole criterion for being a citizen of the EU. As granting 
 
7 Tampere Programme, Objective 21.  
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nationality of a Member State is in the sole control of Member States,8 EU Member States 
not only have the carte blanche in granting nationality, but also they are the gatekeepers to 
citizenship of the Union. The ECJ has also recognised that unlike the personal scope of other 
terms in the Treaties, such as ‘worker’, which were defined by the Court itself, the personal 
scope of Union citizenship is entirely determined by the Member States.9  
Citizenship of the Union has an exceptional character. It is neither the nationality of a state, 
nor is it the dual nationality of a federal system. EU citizenship is a unique status under 
international law. It is unique because differential treatment on the grounds of nationality is 
generally a core feature of international law,10  while the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality is one of the crucial components of EU citizenship. It is also 
interesting that a status which derives from nationality, eliminates distinction based on 
nationality. Article 18 TFEU protects Union citizens against any discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality:  
Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited.11 
The core rights associated with the status of EU citizenship (as discussed in chapters 3 and 4) 
are the rights to free movement and residence in any Member States, the right to vote and to 
stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their 
Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; the right to 
enjoy diplomatic protection of any Member States in the countries where the citizen is not 
represented by their country of nationality; the right to petition the EP, to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in 
any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.12 These rights are 
complemented by the right to equal treatment with the host State nationals.  
 
8 ‘The Edinburgh Decision’ OJ 1992 C 348; see D Kochenov, ‘Annotation of Rottmann’ (2010) 47 Common 
Market Law Review 1831. 
9 See for example, Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-7917, where the Court held that the determination 
of the beneficiaries of the Union citizenship rights to vote and to stand as a candidate for European Parliament 
elections falls within the competence of the Member State, which must be exercised in compliance with Union 
law; see also C-369/90, M.V. Micheletti and others v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-
4239, p10.  
10 P Mindus, European Citizenship after Brexit (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 12. 
11 TFEU, Article 18.  
12 Added to the TFEU by the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 24.   
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Most of these rights resemble a series of rights which existed even before the introduction of 
EU citizenship. Member State nationals could enjoy free movement and residence rights in 
other Member States even before the Maastricht Treaty came to effect by relying on the 
Residence Directives.13 They were also, already, enjoying the right to non-discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality. The EU citizenship status itself, however, has had an impact on 
the rights that existed in the pre-Maastricht regime. By analysing the cases decided by the 
Court after the Maastricht Treaty came into force, we can see that the status of EU citizenship 
is not just a series of consolidated rights which existed even before EU citizenship;14 the 
status itself, provides the holder with an additional layer of protection against discrimination, 
especially against discrimination based on nationality.15 The Advocate General Opinion in 
the Boukhalfa case supports this: 
The concept [of EU citizenship] embraces aspects which have already largely been 
established in the development of Community law and in this respect it represents a 
consolidation of existing Community law. However, it is for the Court to ensure that 
its full scope is attained. If all the conclusions inherent in that concept are drawn, 
every citizen of the Union must, whatever his nationality, enjoy exactly the same 
rights and be subject to the same obligations.16  
The analysis of cases shows that the Court does generally agree with this opinion. As we will 
see below, there are a number of cases in which a Member State national was not eligible for 
a right (e.g. under the free movement provisions), but the Court held the person should be 
granted that benefit because of their EU citizenship status, which entitles the holder to the 
same rights as the host State nationals. The Court has shown that ‘in the eyes of the Court, 
Member State nationals would be, above all, Union citizens and any other status they might 
have (e.g. worker or service-provider) should be coloured by the fact that they are Union 
citizens’.17 The Court, as the below examples will demonstrate, has clearly expanded the 
 
13 Directive 90/364 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L180/26; Directive 90/365 on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L180/28; Directive 
93/96 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59. 
14 Tryfonidou, The Impact of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms; for a different view see: D 
O’Keeffe, ‘Union Citizenship’ in D O’Keeffe and P Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty 
(Chancery/Wiley 1994). 
15 For a detailed analysis of the Court’s approach to cases where the rights of an EU citizen are at issue, see 
Tryfonidou (n 14). 
16 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa [1996] ECR I-2253, para 63. 
17 Tryfonidou (14) 30. 
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personal and material scope of the Treaty provisions just to ensure that the EU citizen would 
enjoy the right they claimed.   
Martínez Sala,18 is a good example that shows that EU citizenship and the rights attached to it 
are not simply what Member State nationals were enjoying before the changes made by the 
Treaty on the European Union. The claimant was a Spanish national who was lawfully 
resident in Germany (under German law). Her application for a child-raising allowance was 
refused because she was economically inactive and, thus, could not rely on Regulation 
1612/68, which governed the position of migrant workers.19 The Court held that a Union 
citizen who is lawfully residing in the host State, may enjoy the prohibition of discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality in all situations that fall within the material scope of EU law 
and must be treated exactly the same as German nationals.20 The case demonstrates that EU 
citizens enjoy this right even where the discrimination against the claimant would not affect 
the effectiveness of the Treaty’s economic aims. In the case the Court showed that the right to 
equal treatment with the host State nationals is not merely an instrument for the achievement 
of the Treaty’s aims.21 The Court elevated the status of EU citizenship to the fundamental 
status of Member State nationals, meaning that the status holder enjoys the benefits of the 
status, regardless of their economic status, and regardless of the effect exercising those 
benefits have on the Treaty economic aims.22  
In subsequent judgments, the Court made it clear that the prohibition of discrimination 
against EU citizens is no longer limited to the situations which fall within the material scope 
of EU law, as it had originally stated in Martinez Sala. Garcia Avello23 is an example where 
the Court ruled that Member State nationals who are lawfully resident in the territory of 
another Member State must be treated equally with the host State nationals even with regards 
to matters the regulation of which falls within the Member States competence. The case was 
about registering the surname of two children born in Belgium to a Spanish couple. The 
Belgian authorities refused to register their surname in accordance with Spanish practice (two 
separate words as surname), on the basis that in the registration documents of persons bearing 
 
18 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-269. 
19 Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJL257/2. It now 
has been repealed and replaced by Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union 
[2011] OJL141/1. 
20 Article 6 TEC (now Article 18 TFEU).  
21 Tryfonidou (n 14) 32.  
22 ibid, 31. 
23 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. 
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Belgian-Spanish nationality, Belgian practice must be followed. The Court held that the 
children as nationals of a Member State (Spain) lawfully residing in another Member State 
(Belgium) could invoke Article 12 EC (now 18 TFEU) and thus were protected against 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The Court ruled that although the rules 
governing a person’s surname are within the Member States competence, the host State must 
still comply with EU law when exercising that competence. In this case, the matter was in the 
competence of the host State, and not covered by EU law, nevertheless, the Court, once more, 
extended the scope of EU law in order to guarantee the EU citizen would not be 
discriminated against. In other words, ‘no areas of Member State competence can now 
remain insulated from the effects of EU law, as any Union citizen who has exercised one of 
the rights stemming from the personal market freedoms can now rely on EU law in order to 
challenge the choices of a Member State in any area’.24 
Rottmann is another example of the Court’s intervention with regards to a matter which falls 
within the exclusive competence of the Member States. The grant or revocation of nationality 
falls within the complete (almost, after Rottmann) control of the Member State.25 The 
claimant was an Austrian doctor who moved to Germany and acquired German nationality, 
for which he had to give up his Austrian nationality as required by German law. He acquired 
German nationality, for which he had to give up his Austrian nationality as required by 
German law. He, however, in his application for citizenship, did not reveal the criminal 
proceedings pending against him in Austria to investigate accusations of fraud in the exercise 
of his profession. After the German authorities became aware of the criminal proceedings 
against him in Austria, his German nationality was revoked due to deception in the process of 
naturalisation. This left Dr Rottmann stateless. The main issue from the point of view of EU 
law was that in addition to Member State nationality, Dr Rottmann would also lose his EU 
citizenship, as he would no longer hold any Member State nationality. In its judgment, the 
Court first referred to the Declaration No 2 on nationality of a Member State, annexed by the 
Member States to the final act of the Treaty on European Union: 
The Conference declares that, wherever in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the question 
 
24 Tryfonidou, (n 14) 34.  
25 D Kochenov, ‘Annotation of Rottmann’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1831; Tryfonidou, ‘The 
Impact of EU Law on Nationality Laws and Migration Control in the EU’s Member States’ (2011) 25 Journal of 
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whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled 
solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.…26 
The Court also observed the conclusions of the European Council at Edinburgh on 11 and 
12 December 1992, concerning certain problems on the Treaty of European Union: 
The provisions of Part Two of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
relating to citizenship of the Union give nationals of the Member States additional 
rights and protection as specified in that Part. They do not in any way take the place 
of national citizenship. The question whether an individual possesses the nationality 
of a Member State will be settled solely by reference to the national law of the 
Member State concerned.27  
The Court then mentioned the national law related to the withdrawal of nationality in case of 
statelessness, which made it possible to do so if the nationality was acquired by fraud. The 
Court also mentioned international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,28 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,29 the European Convention on 
Nationality30 but what is relevant to our discussion here is ‘whether it is contrary to European 
Union law, in particular to Article 17 EC (now Article 20 TFEU), for a Member State to 
withdraw from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that State acquired by naturalisation 
and obtained by deception inasmuch as that withdrawal deprives the person concerned of the 
status of citizen of the Union and of the benefit of the rights attaching thereto by rendering 
him stateless, acquisition of that nationality having caused that person to lose the nationality 
of his Member State of origin’.31 The Court held that although grant or withdrawal of 
nationality is a matter that falls to be regulated by Member States, Germany must have due 
regard to EU law and ensure that a) the withdrawal decision is proportionate, and b) the 
decisions can be justified to protect the public interest.  
The Rottmann case illustrates that the Court not only intervenes in matters falling within the 
competence of the Member States – Garcia Avello – but also showed that, in order to protect 
the rights of an EU citizen, the Court does not hesitate to make a ruling in a case related to a 
highly sensitive area of Member States’ sovereignty (for which the Member States adopted 
 
26 OJ 1992 C 191, p. 98. 
27 ‘The Edinburgh Decision’ OJ 1992 C 348, p. 1. 
28 C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449, para 53. 
29 Rottmann, para 15. 
30 Rottmann, para 18. 
31 Paragraph 36.  
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different decisions and declarations to ensure their sovereignty in this area would not be 
affected by the status of EU citizenship).32 The Court has demonstrated its ‘ability to 
guarantee the rights of EU citizens in the supranational capacity by automatically acquiring 
jurisdiction where such rights are infringed – an innovation introduced in Ruiz Zambrano – as 
well as the necessity for EU law to be taken into account in the determination of the 
possession of the legal status itself and jurisdiction to have a final say on this matter – 
acquired in Rottmann’.33  
The Court has also interpreted EU law provisions in a way that EU citizens enjoy the rights 
granted by those provisions, even if they did not actually fall within the personal scope of 
those provisions. For this purpose, the Court read the relevant provisions in conjunction with 
the citizenship provisions of the Treaty. For instance, in Grzelczyk,34 the Court found that 
Directive 93/9635 does not establish any right to payment of maintenance grants by the host 
State for students holding the nationality of other Member States.36 Mr Grzelczyk was a 
French national studying at university in Belgium. He successfully completed three years of 
his studies, nevertheless, in his fourth and final year he applied for the minimex, which was a 
minimum subsistence allowance. The application was refused, and the Court found that the 
fact that Mr Grzelczyk was not of Belgian nationality was the only bar to the maintenance 
being granted to him.  The Court then held that because Belgian national could qualify for the 
minimex, the refusal of minimex to Mr Grzelczyk would amount to nationality 
discrimination, which is prohibited by Article 18 TFEU (then Article 12 EC).  
The Court’s decision in favour of Mr Grzelczyk was clearly influenced by the status of EU 
citizenship. In a similar case, Brown,37 before the introduction of EU citizenship, the Court 
decided that when a Member State national does not satisfy the conditions of EU law 
provisions (in that case, Regulation 1612/68), and thus the person does not fall within the 
scope of the provisions, the former is not eligible for enjoying the rights granted by those 
provisions, and the host State is able to refuse those rights.38 In Grzelczyk however, that was 
 
32 For a detailed comment on the Rottmann case, see: D Kochenov, ‘Annotation of Rottmann’ (2010) 47 
Common Market Law Review 1831. 
33 S Carrera, ‘The Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU’ (2006) 507. 
34 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193. 
35 Directive 93/96/EC on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59. 
36 Grzelczyk, para 39.  
37 Case 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205. 
38 Case 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205. 
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decided after the introduction of EU citizenship, the Court departed from its position in 
Brown, and held that: 
since Brown, the Treaty on European Union has introduced citizenship of the 
European Union into the EC Treaty and added to Title VIII of part Three a new 
chapter 3 devoted to education and vocational training. There is nothing in the 
amended text of the Treaty to suggest that students who are citizens of the Union, 
when they move to another Member State to study there, lose the rights which the 
Treaty confers on citizens of the Union. 
Nevertheless, the Court noted that EU citizens are still required to satisfy the conditions of 
their right of residence, namely to be financially self-sufficient and to have comprehensive 
medical insurance, and the host State may withdraw the right of residence of a student who 
poses an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host State. 
The analysis of the above cases shows that in EU citizenship cases, the applicant (EU citizen) 
is at the centre of the case, and the Court is devoted to ensuring that EU citizens enjoy all the 
rights and freedoms provided and protected by EU law.39 The Court has relaxed the 
connection between the rights of EU citizens with the contribution these rights make to the 
objectives of the Treaties. It is not (only) the effectiveness of the Treaty, and the contribution 
granting the right to the subject EU citizen would make to the objectives of the Treaty, or a 
Regulation or a Directive, that is important, but it is important for the Court that EU citizen is 
treated equally with the host State nationals, just because the former is a citizen of the Union.  
The Court has demonstrated its ‘ability to guarantee the rights of EU citizens in the 
supranational capacity by automatically acquiring jurisdiction where such rights are 
infringed. The Court has shown that it does not hesitate to intervene in matters falling within 
the competence of the Member States. Its preference for a rights-based approach to 
interpreting EU citizenship provisions and especially free movement of persons has often 
conflicted with ‘national governments’ preference for the status quo, unilateral citizenship 
and migration control and a power-driven approach’. The judgments of the Court have often 
overcome the States’ preference and caused significant changes in national legislation – for 
 
39 S Morano-Foadi and S Andreadakis, ‘The Convergence of the European Legal System in the Treatment of 
Third Country Nationals in Europe: The ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence’ (2011) 22 European Journal of 
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instance changes made after Rottmann, to national legislation on the loss of citizenship 
because of fraud.40 
3. EU long-term residence status 
The status of EU citizenship brings all its holders under one umbrella and protects them 
against discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The status is inclusionary for Member 
State nationals. At the same time, it is exclusionary for the rest of the EU population who are 
not nationals of a Member State, e.g. TCN permanent residents. The exclusionary nature of 
EU citizenship has generally been criticised.41 Similar to all citizenships,42 EU citizenship 
defines who is an insider and who is an outsider.43 ‘The very notion of membership in society 
on grounds of the formal attribute of citizenship means that one includes all individuals, who 
have citizenship and benefit from rights connected to it, while all those who do not have 
respective citizenship are excluded and cannot benefit from the special bundle of membership 
rights’.44 It is thus a factor of ‘otherness’. This seems to have a negative impact on the 
integration of TCN permanent residents into the EU’s society. The Tampere Programme was 
intended to remedy, or at least minimise, the negative impact that excluding TCN permanent 
residents from the status of EU citizenship had on the TCNs’ integration, by granting them a 
status ‘as near as possible’ to those of EU citizens. Whether the LTR Directive is capable of 
approximating the status of TCN permanent residents to that of EU citizens, is the question 
this section intends to answer.   
TCNs, as discussed above, are excluded from the scope of Article 18 TFEU, and thus are not 
protected against discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Article 11 of the LTR 
Directive, however, provides LTRs with the right to equal treatment with the nationals of the 
host Member State. 
 
40 D Kostakopoulou, ‘The European Court of Justice, Member State Autonomy and European Union 
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(Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1995); M Martiniello, ‘European Citizenship, European Identity and 
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Integration: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe (Pinter 1995); T Kostakopoulou, ‘European 
Citizenship and Immigration after Amsterdam: Openings, Silences, Paradoxes’ (1998) 24 Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 639. 
42 JH. Weiler, ‘Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC 
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Long-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards: 
(a) access to employment and self-employed activity, provided such activities do not 
entail even occasional involvement in the exercise of public authority, and conditions 
of employment and working conditions, including conditions regarding dismissal and 
remuneration; 
(b) education and vocational training, including study grants in accordance with 
national law; 
(c) recognition of professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, in 
accordance with the relevant national procedures; 
(d) social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national law; 
(e) tax benefits;  
(f) access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made available 
to the public and to procedures for obtaining housing; 
(g) freedom of association and affiliation and membership of an organisation 
representing workers or employers or of any organisation whose members are 
engaged in a specific occupation, including the benefits conferred by such 
organisations, without prejudice to the national provisions on public policy and public 
security; 
(h) free access to the entire territory of the Member State concerned, within the limits 
provided for by the national legislation for reasons of security.45 
Three observations can be made about Article 11 of the LTR Directive. First, the right to 
equal treatment for LTRs is not as general as what Article 18 TFEU provides for EU citizens. 
The latter provides EU citizens with the protection against discrimination in all matters 
within the scope of application of the Treaties, while the material scope of Article 11 of the 
Directive is limited to the specific issues listed in the Article. The second observation to be 
made is that Article 11 LTR Directive makes multiple references to national laws. A third 
interesting point is that the right to equal treatment is limited to the Member State which 
granted the long-term residence status to the TCN. This means that, in case an LTR moves to 
 
45 LTR Directive, Article 11.  
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a second Member State, until that State approves the LTR’s application for the status of EU 
LTR – which he/she has already been granted by another EU Member State – the LTR would 
not be protected against discrimination on the grounds of nationality (even on the limited 
areas listed above).  
The text of provisions governing the rights of EU citizens are also limited but the Court has 
extensively expanded EU citizens’ rights by adopting a right-based approach in interpreting 
the provisions. Since the adoption of the LTR Directive, the Court has handed down at least 
three important judgments (Kamberaj,46 Commission v. Netherlands,47 Mangat Singh,48) in 
which, in the words of Peers,49 the Court laid the foundations for the [interpretation of] the 
Directive. By analysing these cases we can see whether/how the Court approached the 
position of LTRs differently from that of EU citizens, as seen in the cases discussed in 
section 2.  
In the Kamberaj case, Mr Kamberaj, an Albanian citizen residing in Italy since 1994, holding 
permanent residence permit, had received housing benefit between 1998 and 2008. However, 
in 2009 his application for the same benefit was refused because the funds available to TCNs 
had been exhausted. The funds for EU citizens and Italians were still available. He challenged 
the distinction between TCNs and EU citizens, which, he argued, is prohibited under the LTR 
Directive, as well as the Race Equality Directive.50 The national court requested a 
preliminary reference.  
The Court began its judgment by recalling the integration objective of the LTR Directive. 
The Court ruled that since nationality is excluded from the grounds on which one could claim 
discrimination under the Race Equality Directive,51 Mr Kamberaj could not rely on the 
provisions of this Directive.52 Thirdly, the Court ruled inadmissible a question relating to the 
requirement that TCNs must have worked for three years to be eligible for housing benefit.53 
 
46 Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) 
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Mr Kamberaj had worked for three years prior to claiming the benefit. Finally, the Court 
declared inadmissible two questions as to whether requiring EU citizens to live or work in the 
relevant province for five years, and to declare themselves belonging a linguistic minority. 
The questions were inadmissible as they were relevant to EU citizens only.  
The Court then addressed the question related to Article 11 of the LTR Directive which 
provides LTRs with the right to equal treatment with nationals of the Member State where 
they reside as regards certain entitlements.54 In that regard, the Court repeated its ruling in 
Ekro,55 and held that when an express reference to national law is made in EU law, such as in 
Article 11(1)(d) of the LTR Directive, ‘it is not for the Court to give the terms concerned an 
autonomous and uniform definition under European Union law’.56 The meaning and exact 
scope of such concepts are defined by national law. The Court however, held that in the 
absence of such an autonomous and uniform definition under EU law of a concept (e.g. social 
security, social assistance and social protection) in a provision – in this case, Article 11(1)(d) 
of the LTR Directive – the concept must not be defined by a national law provision in a way 
that the effectiveness of the LTR Directive is undermined.57 The judgment means that where 
there are references in the Directive to national legislation, it is the relevant national law that 
governs the situation, and the national legislation can be saved as long as they do not 
undermine the effectiveness of the aims of the Directive.  
The second of the three cases mentioned above, Commission v Netherlands, was about the 
charges for residence permits of LTRs who move to the Netherlands from another Member 
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State. The Commission considered the charges excessive and disproportionate and took an 
action on the basis of recital 10 of the preamble to the LTR Directive:  
A set of rules governing the procedures for the examination of application for long-
term resident status should be laid down. Those procedures should be effective and 
manageable, taking account of the normal workload of the Member States' 
administrations, as well as being transparent and fair, in order to offer appropriate 
legal certainty to those concerned. They should not constitute a means of hindering 
the exercise of the right of residence.58 
The Dutch authorities argued that since the LTR Directive does not set the amount of 
application fees, competence in that respect lies with the Member States.59 The Court firstly 
pointed out that recital 10 in the preamble, which was the basis of the action by the 
Commission: 
A set of rules governing the procedures for the examination of application for long-
term resident status should be laid down. Those procedures should be effective and 
manageable, taking account of the normal workload of the Member States' 
administrations, as well as being transparent and fair, in order to offer appropriate 
legal certainty to those concerned. They should not constitute a means of hindering 
the exercise of the right of residence. 
The Court held that the recital to the Directive had no binding legal force and did not 
establish independent obligations for the Member States.60 It then noted the margin of 
appreciation the Member States have in fixing fees for issuing residence permits pursuant to 
the LTR Directive.61 The Court, however, held that this discretion is not unlimited. Imposing 
fees may not be so high that the achievement of the objectives pursued by the Directive are 
undermined, and, therefore, deprive the Directive of its effectiveness. The Court noted that 
the principal purpose of the Directive is the integration of TCN residents in the EU.62 The 
other objective of the Directive, the Court noted, is to contribute to the effective attainment of 
the internal market by enabling LTRs to move to a second Member State.63 The Court, thus, 
ruled that, having regard to the objectives pursued by the LTR Directive, LTRs who move to 
 
58 Recital 10 of the preamble to the LTR Directive.  
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the second Member State, and satisfy the conditions and comply with the procedures laid 
down in the Directive, have the right to obtain the long-term residence status in the second 
State. The second State has the discretion to fix the charges for a residence permit, 
nevertheless, charging a fee must not have either the object or the effect of creating an 
obstacle to obtaining the residence permit. Finally, the Court held that the fees imposed by 
the Dutch legislation undermine the objective pursued by the Directive and deprive it of its 
effectiveness.  
The third famous case which touched upon the LTR Directive is the Singh case.64 Mr Singh, 
an Indian national, who was a resident in the Netherlands holding a residence permit for a 
fixed period relating to his work as a spiritual leader. That permit was renewed on several 
occasions, each time for a fixed period. After over five years of lawful residence, Mr Singh 
applied for the status of long-term resident. The application was refused on the basis that he, 
as a holder of a limited residence permit, did not fall within the scope of the LTR Directive.65 
Mr Singh appealed against the refusal and the court referred the case to the ECJ in order to 
clarify the personal scope of the LTR Directive.  
The Advocate General referred to the purpose of the LTR Directive, as expressed inter alia in 
recitals 2, 4 and 12 to the Directive, and noted that is to achieve a scheme based on the 
integration of TCNs who are legally settled on a long-term basis in the Member States in such 
a way as to contribute to the economic and social cohesion which is a fundamental objective 
of the European Union. That scheme is based on the grant of long-term residence status, 
which should have a common definition in all Member States so that legally resident TCNs 
can acquire that status and enjoy it on much the same terms in all of the Union. To that effect, 
the establishment of that status must allow the legal certainty of TCNs to be guaranteed by 
preventing the acquisition of such a status from being left to the discretion of Member States 
once the conditions are actually met.66  
The Court in its judgment clarified the personal scope of the LTR Directive and held that 
those TCNs who have settled in a Member State, but their residence permit has an expiry date 
– ‘formally limited’ – are also included in the beneficiaries of the Directive. The Court then 
addressed the issue of references in the Directive to national legislation. The Court held that 
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when the LTR Directive makes a reference to national legislation, e.g. for defining lawful 
residence, or the integration conditions, the relevant national law may not undermine the 
objectives of the Directive.  
The first observation about the above judgments is that, unlike the EU citizens’ cases, EU 
LTRs, are not at the centre of the case. It is not the EU status of LTRs which is important for 
the Court. In the EU citizens’ cases analysed on section 2, the main intention of the Court 
was to ensure that the EU citizens enjoy the rights they claim. Neither the lack of jurisdiction, 
nor the limited material scope, nor personal scope has prevented the Court from expanding 
and developing the rights of EU citizens. By contrast, in the LTRs’ cases,67the focus of the 
Court is on the effectiveness of the LTR Directive. The Member States are free to impose 
conditions under national law on LTRs (and applicants for the status of long-term residence), 
as long as the conditions do not affect the effectiveness of the Directive to achieve its aims.  
The principle of effectiveness removes the concern that the references in the LTR Directive 
to national legislation could make the Directive meaningless. Nevertheless, the application of 
the principle of effectiveness does not stop the Member States from imposing discretionary 
conditions on LTRs and those who apply for the status. Two LTRs in the same Member State 
can still be imposed different integration conditions based on their nationality. A LTR can 
still be treated differently in two different Member States depending on the economic needs 
of the States.  
The application of proportionality adopted by the Court also does not seem enough to achieve 
the initial aim to approximate the status of LTRs to that of EU citizens. The rights of LTRs 
can still be limited by national legislation, which must merely not be excessive and 
disproportionate. This approach in interpreting the Directive (just ensuring the effectiveness 
of the Directive and that the conditions defined by national legislation are not 
disproportionate) is a downgrade from the initial aim: approximating the status of TCN 
residents to that of EU citizens and granting the former the rights of the latter. The judgments 
demonstrate the Court’s inability to effectively provide LTRs with the rights which were 
intended to be granted to LTRs. The text of the Directive, particularly the discretion reserved 
for the Member States to apply national laws on LTRs, ties the Court’s hands in adopting the 
same approach adopted in EU citizens’ cases.  
 
67 Such as Kamberaj, Commission v Italy, and Mangat Singh, which were analysed above.  
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By applying the principle of proportionality, the Court only tried to balance the aims of the 
LTR Directive with the text of the LTR Directive. Nevertheless, the Court in these judgments 
ignored the logic of providing LTRs with freedom of movement and equal treatment rights. It 
is not logical to give LTRs a status which encourages them to move and then imposing a 
burden on them, which puts LTRs in a disadvantaged situation in the second State.  
The approach of the Court in cases where the claimant is an LTR does not come as a surprise 
as the claimant simply did not have the status of EU citizenship. The Court has made it clear 
that in cases such as Martinez Sala, Garcia Avello, Grzelczyk, the Court interpreted the 
relevant provision in the light that the subject was an EU citizen, and should be treated as 
such. What made it possible for the Court to adopt such an approach in these cases, was, with 
no doubt, the Treaty provisions on the general protection of EU citizens against 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The Court expanded the personal and/or 
material scope of the relevant provision in order to ensure that an EU citizen would have the 
same rights as the host State nationals. In the absence of the general protection against 
nationality discrimination for LTRs, the LTR Directive does not seem to form a status 
comparable to EU citizenship.  
4. Long-term residence status as a subsidiary form of EU citizenship?  
The introduction of a special status for permanent resident TCNs has generally been 
welcomed by EU law scholars.68 The status marks a detachment of autonomous free 
movement rights and equality of treatment with the host State nationals from the status of EU 
citizenship. This means that holding the nationality of a Member State (and thus EU 
citizenship) is no longer the sole route to these rights.69 LTRs acquire certain citizenship 
rights because of their residence in the Union. In other words, LTRs are ‘civic citizens’ of the 
Union.  Civic citizenship, is one of the methods used with the intention to facilitate the 
inclusion of non-citizens into the receiving society.70 The exclusion of legally resident non-
citizens from enjoying the rights available to other members of the society who are citizens is 
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recognised as ‘a major barrier to inclusion’.71 The concept of civic citizenship removes this 
barrier by extending the ‘membership’ of the society to non-citizen residents without granting 
them the formal status of citizenship – either because they cannot or are not interested in 
acquiring the status. 
The status of long-term residence has  been described as ‘a subsidiary form of EU 
citizenship’ by Acosta.72 The purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which the 
status of long-term residence is actually ‘as near as possible’ to EU citizenship, and whether 
it can be described as a subsidiary form of EU citizenship.   
Acosta in his book ‘assessed the implementation and possible interpretation by the ECJ of the 
LTR Directive in order to conclude that long-term residence status has the potential to 
become a subsidiary form of EU citizenship which escapes direct control by the Member 
States. Hence, this Directive brings the prospect of transforming Member States’ control over 
the relationship between territory and population’.73 This conclusion was made in 2011. Since 
then the Court has handed down the three important judgments of Kamberaj, Commission v 
Netherlands, and Singh, seen earlier. Considering these judgments, does the long-term 
residence status have the potential to become a subsidiary form of EU citizenship which 
escapes direct control by the Member States? Does the LTR Directive bring the prospect of 
transforming Member States’ control over the relationship between territory and population? 
Acosta also predicted that ‘a purposive interpretation by the ECJ will mean that LTRs will 
obtain similar treatment to European citizens in a number of areas in line with the Tampere 
objective, re-affirmed in the Stockholm programme, of equal treatment’.74 By comparing the 
above judgments with the Court’s judgments on EU citizenship, we can see to what extent, as 
predicted by Acosta, the Court’s approach in both situations is similar and that LTRs receive 
similar treatment to European citizens in line with the Tampere objective of equal treatment.  
The LTR Directive determines the terms for conferring and withdrawing long-term residence 
status, and the rights pertaining thereto.75 For the acquisition of the status the applicant must 
lodge an application with the competent authorities of the host State and provide 
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documentary evidence that he/she meets the conditions set out in the Directive. The 
application and its accompanied evidence are determined by the national law of the host 
State. Thus, with regards to acquisition, the statuses of LTR is similar to EU citizenship.  
Both are EU-level statuses, the acquisition of which is governed by national laws.  
In terms of the withdrawal of the status of long-term residence, the status will be withdrawn 
in case of: 
a) adoption of an expulsion measure when the LTR is an actual and sufficiently 
serious threat to public policy or public security;  
(b) in the event of absence from the territory of the Union for a period of 12 
consecutive months; 
(c) detection of fraudulent acquisition of long-term resident status.76 
With regards to the expulsion measure when the LTR constitutes a threat to public security or 
policy, the Member States must have regard to the duration of residence in their territory; the 
age of the person concerned; the consequences for the person concerned and family 
members; links with the country of residence or the absence of links with the country of 
origin. The LTR must also be provided with an opportunity to challenge the expulsion 
decision, as well as legal aid if necessary. With regards to the expulsion measure, the position 
of LTRs is very similar to EU citizens, who can be returned to their own State on similar 
grounds.77 Again, the duration of residence in the host State, age and consequences of 
deportation will be considered, and any decision to remove an EU citizen is subject to judicial 
scrutiny.78      
Losing the status after a year of absence from the territory of the Union may be justified,79 as 
such a relatively long absence may indicate that the LTR has changed their intention to live 
permanently in the Union, and thus allowing them to keep the status would not contribute to 
the objectives of the Tampere Programme or the Directive (e.g. the development of the 
internal market or the integration of TCN residents into the host society). However, the 
possibility of withdrawing the status after one year proves that the status of long-term 
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residence is not as stable and strong as EU citizenship, which can never be withdrawn in case 
of absence from the Union.  
The long-term residence status, once granted, appears to escape the direct control of the host 
Member State. It can only be withdrawn in certain circumstances, defined by the Directive, 
and the withdrawal is subject to judicial scrutiny. Thus, with regards to the withdrawal, the 
statuses of LTR and EU citizenship share a number of similarities. In other words, just as the 
grant of both is governed by national legislation – LTR due to the conditions defined in the 
Directive, and EU citizenship as a result of being derivative – the withdrawal of both is also 
subject to judicial review – LTR because this is required by the Directive, and EU 
citizenship, because this was established in the Rottman case. Moreover, the grounds of 
expulsion of LTRs are similar to those on which a Member State may rely for the expulsion 
of EU citizens. LTRs – who have resided in a Member State for at least 5 years – can only be 
expelled on the grounds which an EU citizen can be expelled after 5 years of residence in the 
host state, i.e. serious grounds of public policy and public security.  
Nevertheless, although long-term residence seems to have similarities with EU citizenship in 
terms of acquisition and withdrawal, the long-term residence status is fundamentally different 
from EU citizenship in terms of characteristics.  
First, recalling the conclusions of the previous three chapters, unlike EU citizenship, the 
status of EU long-term residence is limited to one Member State. The holder of the status, 
when intending to move to another Member State, needs to obtain the approval of the second 
State. As we saw in chapter 3, the LTR will not be able to work until his/her application for 
such an approval is accepted. Even after approving the right of residence, the second Member 
State is free to limit the right to work or self-employment of the LTR, according to the 
economic needs of that State. For instance, a quota may be placed on the number of LTRs, or 
the number of LTRs in a specific job.80 This means that the movement of LTRs between the 
Member States for periods exceeding 3 months, which is the right that corresponds to the 
most basic rights attached to EU citizenship (the rights to move and reside freely in the 
territory of the Member States), is still, fully, within the control of the Member States. A 
status which does not grant the most basic right derived from EU citizenship, cannot be 
described as equivalent to EU citizenship. Even the most basic type of it (e.g. subsidiary 
 
80 See section 2.2.1 in chapter 2 of the thesis.  
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form).  A status with such a geographical limitation does not seem to be an EU status at all, 
let alone an EU citizenship status. 
Secondly, the status of EU long-term residence granted by one Member State is not mutually 
recognised by other Member States. EU Member State have the competence to grant the 
status of EU citizenship (national laws govern the acquisition of nationality and consequently 
EU citizenship), but once the status is acquired, the status cannot be challenged by another 
Member State.81 In case of movement to a second Member State, that State may never 
question the basis on which the person acquired the status of EU citizenship. Thus,  
discretionary measures may not be imposed on EU citizens, for instance, what conditions the-
now-EU-citizen satisfied to obtain the status of EU citizenship. In the case of LTRs, however, 
the status may be challenged and if not all the criteria specified in the Directive were satisfied 
in the first Member State, the second State can require the LTR to meet the conditions which 
are not satisfied (e.g. the integration conditions). In addition, not all Member States recognise 
the status (in particular, the UK, Ireland and Denmark). It is hard to describe the status of 
long-term residence as a form of EU citizenship, when it is recognised only in parts of the 
Union.  
The third issue which makes it difficult to consider the status of long-term residence as a 
subsidiary form of Union citizenship is the inconsistency between the extension of EU 
citizenship to cover persons holding the long-term residence status and an EU’s primary 
objective, namely the development of the internal market. As only residence in one Member 
State counts for acquiring the status of long-term residence (for the first time), those TCN 
who move between the Member States, i.e. the internal market, acquire the status of long-
term residence later than those who reside in one Member States for 5 years. Moreover, an 
LTR who moves to the second Member State must pay an application fee, additional to the 
one they had already paid in the first Member State. In other words, a person who has ‘the 
subsidiary form of EU citizenship’ (as Acosta claims) is charged a fee for exercising the first 
rights listed in the Treaty as the core, fundamental, rights of EU citizens. In practice, 
therefore, the LTR Directive punishes actual contributors to the internal market, and treats 
non-contributor TCNs better. What kind of EU citizenship is it that those who move within 
the internal market acquire it later than those who do not contribute to the market? 
 
81 See, inter alia, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239; Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-
9925.  
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Fourthly, LTRs may be treated better or worse in the second Member State depending on 
their country of nationality. An LTR can have more expansive rights than another LTR in a 
similar situation, just because of his/her nationality. For instance, nationals of certain 
countries are not required to satisfy the integration conditions, while others are required to do 
so (e.g. as mentioned in chapter 2, nationals of Canada, Japan and the US are not required to 
meet the integration conditions in France and Germany). This is possible as the right to equal 
treatment with the nationals of the host State is activated after the status is granted by the 
second State to the applicant. LTRs, unlike EU citizens, do not enjoy a general protection 
against discrimination on the grounds of nationality such as the one provided by Article 18 
TFEU.  
The wording of Article 18 TFEU does not explicitly exclude TCNs from its personal scope. 
On the one hand, the heading of ‘non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union’, under 
which the Article can be found in the Treaty, suggests that it applies to EU citizens only.82 On 
the other hand, Article 19 TFEU which instructs the Council to take action against 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation, is placed under the same heading but applies to non-EU citizens too.83 Thus, 
being under the heading of ‘non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union’ does not 
necessarily mean that Article 18 covers EU citizens only. The Court nevertheless, has left no 
doubt that Article 18 TFEU applies to Member State nationals only.84 Therefore, LTRs may 
be treated more or less favourably by the second Member State, depending on their 
nationality. 
The two last issues mentioned above highlight the failure of the LTR Directive to bestow the 
right to equality with EU citizens on TCN permanent residents, as the Tampere Programme 
recommended. LTRs are neither provided such equality among the Member States, nor 
within the Member States. LTRs in the same Member State may be treated differently 
depending on their nationality. For instance, a Japanese LTR is automatically exempt from 
the integration conditions while a Chinese national is required to satisfy those conditions in 
order to obtain the status. LTRs in exactly the same position may also be treated differently 
by two Member States. For example, LTR A moves to Sweden, where he is re-granted the 
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status with the full right to work, but LTR B moves to Spain and receives a residence permit 
with no right to work.  
Additionally, the status of long-term residence is missing the core of any citizenship status in 
a democratic society: the right to vote.85 In the absence of voting rights, the status does not 
seem to be democratic enough to be considered as citizenship of the EU, which is built on 
representative democracy.86  
The above reasons make it hard to agree with the conclusion that 1) the status of long-term 
residence escapes the direct control of the Member States; 2) the status is a form of EU 
citizenship. The conclusion is apparently based on inaccurate observations of the Directive.  
For instance, Acosta observes that ‘once TCNs attain long-term residence, they have equal 
access to the labour market (with the minor exception of activities that entail even occasional 
involvement in the exercise of public authority)’ with EU citizens.87 This observation ignores 
the fact that this equal access is limited to the first Member State. LTRs have equal access to 
the labour market (with the minor exception of involvement in the exercise of public 
authority) with the host State nationals. The second Member State is free to impose quotas 
and limit the right to work of LTRs. Thus, while it is correct to say that LTRs have equal 
access to the labour market of the first Member State, it is totally wrong to say that LTRs 
have equal access to the labour market with EU citizens, as the access of the latter is not 
limited to one Member State.   
Moreover, Acosta claims that ‘[f]ifteen Member States allow some categories of TCNs to 
vote in municipal elections and six in regional ones or elections for national representative 
bodies’.88 He also mentions the Spain v. United Kingdom (Gibraltar) case89 and continues 
that ‘Member States are also free to grant voting rights in European Parliament elections’ to 
TCNs. While such a conclusion can be drawn from that case, the Member States are free to 
do so only by granting their nationality. Such a right may never be granted to a TCN. A TCN, 
once granted the nationality of a Member State, is not a TCN anymore. 
The other observation made by Acosta leading him to reach the conclusion that the status of 
long-term residence escapes the direct control of the Member States is that ‘TCNs satisfying 
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the conditions and procedures laid down in the directive have a right to obtain long-term 
residence and that Member States have an obligation to grant it if the conditions are met once 
the TCN applies for it’.90 This is only partially accurate. TCNs have the right to obtain the 
status if they satisfy the conditions and procedures, but who sets these conditions and 
procedures? These are defined by the host State’s national law, which is in the control of the 
host State only. The control may not be absolute – due to the prohibition of imposing 
disproportionate conditions which undermine the effectiveness of the Directive’s aims – but 
is clearly significant as we see that each Member State defines its own requirement (from no 
integration conditions, to one-year courses). 
I also do not agree that the host State’s obligation to grant the status to TCNs who satisfy the 
conditions, reduces Member States’ margin for manoeuvre, and that this obligation has 
created a ‘right-based approach’ to long-term residence.91 This is, again, true for the first 
State only. The second Member State is still free to refuse (re)granting the status due to a 
national quota on the number of LTRs who can move to that state in a year.92  One might say 
that the first State is now obliged to grant the status if the conditions are satisfied, and that is 
a ‘right-based approach’ of the Directive to the status of long-term residence. Nevertheless, 
first, a right which is subject to conditions is an entitlement rather than a right. Secondly, if 
the status has such a geographical limitation, it is not an EU status which is a subsidiary form 
of EU citizenship; it is simply a national status which can potentially be exchanged with a 
similar status in another Member State.  
Acosta built his conclusion on the hope that ‘a purposive interpretation by the ECJ will mean 
that LTRs will obtain similar treatment to European citizens in a number of areas in line with 
the Tampere objectives, re-affirmed in the Stockholm programme, of equal treatment’.93 The 
analysis of the cases decided so far by the Court on the rights of LTRs does not support this 
‘prediction’ made in 2011. 
The starting point in cases in which the subject is an EU citizen, is whether one of the 
freedoms of the subject would be hindered.94 As observed by Evans,95 the starting point in the 
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cases where the subject is a TCN is whether the Union is competent to regulate the rights of 
the subject, or whether the subject is entitled to such a right.96 Moreover, in the case of LTRs, 
as we saw earlier in this chapter, the approach of the Court was not a right-based one, similar 
to EU citizenship cases.  In the EU citizenship cases when the subject was not eligible for a 
claim, the Court still held the person should be granted that benefit because of their EU 
citizenship status and the right to equal treatment with the host State nationals attached to EU 
citizenship. Nevertheless, the judgments in the LTR cases were limited to ensuring that the 
effectiveness of the LTR Directive is not undermined by disproportionate requirements. Such 
an approach would possibly prevent the effectiveness of the Directive in facilitating the 
integration of LTRs to be undermined, but it is unlikely to approximate the treatment of LTRs 
to EU citizens.  
It should also be noted that the rights of EU citizens have been expanded by the ECJ, 
interpreting the text of the Treaties. The Court, however, has made the most of the 
possibilities the Treaties offer, and has not overstepped the boundaries of the Treaties.97 The 
LTR Directive which explicitly limits the equality of LTRs with the host State nationals to 
certain areas, does not seem to provide the Court with an opportunity to significantly expand 
the rights of LTRs.  
The Tampere summit conclusions were very promising and liberal. The objectives clearly 
suggested that the EU had started to move towards a new approach to the status and rights of 
TCN permanent residents. Acosta reached these conclusions, in the light of the Tampere 
objectives, which were very promising and liberal. Therefore, one cannot blame him for 
making such predictions. However, I critically analysed his conclusions simply to: a) 
highlight the limitations of the LTR Directive and to raise the point that what has been done 
is not enough to achieve the initial aims; b) demonstrate the illusion that the status granted by 
the Directive is a subsidiary form of EU citizenship, which will be developed further by the 
Court, should not slow down the efforts to make the long-term residence status a genuinely 
EU status. 
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5. It is in the Union’s interest to extend the status of EU citizenship to LTRs 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the chapter determines the approximation of the 
status of long-term residence and EU citizenship as an interest for the Union rather than 
arguing that LTRs deserve to enjoy certain rights. After considering what the status of long-
term residence actually is and to what extent it is similar to EU citizenship, I now explain 
why it is in the interest of the Union to approximate the status of LTRs to EU citizenship. The 
benefits of it can be seen from three different angles: 1) facilitating the integration of LTRs; 
2) consistency in the EU’s immigration and integration policy; 3) the view that residence 
seems a more appropriate criterion for EU citizenship.  
5.1. To facilitate the integration of LTRs by the best possible way which has 
already been successful 
As was concluded above and in the previous chapters, the current status of long-term 
residence and the rights granted by the LTR Directive to the holder of this status are 
inconsistent with the EU’s objective to ensure the integration of lawfully resident TCNs into 
the Member States’ societies.98 However, I am not simply suggesting that in order to enhance 
the integration of LTRs, the rights of EU citizens should be extended to LTRs; rather, I am 
suggesting that the approach to LTRs’ integration of TCNs should be changed. The current 
approach, which distinguishes between mobile EU citizens and LTRs, takes for granted that 
those not holding a Member State nationality are the only ones facing a problem of inclusion.  
The concept of EU citizenship has been a significant element of the process of transforming 
Member State nationals from ‘immigrants’, who are subject to national conditions of entry 
and residence, to EU citizens, who are entitled to equal treatment as the host state nationals. 
EU law has proven itself to constitute an instrument of integration, as it did with regards to 
EU citizens.99 It transformed mobile Member State nationals from ‘immigrants’ and ‘others’ 
to EU citizens.100 There does not seem to be any reason preventing the Union to 
reconceptualise the integration of TCN permanent residents and utilise the same method for 
their integration. The position of LTRs can also change from ‘others’, ‘immigrants’, and 
second-class permanent members of the Union’s society, to members of this society who are 
treated equally with other members, regardless of nationality, and as a result, their integration 
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would be enhanced. This is the approach to integration of TCN residents which the Tampere 
Programme recommended.  
Although the Tampere Programme drew a distinction between EU citizens and TCN 
residents, the approach in the Tampere Programme was towards accepting that TCN residents 
are also members of the society and their integration can be enhanced by granting them rights 
of other members and treat them like ‘one of us’, which lead them to become ‘one of us’. The 
approach adopted in the Programme was similar to how the EU has treated Member State 
nationals. In the LTR Directive, however, this approach was replaced by the approach that 
integration is a condition that TCNs need to meet, rather than the result of granting them 
rights (as discussed in chapter 2). 
The shift in the EU’s approach to the integration of TCN residents occurred probably due to 
various reasons, both internal and external. First, the security concerns which arose after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. They produced radical changes in the states’ attitudes as well as 
political agenda. States, including EU Member States, focused on internal security issues, 
both at the national and European levels. The states – not only European states – adopted 
more security-conscious measures, in the climate of fear.101 The balance between justice and 
security in the field of Justice, Security and Home Affairs also shifted from the inclusion and 
fair treatment of migrants toward security. Although the fact that LTRs are already admitted 
in the territory of the EU and giving them further rights would not pose any further threat to 
the security of the host State or other Member States, the shift in the field of Justice, Security 
and Home Affairs could have a negative,102 but powerful, influence on the negotiations on the 
proposal of the Directive and pursue the Member States to keep the movements of all non-
nationals to their territories under control.    
The second reason which caused the deviation of the LTR Directive from the Tampere 
Programme was the integration conditions inserted into the Directive draft at the initiative of 
three Member States (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands). At that time, unanimous 
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agreement was required at that time in the Council,103 and the Directive could not be adopted 
unless these conditions were added to the proposal.104  
Now that the two major reasons (the conservative actions taken in the climate of fear after the 
9/11 attacks, and the unanimous agreement requirement) which caused the draft for a 
Directive on the status of TCN permanent residents, in line with the Tampere Programme, to 
be watered down, do not exist anymore, the Union has the opportunity to create the ‘more 
vigorous’ integration policy that it intended to adopt (objective 18 of the Tampere 
Conclusions), which is also consistent with the Union’s current objectives, such as ‘the aim 
… to ensure economic, social and territorial cohesion, building on the current European year 
for combating poverty and social exclusion’ by, inter alia, developing a new agenda for 
migrants' integration to enable them to take full advantage of their potential’.105  
In the absence of those reasons which caused the deviation of the LTR Directive from the 
Tampere Programme, the Commission should initiate a proposal for amendments to the 
Directive in an effort to undo the changes made to the Directive in the 2003 negotiations. The 
approach to the integration of TCN permanent residents could be revered to granting rights 
for facilitating integration, rather than the current approach of integration as a condition for 
obtaining rights. The former did work for EU citizens. It worked so well that the integration 
of EU citizens in the host society was never discussed in the European Council’s meetings as 
an issue.  
The other issue which the EU should address is that the focus of the provisions of the LTR 
Directive is clearly limited to the integration of TCN permanent residents in the host State 
society; the integration to the larger society of the EU is omitted from the provisions. By 
widening the focus of the Directive to the Union’s society (i.e. not just the society of the host 
State), the Union could have the opportunity to not only facilitate the integration of LTRs 
within the host State, but also within the Union society. 
As observed by Carrera, the Union institutions are aware of the impact that a ‘successful 
integration’ of legally residing TCNs has on the benefit of EU social cohesion and economic 
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welfare.106 It is in the Union’s interest to play a more active role in the integration of non-EU 
citizen migrants, first, in order to achieve its social and economic objectives; secondly, for 
the sake of ensuring the effectiveness of the Union’s immigration policy since 
disproportionate integration conditions for TCNs may undermine the effet utile of European 
immigration policy at facilitating the inclusion of LTRs into the host society.107 The Union 
and its Member States have a duty to ensure that disproportionate integration conditions do 
not impose hurdles on migrants’ entry, residence, settlement, and naturalisation, and 
consequently undermine the effectiveness of European immigration policy.108 
Nevertheless, playing a more active role, and possibly adopting a uniform framework of 
integration across the Union, does not mean that the national realities, limitations and 
demands are ignored. The framework can simply define the concepts and goals which are the 
same/similar in all countries. The policymakers can be left free to adjust their integration 
programmes according to domestic considerations, as long as these adjustments do not 
undermine the common concepts and goals. A more inclusive EU citizenship concept is 
likely to encourage the integration of TCNs into the EU and could represent a means to 
overcome weaknesses inherent in national strategies for migrant integration.109 
It might be argued that the Union has no competence in the domain of the integration of 
TCNs. Thus, the Union cannot adopt measures in this field. Nevertheless, this is not an issue. 
The Union had no competence in the integration of mobile EU citizens in the host state 
either. In fact, such an area of EU law never existed. The integration of EU citizens was 
facilitated by the equal treatment of EU citizens with the host State nationals. The same 
method can be used for LTRs. The lack of competence in the integration of TCNs, does not 
prevent the Union from adopting the same method of integration of EU citizens for LTRs 
Moreover, although the Union does not have competence in TCNs’ integration, it has a clear 
competence in the immigration-related matters which is limited to what was conferred to the 
Union by Article 63 EC (now Article 79 TFEU),110 as Kostakopoulou suggested,111 the 
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principle of parallelism may be used to expand the Union’s competence in matters linked to 
immigration, e.g. integration of migrants after immigrating.  
5.2. To fix the inconsistency in the Union’s immigration policy  
Treating TCNs and EU citizens differently is a well-established practice of the EU. It may 
seem entirely acceptable, as these two categories are not equal in terms of legal status in the 
Union. It might also be argued that excluding non-EU citizens from the rights that EU 
citizens are entitled under EU law is justified because the EU is the place of its own citizens. 
Nevertheless, while LTRs do not have citizenship of the Union, they are granted a special 
status which stems from the European legal order rather than Member States’ immigration 
laws. The status is the legal badge of membership of the Union’s society which changed the 
position of the holders from temporary guests to de jure members of the society of the 
Union.112 The Union should not ignore that the de jure members of its society are treated as 
second-class residents.  
Moreover, the Directive not only formally declared LTRs as members of the Union society, 
but also imposed on them the role of contributing to the development and completion of the 
internal market. Union law cannot impose a role on LTRs and at the same time allow the less 
favourable treatment of LTRs who play that role and move to a second Member State. LTRs’ 
position is clearly better – with regards to equal treatment with the host State nationals – in 
the first Member State than the second Member State. This appears to be inconsistent with 
the EU’s commitment to develop the internal market. Objective 2 of the Tampere 
Conclusions states that the Union must ensure that the freedom to move freely between the 
Member States can be enjoyed by all:  
The European Union has already put in place for its citizens the major ingredients of a 
shared area of prosperity and peace: a single market, economic and monetary union, 
and the capacity to take on global political and economic challenges. The challenge of 
the Amsterdam Treaty is now to ensure that freedom, which includes the right to 
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move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and 
justice accessible to all. It is a project which responds to the frequently expressed 
concerns of citizens and has a direct bearing on their daily lives.113 
Under the Directive’s legal regime, despite the objectives of the Tampere Programme, mobile 
LTRs are punished instead of being encouraged. LTRs who move and thus contribute to this 
objective, firstly, do not enjoy the right to that freedom. Their movement is still not as free as 
that of EU citizens (illustrated in chapter 3). Secondly, LTRs who move to a second Member 
State are treated less favourably than LTRs who stay in the first Member State. Mobile LTRs 
lose their status of equal treatment with the host State nationals – at least until their 
application for transferring the status of long-term resident is approved. The logic of the 
internal market, as well as of objective 18 of the Tampere Programme, and the Directive’s 
own purpose (described in its preamble), call into question the legal regime of the Directive.  
The status of long-term residence, as it stands now, is not genuinely an EU status, or putting 
it differently, an EU-wide status. TCNs derive this status from EU law but the status is linked 
and limited to one Member State, which can be exchanged with the same status in another 
Member State. This is not compatible with the concept of moving and residing freely in the 
territory of the Union: 
The concept of ‘moving and residing freely in the territory of the Member States’ is 
not based on the hypothesis of a single move from one Member State to another, to be 
followed by integration into the latter. The intention is rather to allow free, and 
possibly related or even continuous, movement within a single ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice,’ in which both cultural diversity and freedom from discrimination 
[are] ensured.114 
Approximating the status of long-term residence to EU citizenship – which provides the 
holder with a genuine free movement within the EU, ensures protection against 
discrimination on any ground and in any area of benefits – would be an important step 
towards ensuring the coherence and consistency in the European immigration policy and 
achieving the integration aims of the policy.  
The Directive seems to be inconsistent with another Tampere Programme’s objective too: 
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The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside 
legally on the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy 
should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU 
citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.115 
Approximating the status of long-term residence to EU citizenship is not only in line with the 
above Tampere objective, but is also a step towards achieving the objective of Article 79 
TFEU: 
The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally in Member States …116 
It is true that the term of ‘fair treatment’ is vague and can be interpreted widely, however, it 
seems difficult to consider as ‘fair treatment’, a situation whereby a holder of an EU status is 
treated differently from another holder of the same status in the same situation in another part 
of the Union. Allowing the Member States to treat LTRs differently based on their 
nationality, or to impose different conditions on their right of residence in the second 
Member State, seems to be anything (i.e. discrimination based on nationality, religion, ethnic 
origin and wealth status) but ‘fair treatment’.  
5.3. Residence seems to be a more appropriate criterion for EU citizenship 
A person who has never set foot in the territory of the Union but happens to have the 
nationality of a Member State, probably just because his/her father/mother is a national of 
that State, holds EU citizenship.117 The person is not required to satisfy any further condition. 
On the other hand, a person who has lived all or a substantial part of their life and holds the 
status of EU LTR and thus is a de jure member of the Union’s society, and has been assigned 
a role in the internal market, is an ‘alien’. The first person is considered to have a link with 
the Union  and thus deserves to enjoy EU citizenship rights. The second person however, 
cannot even move freely within the territory of the Union.118   
 
115 Tampere Programme, Objective 18.  
116 TFEU, Article 79.  
117A Tryfonidou, ‘The Impact of EU Law on Nationality Laws and Migration Control in the EU’s Member 
States’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 358.  
118 His or her movement rights are nothing more than those enjoyed by other TCNs, e.g. tourist, under the 
Schengen acquis.  
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The Union is a supranational institution with a nationality-based membership criterion. With 
the current criterion in place, many of those who are actually members of the EU society and 
have a genuine link with the EU, are deprived of the advantages of EU citizenship. LTRs are 
among these individuals. As it was held by the ECJ, a genuine link between individuals and 
the host society is established by, inter alia, long residence, rather than citizenship per se.119  
LTRs who have resided in a Member State for at least five years, and thus, have established a 
genuine link with the EU, are still considered aliens.120 
It is difficult to justify the treatment of LTRs by the Union in a way other than how it treats 
EU citizens. LTRs are ‘an integral part of the European community, de facto members of and 
contributors to the flourishing European societies’, Kostakopoulou argues.121 And taking this 
argument further, LTRs are not only de facto members of the society and the contributors to 
the flourishing European societies, but, as a result of the 2003 Directive, LTRs are also de 
jure members of the Union’s society. 
The Union is not a nation. The Union is a supranational polity bringing together a diversity of 
people in Europe. In nations only those sharing common history, ethnicity or cultural ties 
with that nation can be its citizens. LTRs might not have a shared history with Member State 
nationals, but they, of course, have a shared future together. This should call for a more 
appropriate entitlement for citizenship.  
Furthermore, if eventually the eligibility criterion for EU citizenship is changed, and 
permanent residents also become the citizens of the Union, a direct relationship between the 
EU and its permanent residents would be established.  Such a direct relationship would not 
need to be ‘mediated’ by the Member States. This would be a step forward towards one of the 
Union’s objectives, to create an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.122  
Moreover, the Union as a supranational polity has no control over its citizenship/membership 
criteria. The Union should defend its identity and its right to autonomy. ‘It is for each State to 
 
119 Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; Case C-103/08 Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117. 
120 Carlier argues that slowly but surely, European citizenship seems to evolve from a nationality citizenship to a 
residence citizenship. JY Carlier, ‘Annotation of Zhu and Chen’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1121, 
1131. 
121 T Kostakopoulou, ‘Long-Term Resident Third Country Nationals in the European Union: Institutional 
Legacies and Evolving Norms’ in R Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union Law (2004) 318. 
122 The preamble to the TFEU, para. 1. In the earlier versions of the Treaty, the objective was stated as: ‘creating 
an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as 
closely as possible to the citizen’.  
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determine under its own law who are its nationals’.123 Although, the European Union is not a 
state, it has citizens. It should be the Union, itself, that decides who its ‘people’ are, and thus, 
who can enjoy the rights it has conferred on its citizens.124 
One might argue that the change of the criterion of eligibility for EU citizenship is not 
appropriate because the Union is like a club, and the members of the club are the Member 
States and, subsequently, their nationals. However, as discussed in chapter 4, it is not possible 
for a liberal and democratic organisation to ignore its permanent residents. The exclusion of 
LTRs from the citizenship of the EU, as an organisation with liberal and democratic values, 
counts as a ‘political tyranny’, using the words of Walzer,125 because the exclusion of LTRs 
from access to full citizenship rights, subjects a part of the population to legislation without 
representation.  
LTRs can potentially become EU citizens in the near future. In other words, LTRs are EU 
citizens-in-the-making. It is not unlikely that the way LTRs are treated by the Union until 
they eventually become EU citizens (if they ever do become), will have an impact on the way 
LTRs see the Union, which can, in turn, negatively affect the relationship of the Union with a 
large number of potential EU citizens. The Union should seize the opportunity to avoid any 
unnecessary negative impact on this relationship.126 
One might argue that if LTRs are Union-citizens-in-the-making, probably other TCN 
residents are also permanent-residents-in-the-making, and the differentiation between LTRs 
and other TCN residents may not be justified. Nevertheless, the situation of LTRs is different 
from other TCNs. LTRs hold an EU status. Other TCNs are still migrants subject to national 
laws. 
5.4. What can be done? 
Having argued that it is in the Union’s interest to approximate the status and rights of LTRs 
to those of EU citizens, I now examine the options that are available to the Union. Nationality 
of a Member State being decisive in access to the status of EU citizenship, means that 
citizenship of the Union is left in the control of the Member States. The derivative character 
 
123 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law. 
124 For a different view see B Kunoy 'A Union of national citizens: the origins of the Court's lack of avant-
gardism in the Chen case' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 179-190, 187. 
125  M Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books 1983) 60–63. 
126 D Owen, ‘Citizenship and the Marginalities of Migrants’ (2013) 16 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 326, 328–329. 
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of EU citizenship has been criticised by a number of academics.127 These criticisms generally 
consider the sovereignty of the Member States to grant EU citizenship unjustifiable from two 
points of view. First, the EU is not a state for which a traditional state-level form of 
citizenship links its membership to the polity to which they belong and provides them with a 
chance to participate in the political activities of that polity.128 Secondly, the benefits of EU 
citizenship should be extended to permanent resident TCNs because permanent residents 
deserve to enjoy these benefits.129 I build up my argument on these two criticisms and 
propose that while derivative EU citizenship is not consistent with the characteristics of the 
Union, and permanent resident TCNs deserve to enjoy certain rights similar to EU citizens, it 
is in the EU’s interest to extend these rights to its permanent residents regardless of 
nationality (for the reasons which I explain below). To reach such a conclusion I refer to the 
Tampere Programme objectives, particularly Objective 21 of the Tampere conclusions 
recommending the status of TCN residents to be approximated to EU citizenship.  
The first way to approximate the status of TCN permanent residents and EU citizens 
(objective 21 of the Tampere conclusions) is to detach citizenship of the Union from 
nationality of a Member State. By doing so, the Union will have a form of unmediated 
citizenship. Decoupling the status of EU citizenship from nationality of a Member State has 
been recommended elsewhere;130 nevertheless, the solution does not seem to be very 
plausible.131 The difficulty is the obsession of the Member States to control who holds the 
status of EU citizenship. As a result, a change in the Treaties for implying the option does not 
seem likely to happen in the foreseeable future. Thus, this thesis is not suggesting the transfer 
of the gatekeeper role to the Union citizenship as a practical option for extending the rights 
of EU citizens to LTRs. This thesis is suggesting that LTRs may enjoy the benefits of the 
status of EU citizenship, without acquiring EU citizenship, and the MSs, can remain the 
gatekeepers to these benefits for LTRs.  
 
127 D Kochenov and M van den Brink, ‘Pretending There is No Union: Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights 
of Third-Country Nationals in the EU’ in D Thym and M Zoetewij Turhan (eds), Degrees of Free Movement 
and Citizenship (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015). 
128  J Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring 
of Political Space (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
129 ibid.  
130
 See, for example, A Becker, M, ‘Inclusive European Citizenship and Third- Country Nationals’ (2004) 7 
Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J 132; A Wiener, ‘Rethinking Citizenship: The Quest for Place-Oriented Participation 
in the EU’ (1996) 7 Oxford International Review 44–51; F Fabbrini, ‘The Right to Vote for Non-Citizens in the 
European Multilevel System of Fundamental Rights Protection. A Case Study in Inconsistency?’ (2010) 4/2010 
<http://www.ericsteinpapers.eu>; Z Yanasmayan, ‘European Citizenship: A Tool for Integration’, Illiberal 
Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration in the EU (Ashgate 2009) 79. 
131 W Maas, ‘Migrants, States, and EU Citizenship’s Unfulfilled Promise’ (2008) 12 Citizenship Studies 583, 
593. 
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The rigid resistance of the Member States to detaching Union citizenship from nationality has 
led to the emergence of the concept of civic citizenship. The inability of the Union to define 
its citizenship criteria, led the Commission to consider the concept.132 The notion is based on 
the enjoyment of rights based on residence rather than nationality: 
‘The legal status granted to third country nationals would be based on the principle of 
providing sets of rights and responsibilities on a basis of equality with those of 
nationals but differentiated according to the length of stay while providing for 
progression to permanent status. In the longer term this could extend to offering a 
form of civic citizenship, based on the EC Treaty and inspired by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, consisting of a set of rights and duties offered to third country 
nationals’.133 
Civic citizenship decouples the rights and obligations of citizens from the formal badge of 
citizenship and extends membership of the society to non-citizens who are permanently 
resident. Civic citizenship seems to be the most pragmatic way to approximate the status of 
long-term residence to EU citizenship. Civic citizenship of the Union, on the one hand, gives 
the permanent residents of the Union a status ‘as near as possible’ to EU citizenship, and on 
the other hand, the Member States remain the gatekeepers to EU citizenship (by approving 
the status of long-term residence) and, thus, may agree with the change. They not only remain 
the gatekeepers of EU citizenship, but they also decide who will be LTRs, as the status of 
long-term resident is still granted by the host State following an application. Considering the 
obstacles in the way of the other option stated above, this option seems to be the most 
plausible option available to the Union.      
Nevertheless, this option would be effective only if: 
 1) the right to equal treatment with the host State nationals is replaced by the right to equal 
treatment with EU citizens. In other words, the status of long-term residence, once granted, is 
automatically recognised by other Member States, and LTRs enjoy the right to equal 
treatment with nationals in the second Member State. 
 
132 Commission, 'Communication on a Community immigration policy' COM (2000) 757, 19. 
133 ibid 757, 22. On the concept of civic citizenship, see Bauböck, Civic Citizenship: A New Concept for the 
New Europe, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a 
Community Immigration Policy COM (2000) 757 final. 
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 2) the possibility to impose discretionary conditions on LTRs under national laws is limited. 
The status of long-term residence would not be ‘as near as possible’ to EU citizenship (or EU 
civic citizenship), if it is unreasonably linked to national laws, which of course can vary from 
a Member States to another. 
 Perhaps the point is best explained by way of example: LTR 1 moves from the Netherlands 
to Germany, and LTR 2 moves from the Netherlands to Spain, and these two LTRs face 
different conditions according to the national laws at the destinations; they are treated 
differently, rather than enjoying ‘the benefits attached to EU citizenship’.   
The status of civic citizenship is a possible option for the Union, which can be granted to 
LTRs by making minor changes to the LTR Directive. First, the protection of LTRs against 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality can be extended to all benefits and not just the 
certain areas listed in the Directive. The value of such a protection provided by a provision in 
the Directive will not be less than the protection provided by Article 18 TFEU for EU 
citizens. Of course, the legal value of the former is not comparable with the latter; 
nevertheless, practically, the Directive will provide LTRs with such a protection to an 
acceptable extent, as it is also the case for TCN family members of EU citizens. They are also 
not covered by Article 18 or any other Treaty provision prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality; however, Directive 2004/38 protects these TCNs from nationality 
discrimination.134 The inclusion of a provision similar to Article 18 TFEU in the LTR 
Directive paves the way for the ECJ to expand the rights of LTRs, as it also expanded the 
rights of EU citizens by reading EU law provisions together with the Article.    
The second change which should be made to the LTR Directive in order to grant a genuine 
EU civic citizenship to LTRs is the inclusion of the right to vote in the Directive. The 
Member States are likely to resist the extension of this right to non-EU citizens due to the 
symbolic meaning of this extension. The extension might be seen by the Member States as 
devaluing the status of EU citizenship. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in chapter 4, it is in the 
Union’s interest to extend this right to LTRs (in order, inter alia, to enhance the Union’s 
legitimacy and promote democracy). 
 
134 In matters which fall within the scope of the Directive. Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ 
L158/77 (the Citizens’ Rights Directive) 
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One may wonder whether EU Member States would give up their control over who holds EU 
citizenship, even the civic type of it. Member States may have reasonable concerns – in 
particular, security concerns – over who enters the free circulation of people in the EU. 
However, these concerns do not apply to LTRs. They are already part of the free circulation. 
Moreover, being the gatekeeper of EU citizenship is a sensitive issue for Member States. 
When the status of EU civic citizenship in the form of long-term residence is also granted by 
the Member States (after satisfying all the conditions laid out in the amended Directive), the 
hegemonic role of the Member States in controlling who enjoys EU citizenship rights will not 
change. To obtain long-term residence status, a TCN has to be approved by a Member State, 
and may have to pass economic, security, and social checks. Thus, the Member States remain 
the gatekeepers to EU citizenship, as well as EU civic citizenship, and the strong desire of the 
Member States to have control on who can hold EU citizenship, and the benefits attached to 
it, would be accommodated.  
One might also wonder why the extension of the rights and status of EU citizens to LTRs did 
not occur when the LTR Directive was adopted. What has now changed to make one of the 
options mentioned above possible? At that time, a number of Member States were clearly 
against certain rights being granted to LTRs – or in fact the Member States were reluctant to 
lose control on the rights, especially the intra-EU movement of LTRs. Nevertheless, the 
extension of EU citizenship rights to LTRs does not appear to be as difficult as it probably 
was in 2003. This is due to the external and internal reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, 
such as the state of fear after 9/11 attacks, and the method of the Council’s decision-making 
when the Directive was adopted. Despite all these factors which increase the possibility of 
adopting a more liberal Directive, any change to the rights of TCN permanent residents will 
not be easy. Changes to their rights and status may be politicised, as the position of this 
category of migrants can be linked or confused with asylum, especially in the media. The 
demand and will of the citizens and constituents will of course have an impact on the actions 
of the governments, and MEPs. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter started by analysing the status of EU citizenship. The analysis shows that the 
status of EU citizenship is different from just a series of rights. It is a unique status which 
protects its holders from discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The analysis of the 
Court’s judgments (such as Grzelczyk and Martínez Sala – as analysed in section 2 of this 
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chapter) also shows that the Court has extensively expanded EU citizens’ rights by adopting a 
right-based approach in interpreting EU law provisions, when the applicant is an EU citizen. 
The Court has shown that it is devoted to ensuring that an EU citizen enjoys all the rights and 
freedoms provided and protected by EU law provisions, even if the EU citizen does not fall 
within the scope of the provisions or granting those rights to the EU citizen does not 
contribute to the aims of the Treaties. 
On the other hand, LTRs are protected against nationality discrimination in the limited areas 
listed in the LTR Directive. Thus, the status seems to be far from EU citizenship. Moreover, 
the focus of the Court in the LTRs’ cases is the effectiveness of the LTR Directive, rather 
than ensuring the LTR enjoys the rights provided by the Directive. In other words, in the 
LTR’s cases, we do not see the right-based approach which the Court adopts in cases 
involving an EU citizen. Therefore, the status and the rights attached to it do not seem to be 
developed by the Court.   
Despite the fundamental differences between the status of long-term residence and EU 
citizenship, it has been claimed that i) long-term residence status is a subsidiary form of EU 
citizenship and ii) as a result of a purposive interpretation of the LTR Directive, LTRs will 
obtain similar treatment to EU citizens in a number of areas in line with the Tampere 
objective of equal treatment. The analysis of the statuses of EU citizenship and long-term 
residence in this chapter does not support the first claim. The analysis of the ECJ’s judgments 
on the Directive also does not support the second claim. The rights and status of LTRs are 
heavily coloured by the Member States’ discretion, which makes it difficult to compare long-
term residence with EU citizenship. Moreover, the Court has demonstrated that its focus is on 
ensuring the effectiveness of the LTR Directive rather than expanding rights of LTRs and 
ensuring that LTRs obtain similar treatment to EU citizens. 
In the last section of the chapter, I argued that it is in the interest of the Union to extend the 
status of EU citizenship to LTRs. The benefits of such an extension for the Union were 
considered from three angles: i) the extension will enhance the integration of LTRs into the 
EU’s society; ii) the extension will improve the consistency in the EU’s immigration and 
integration policy; iii) residence seems to be a more appropriate criterion for EU citizenship 
than nationality of a Member State. At the end of the chapter, possible ways for 
approximating the status of long-term residence to EU citizenship were discussed.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions  
This chapter offers the general conclusions of the thesis, and it has been structured as follows: 
section one provides a brief background of the issues discussed in this thesis; section two 
offers a summary of the core findings of each chapter, issues that have been discussed, and 
how the research questions have been answered; and section three provides some policy 
recommendations regarding rights and status of long-term residents (LTRs).  
1. Background 
The European Council imposed a mandate on the Council to adopt a more vigorous 
integration policy with the aim to enhance the integration of TCN residents in the Union by 
giving TCNs rights, obligations and status similar to those of Union citizens. The Programme 
was the EU’s overarching immigration policy when the Long-term Residents Directive (LTR 
Directive)1 was adopted. Thus, the Directive’s provisions would be expected to be in line 
with the objectives of the Tampere Programme. The preamble to the LTR Directive also 
confirms that one of the purposes of the Directive is to achieve the objective of the 
Programme to approximate the rights of LTRs to the rights that EU citizens enjoy. This thesis 
has examined the extent to which the provisions of the LTR Directive are capable to achieve 
those objectives of the Tampere Programme which are related to TCN residents. The ultimate 
aim of this thesis is to examine the capability of the LTR Directive to facilitate the integration 
of LTR into the EU society. 
The research has focused on those objectives of the Tampere Programme which were related 
to the TCN residents in the Union. I identified four steps in three objectives of the 
Programme relevant to TCN residents. First, the Union must ensure fair treatment of TCNs 
who reside legally on the territory of the Union. Secondly, the Union must adopt a more 
vigorous integration policy which aims at giving TCN residents, rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens. Thirdly, the legal status of TCNs should be approximated 
to that of Member States' nationals. Fourthly, a person who has resided legally in a Member 
State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, 
should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible 
to those enjoyed by EU citizens (e.g. the right to reside, receive education, and work as an 
 
1 Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents. OJ L 16, 23 January 2004. 
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employee or self-employed person, as well as the principle of non-discrimination vis à vis the 
citizens of the State of residence). 
2. Summary of findings 
Rights – prize or tool for integration? 
Chapter 2 focused on the aim of the Tampere Programme to enhance the integration of TCN 
lawful residents in the receiving society through rights and obligations comparable to those of 
EU citizens. Two different approaches to integration were discussed in that chapter: i) civic 
integration, and ii) inclusion of migrants into the receiving society (pages 21 to 24). The first 
approach is built on conditions, tests, and formal integration trajectories. In this model of 
integration, rights are the prize for integration, rather than a tool for integration. It was argued 
that this approach to integration, which is based on testing, imposing conditions, and 
penalising the failure to comply with the conditions is, unlikely to contribute to the inclusion 
of migrants, and it will eventually lead to disintegration by fostering intolerance, divisions, 
and fragmentation within society (page 22). On the other hand, the focus of the second 
identified approach to integration is on providing migrants with equal opportunities with 
citizens to participate in the host society.  The wider the range of areas available to them to 
participate, the higher the level of inclusion. This approach to integration is built on the 
notion of being accepted in the society and on accepting the rules and values of that society 
(page23).  
It was illustrated that the approach of the LTR Directive to the integration of TCN residents is 
entirely different from what the Programme recommended (page 38 to 42). The Programme’s 
approach to integration was a rights-based approach and the Directive’s approach is a 
condition-based approach. The Programme recommended the first approach to integration 
(inclusionary approach) whilst the Directive follows a different direction to the integration of 
LTRs into the society. Those TCNs who apply to enjoy the rights listed in the Directive must 
meet integration conditions. The balance of responsibility, which in the Programme was on 
the host State, in the Directive shifted towards the TCN applicant. It was demonstrated that 
while the LTR Directive provides its beneficiaries with a secure residence status, which is 
essential in the process of migrants’ integration, the integration conditions of the Directive, in 
relation to which the Member States maintain major discretion, are capable of undermining 
the effectiveness of the Directive and the achievement of the Programme’s integration 
objective.   
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Considering that the Tampere Programme was a political document with vague and general 
objectives, it is not surprising that in implementing the objectives of such a document, the 
language and terms used are changed. Nevertheless, the LTR Directive could at least be 
expected to be in line with those chief objectives rather than contradictory to the initial goal 
set by the Programme, which was to facilitate the integration of TCN residents to the host 
society. The Directive shifted from facilitation of integration, to requiring proof of 
integration, and even further, to imposing sanctions for failure to prove integration. 
It was then argued that the Union has traditionally used the inclusive approach (second model 
of integration) to the integration of mobile EU citizens and their TCN family members; why 
the same approach could not be adopted for enhancing the integration of LTRs.  EU citizens 
and their TCN family members automatically acquire permanent residence right after 
residing for 5 years in the host Member State. LTRs, although have resided for the same 
length of time, can be required to comply with integration conditions when they apply for the 
status of long-term residence or when they move to a second Member State and did not 
satisfy integration conditions in the first Member State. The reason for this different approach 
suggests that the main purpose of integration conditions is not to ensure that non-European 
nationals are familiar with the culture and life in the host State. As a TCN family member of 
an EU citizen may come from the same country as an LTR, requiring LTRs to prove their 
integration into the society – and not TCN family members of EU citizens – calls into 
question the real intention of the Member States. The intention cannot be enhancing the 
integration of TCNs into the receiving society, as if this was the reason, the Member State 
would impose similar conditions on TCN family members too.2 Thus, the different approach 
of Member States to integration of LTRs and TCN family members of EU citizens does not 
seem have a reason other than the willingness of the Member States to be in control of 
migration of TCNs.  
Although the deviation of the Directive from the Tampere Programme is evident, this is still 
and will probably remain the case in the foreseeable future, that the Member States insist on 
being in the control of settlement and movement of LTRs to their territories, despite the fact 
that these Member States in the Tampere Summit vowed to adopt its approach to settlement 
of EU citizens for LTRs as well.   
 
2 It should be acknowledged that TCN family members of EU citizens are protected against discrimination, 
nevertheless, this protection has been granted to them by the Member States and if the Member States were 
concerned that 5 years of residence would not be enough for the migrant to integrate in the host society, they 
could impose integration conditions on them.  
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It is not only the Tampere Programme with which the LTR Directive is not in line. The 
Directive is not in line, and indeed in conflict, with its own preamble. In the preamble to the 
Directive, equality of treatment with EU citizens has been recognised as a method of 
enhancing the integration of TCN residents into society, whereas, the main body of the 
Directive allows different treatment of LTRs and EU citizens in the name of integration. 
Vaguely formulated plan (the Tampere Programme), and the reluctance of the Member States 
to abandon their control on the migration of TCNs to their territories were identified as the 
main reasons for the deviation of the Directive from the initial plan (the Programme). 
Nevertheless, despite this deviation, the Directive provides LTRs with secure residence in the 
host State (first Member State) as well as certain rights which had been available to EU 
citizens only (not even TCN family members – as their rights are derivative and not self-
standing).  
Rights of LTRs as near as possible to those of EU citizens? 
Chapter 3 has focused on another objective of the Tampere Programme which recommended 
those who hold a long-term residence permit should enjoy rights ‘as near as possible’ to those 
enjoyed by EU citizens. In this chapter, first, the rights of EU citizens were analysed, and 
then the rights which LTRs derive from the LTR Directive were compared with what EU 
citizens enjoy. The analysis of rights in this chapter was limited to the core rights (and 
obligations) of EU citizens. These core rights are listed in the Citizenship Part of the TFEU: 
free movement to other Member States, equal treatment with nationals of the host State, and 
political rights. Free movement rights and equal treatment in the host State were analysed in 
chapter 3, and political rights in chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 has sought to identify the material differences between the rights of LTRs and 
mobile EU citizens in the second Member State and to analyse the reasons for which these 
differences should decrease. It was explained that EU citizens can derive free movement 
rights from two different sources: i) the personal market freedoms, which are source of rights 
for economically-active Member State nationals; and ii) the citizenship provisions of the 
Treaty which grant the rights of free movement and residence to all EU citizens, including 
economically inactive Member State nationals. It was also said that the rights stemming from 
the personal market freedoms are activity-oriented, and they are, inter alia, granted to 
Member State nationals in order to contribute to the economic aims of the Treaty, such as the 
development of the internal market. Nevertheless, the rights stemming from the citizenship 
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provisions are status-oriented rights, and Member State nationals enjoy these rights merely 
because they are EU citizens.  
Then I reviewed the provisions of the LTR Directive regarding residence in a second Member 
State. It was illustrated that the provisions have provided LTRs with the possibility of directly 
deriving from EU law the right of residence within the territory of the Union. In addition, the 
law governing the rights of LTRs is now under parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, which is 
crucial to ensure the fair treatment of LTRs. However, the LTRs’ right of residence in the 
second Member State is still inherently different in nature from the right of residence of EU 
citizens. The residence right of the latter is an unconditional right, while the rights which the 
LTR Directive grants to LTRs are conditional and subject to the approval of the host State. It 
was also demonstrated that the second State is free to impose discretionary conditions on 
LTRs. Moreover, due to the limited geographical scope of the LTR Directive, LTRs may not 
move and reside in as many Member States as EU citizens may reside.  
Regarding the important supplementary right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality 
in the second State, the position of LTRs entirely differs from that of EU citizens. EU citizens 
have the right to equal treatment with the nationals of the host State (subject to limited 
exceptions, such as the public service/official authority exception), whereas LTRs acquire 
this right after successfully obtaining a residence/work permit in that State.  
Due to these material differences, it was concluded that the rights of EU citizens and LTRs 
regarding residence and non-discrimination based on nationality in the second State, are 
neither comparable in nature, nor comparable in geographical scope, nor comparable in their 
extent. Therefore, the Tampere Programme’s objective to grant LTRs rights comparable to 
those of EU citizens does not seem to have been effectively achieved. The LTR Directive has 
obviously gone some distance towards accomplishing this intended objective; however, due 
to differences in the nature and scope of the rights it grants to LTRs, the rights of LTRs 
cannot be considered comparable. The main problem obviously lies in, first, the lack of 
mutual recognition of the status of long-term residence granted to TCNs in the first Member 
State, which makes it necessary for LTRs to obtain a new residence permit in the second 
Member State; secondly, the possibility with which the second Member State has been 
provided to impose discretionary, and discriminatory, conditions on LTRs when they apply 
for a residence permit. In other words, the second Member State is free to maintain and apply 
their own immigration rules in considering the LTRs’ application for a residence/work permit 
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and, thus, the LTR Directive has failed to achieve the other objective of the Tampere 
Programme to approximate the various national laws on the conditions of admission and 
residence of LTRs across the Union. 
After it was established that LTRs have not been granted rights of movement and residence in 
the second State, the reasons for which the Union should ensure LTRs enjoy such rights were 
analysed. It was argued that it is against the rationale of the internal market to exclude LTRs 
from free movement in the EU and that providing LTRs (especially those who are 
economically active) with the rights of movement and residence within the Union is a 
prerequisite to the completion of the internal market project. Thus, it was suggested that the 
personal scope of the personal market freedoms is extended to economically active LTRs. 
It was also suggested that economically inactive LTRs should also be granted rights of 
movement and residence within the Union, similar to what EU citizens enjoy under the EU 
citizenship provisions. In other words, the personal scope of the citizenship provisions should 
be extended to LTRs. This suggestion was made in order to enhance the integration of LTRs 
into the EU’s society. It was argued that it is not possible to label LTRs as ‘different’, 
‘foreigner’, ‘alien’, ‘second-class resident’ and expect them to develop a sense of belonging 
to the EU’s society. Removing these labels and genuinely treating LTRs equally with 
Member State nationals, constitutes an efficient instrument for the integration of LTRs into 
the society. 
The second set of core rights of EU citizens, namely political rights, has been examined in 
chapter 4. The main and important difference between the rights of these groups was found in 
relation to electoral rights. In the EU, like most polities, these rights are associated with 
citizenship status. Only those who have the polity’s citizenship enjoy electoral rights. 
However, it was illustrated that the extension of EU citizens’ electoral rights to LTRs is in the 
interest of the Union. It was argued that the EU would benefit from the enfranchisement of 
LTRs in the European Parliament elections. These benefits were examined from three angles.  
The first angle was democracy. By reference to the leading democratic principles of 
affectedness, stakeholders, and coercion, it was illustrated that LTRs now form part of the EU 
demos and thus the EU’s democratic legitimacy would increase if a larger portion of its 
population is enfranchised. It was also said that as long as twenty million of its demos are 
excluded from the basic democratic rights, the EU will not be a fully democratic polity.   
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The second angle adopted in chapter 4 was promoting the integration of LTRs into society. It 
was shown that electoral rights are essential for the achievement of the integration of LTRs; 
and the EU, if it intends to accomplish its own-defined mission set out in EU immigration 
policies since 1999, must enfranchise LTRs in the EP elections.  
The third angle used in chapter 4 was the right to political participation for LTRs as members 
of the society. It was argued that imposing economic roles on LTRs which are identical to the 
roles defined for members of the EU society (i.e. EU citizens) makes LTRs members of the 
society. Moreover, the political rights available to LTRs must be in balance with the 
economic roles imposed on them. It was then concluded that it is a mandate for the EU, as a 
democratic institution, to provide all of its members with an equal opportunity to participate 
in political processes.  
 Long-term resident – an EU status for permanent residents of the Union? 
Finally, in chapter 5 I considered the capability of the LTR Directive to ‘approximating’ the 
status of long-term residence to that of EU citizenship, and i) whether the status of long-term 
residence can potentially become ‘a subsidiary form of EU citizenship’; ii) whether ‘a 
purposive interpretation by the Court will mean that LTRs will obtain similar treatment to 
European citizens in a number of areas in line with the Tampere objective, re-affirmed in the 
Stockholm programme, of equal treatment’. It was demonstrated that although long-term 
residence has some similarities to EU citizenship in terms of acquisition and withdrawal, 
long-term residence status is fundamentally different from EU citizenship in terms of 
characteristics. Moreover, a purposive interpretation by the Court does not seem to guarantee 
that LTRs obtain a similar treatment to EU citizen. EU citizens are provided with a protection 
against nationality discrimination in any matter which falls within the scope of EU law 
(Article 18 TFEU). This has enabled the Court to expand the rights of EU citizens by reading 
EU law provisions together with Article 18 TFEU. The LTR Directive, however, does not 
provide LTRs with such a protection. As a result, the Court will not be able to expand the 
rights of LTRs, and thus, it is unlikely that LTRs will obtain similar treatment to EU citizens. 
Moreover, the analysis of the Court’s judgments on the LTR Directive shows that the Court 
does not intend to expand the rights of LTRs in the same way that the rights of EU citizens 
have been expanded. It was demonstrated that when the applicant in a case is an EU citizen, 
the Court is prepared to ensure that the EU citizen is guaranteed the claimed right, even if the 
applicant does not fall within the personal or material scope of an EU law provision. On the 
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contrary, in the case of LTRs, the focus of the Court is to ensure the effectiveness of the LTR 
Directive. Thus, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Directive is, at best, likely 
to expand the rights of LTRs in the limited areas listed in the Directive.  
In chapter 5, I also argued that LTRs who have resided in a Member State for at least five 
years, and thus, have established a genuine link with the EU, are still treated as aliens. They 
are deprived of the advantages of EU citizenship. On the other hand, individuals who happen 
to have the nationality of a Member State, for instance through their parents, but do not have 
a genuine link with the Union’s society, are considered to be members of the Union. Thus, a 
nationality-based membership criterion does not seem to be appropriate for the EU. First, 
because, a supranational organisation requires a supranational membership model too. 
Secondly, residents of the Union who have established a genuine link with the Union’s 
society through residence, are possibly treated worse than those who have no genuine link 
with the Union’s society.  
It should be recalled that the one of the two main questions which this thesis intends to 
answer has been whether the LTR Directive is capable to achieve the Tampere Programme’s 
objectives. Based on the findings in this thesis, it can be concluded that integration of TCN 
residents in the EU was the engine of the Tampere Programme, but the Directive does not 
seem to be a suitable, powerful enough fuel for that engine. 
3. Policy Recommendations 
With regards to the integration of LTRs into the Union’s society, it is recommended that: 
1. The Union should not neglect the European dimension of the integration of LTRs. It 
was discussed in section 6 of chapter 2 that LTRs are not just members of the host 
State’s society. They are also members of the Union’s society and therefore, the 
Union should play a more active role in enhancing the integration of its society 
members.  
2. Any LTR may eventually become a Union citizen through naturalisation in the host 
State. The Union should start creating a genuine link with LTRs as soon as possible, 
e.g. once they become LTRs.  
3. As it was illustrated in chapter 2 the approach adopted in the LTR Directive is not in 
line with the approach recommended in the Tampere Programme and thus, is not capable of 
achieving the integration objectives of the Programme. If the Union, and the Member States 
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intend to achieve the objectives set out in the Tampere Programme, they should change their 
approach to the integration of LTRs, and adopt an inclusionary model to the integration of 
LTRs into the Union’s society. This is necessary for effectively achieving their own-defined 
objectives in the Tampere Programme, which were also reiterated in the Union’s immigration 
policy documents after the Tampere Programme. 
4. As discussed in this thesis, particularly chapter 2, the civic integration approach to 
the integration of migrants is not appropriate for the society of the Union; this model of 
integration assumes that the Union’s society is a homogenous one, and diversity is a bad 
thing. Such an approach, thus, ignores the realities of the Union’s society as a diverse society. 
Unlike the civic integration approach, the inclusionary approach of the Union to the 
integration of mobile-EU citizens and their TCN family members has proved to be effective 
and appropriate. Thus, it is the Union’s interest to implement the same approach to the 
integration of LTRs, which has already been approved to be effective.  
The lack of competence with regards to the integration of TCNs into the society will, of 
course, be an obstacle, therefore, I am not suggesting that integration measures should be 
harmonised across the Union, but, at least, a common direction, approach, and understanding 
of integration of LTRs should be agreed between all Member States. 
It is also submitted that: 
5. The integration conditions imposed by the second Member State undermine the 
value of residence in the first Member State. Such conditions ignore the role which residence 
plays in the integration of LTRs into the receiving society, and thus, should be removed from 
the future versions of the LTR Directive.  
With regards to giving LTRs rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens, it is 
submitted that: 
1. Before the LTR Directive, there was no expectation for the Union to recognise the 
rights of TCN residents. They were simply residents in one Member State, and their rights 
and status were governed by national laws. Now, LTRs are permanent residents of the Union, 
whose rights, status and immediate interests are governed by the Union law. 
2. Leading democratic principles of affectedness, stakeholders, and coercion were 
used in section 5.1 of chapter 4 to examine the position of the Union and LTRs in terms of 
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the political right of vote in the European Parliament elections. The exclusion of LTRs from 
access to electoral rights inevitably subjects a part of the EU’s population to EU legislation 
without representation. Since the adoption of the LTR Directive, LTRs are de jure permanent 
members of the Union’s society. It is not possible for the Union as a liberal and democratic 
organisation to ignore its permanent residents.  
3. As illustrated in sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 of chapter 4, enfranchising LTRs is 
supported by leading democratic principles, integration policies, and legitimate claims to 
equality. The enfranchisement of LTRs is not only a claim by LTRs but is also a duty for the 
EU owed to LTRs. Thus, the EU should extend the franchise to LTRs in the EP elections, i) 
in order to take a step towards its democratisation, ii) towards the achievement of the aims of 
its own immigration policy, and iii) towards equal treatment of all members of its society. 
4. Extending free movement rights of EU citizens to LTRs is a strong sign that LTRs 
are treated similarly to other members of the society. The Union should seize the opportunity 
provided by the LTR Directive to show its commitment to the inclusion of LTRs to the 
society by genuinely extending rights to move and reside within the territory of the Union. 
With regards to ensuring fair treatment of TCN residents in the Union, it is submitted that: 
1. Given that LTRs are members of the Union’s society, the Union should take fair 
treatment of its society’s members seriously. Moreover, the objective defined for the Union 
by the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Programme to ensure the fair treatment of TCN 
residents, the Union has a responsibility to ensure LTRs’ fair treatment. Allowing the 
Member States to impose  discretionary conditions on applicants for the status of long-term 
residence, or LTRs who move to a second Member State is obviously contrary to fair 
treatment of LTRs. 
With regards to approximating the status of TCN residents to that of EU citizens: 
1. The legal status granted to TCNs who are permanent residents in a Member State, 
changed the position of these TCNs from de facto members of the Union’s society to de jure 
members of this society. This status, however, as illustrated in section 4 of chapter 5, is far 
from equivalent to EU citizenship. The main difference between the status of long-term 
residence and EU citizenship is the general protection against nationality discrimination. 
Article 18 TFEU prohibits discrimination on the ground of nationality in any matter which 
falls within the material scope of EU law, while the LTR Directive’s protection against 
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nationality discrimination is limited to the areas listed in the Directive. A Member State is 
also free to impose discretionary and discriminatory conditions on LTRs who move to the 
territory of the Member State from another Member State. 
2. Before the LTR Directive, TCN residents were residents of a country which 
happened to be an EU Member State. The LTR Directive was a game-changing legislation, 
which brought the status of rights of LTRs within the scope of EU law. The Union should not 
ignore that millions of migrants who hold a status under EU law are permanent members of 
the EU’s society. 
3. By providing LTRs with the right to equal treatment with other members of the 
society (i.e. EU citizens), the Union shows its commitment to the inclusion of LTRs into the 
society. It is also a clear signal from the members of the society that they accept LTRs as new 
members of the society.  
4. Residence seems to be a more appropriate criterion for acquiring the status of EU 
citizenship. Thus, residence, also, should be the criterion to become EU citizen. Considering 
the political reality of the Union, especially the obsession of the Member States to control 
who holds the status of EU citizenship, I suggest that the status of long-term residence should 
be approximated to that of EU citizenship, without becoming EU citizenship (similar to the 
status of EEA nationals, who are not EU citizens but enjoy rights and protection under EU 
law).  
The second practical way is granting LTRs a supranational EU citizenship which is not 
dependant on the nationality of a Member State. In this way, Member States can maintain 
their control over who holds EU citizenship – i.e. Member States can still decide who can 
acquire their nationality and, through it, EU citizenship – but at the same time there can be a 
completely supranational EU citizenship status which does not require that Union citizens 
first acquire Member State nationality. The Member States can also be in charge of approving 
that supranational EU citizenship status, by, for instance, considering application for the 
status of long-term residence, and when all the conditions defined in the Directive (e.g. 5 
years residence, health insurance) are satisfied, then the status of long-term residence is 
granted by the Member State, but this status includes all the rights and benefits of EU 
citizenship (e.g. a general protection against nationality discrimination under Article 18 
TFEU, or the right to vote in the EP elections).  
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It should be acknowledged that in the current political environment in which rights and 
treatment of TCNs are highly politicized issues, any liberal change to the rights of LTRs 
might not be plausible. Thus, this thesis does not recommend the abolition of all differences 
between EU citizens and TCN long-term residents, e.g. by adding a legal basis for extending 
the right to vote in the EP elections to LTRs. Nevertheless, the illusion that the status granted 
by the LTR Directive is a subsidiary form of EU citizenship, which will be developed further 
by the Court, should not slow down the efforts to make LTR status a genuinely EU status.  
Moreover, at least those differences in treatment between EU citizens and LTRs which satisfy 
any of the following conditions, should be prohibited: (i) measures which cannot be logically 
justified; (ii) measures which do not contribute to the security of Europe; (iii) measures which 
collectively exclude LTRs from enjoying the rights of EU citizens and, thus, have a negative 
impact on the integration of LTRs into the society. One of the differences in treatment of 
LTRs which neither seems to be necessary, nor is logically justified and also collectively 
excludes LTRs from enjoying rights of EU citizens is the possibility for the host State to 
impose integration/language conditions on LTRs. As discussed in chapter 2 this margin of 
appreciation reserved for the Member States was added by three Member States during 
negotiations. As the Council had to vote unanimously at that time, other Member States had 
no choice but to accept the inclusion of this margin of appreciation in the Directive. Now that 
the model of decision making in the field of JHA has changed to qualified majority, if the 
Directive is amended this margin of appreciation which affects the effectiveness of the 
Directive can be removed, even if those three Member States vote against this amendment. 
This appears to be a practical solution for improving the effectiveness of the LTR Directive 
with regards to genuine integration of (inclusion) of LTRs into the EU society. Nevertheless, 
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